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The purpose of this report is to review the evidence on the profitability of technical 
analysis.  To achieve this purpose, the report comprehensively reviews survey, theoretical and 
empirical studies regarding technical trading strategies.  We begin by overviewing survey studies 
that have directly investigated market participants’ experience and views on technical analysis.  
The survey literature indicates that technical analysis has been widely used by market 
participants in futures markets and foreign exchange markets, and that about 30% to 40% of 
practitioners appear to believe that technical analysis is an important factor in determining price 
movement at shorter time horizons up to 6 months.  Then we provide an overview of theoretical 
models that include implications about the profitability of technical analysis.  Conventional 
efficient market theories, such as the martingale model and random walk models, rule out the 
possibility of technical trading profits in speculative markets, while relatively recent models such 
as noisy rational expectation models or behavioral models suggest that technical trading 
strategies may be profitable due to noise in the market or investors’ irrational behavior.  Finally, 
empirical studies are surveyed. In this report, the empirical literature is categorized into two 
groups, “early” and “modern” studies, according to the characteristics of testing procedures.   
Early studies indicated that technical trading strategies were profitable in foreign 
exchange markets and futures markets, but not in stock markets before the 1980s.  Modern 
studies indicated that technical trading strategies consistently generated economic profits in a 
variety of speculative markets at least until the early 1990s.  Among a total of 92 modern studies, 
58 studies found positive results regarding technical trading strategies, while 24 studies obtained 
negative results.  Ten studies indicated mixed results. Despite the positive evidence on the 
profitability of technical trading strategies, it appears that most empirical studies are subject to 
various problems in their testing procedures, e.g., data snooping, ex post selection of trading 
rules or search technologies, and difficulties in estimation of risk and transaction costs.  Future 
research must address these deficiencies in testing in order to provide conclusive evidence on the 
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Technical analysis is a forecasting method of price movements using past prices, volume, 
and open interest.
2  Pring (2002), a leading technical analyst, provides a more specific definition: 
 
“The technical approach to investment is essentially a reflection of the idea that prices 
move in trends that are determined by the changing attitudes of investors toward a variety 
of economic, monetary, political, and psychological forces.  The art of technical analysis, 
for it is an art, is to identify a trend reversal at a relatively early stage and ride on that 
trend until the weight of the evidence shows or proves that the trend has reversed.” (p. 2) 
 
Technical analysis includes a variety of forecasting techniques such as chart analysis, pattern 
recognition analysis, seasonality and cycle analysis, and computerized technical trading systems.  
However, academic research on technical analysis is generally limited to techniques that can be 
expressed in mathematical forms, namely technical trading systems, although some recent 
studies attempt to test visual chart patterns using pattern recognition algorithms.  A technical 
trading system consists of a set of trading rules that result from parameterizations, and each 
trading rule generates trading signals (long, short, or out of market) according to their parameter 
values.  Several popular technical trading systems are moving averages, channels, and 
momentum oscillators. 
 
Since Charles H. Dow first introduced the Dow theory in the late 1800s, technical 
analysis has been extensively used among market participants such as brokers, dealers, fund 
managers, speculators, and individual investors in the financial industry.
3  Numerous surveys 
indicate that practitioners attribute a significant role to technical analysis.  For example, futures 
fund managers rely heavily on computer-guided technical trading systems (Irwin and Brorsen 
1985; Brorsen and Irwin 1987; Billingsley and Chance 1996), and about 30% to 40% of foreign 
exchange traders around the world believe that technical analysis is the major factor determining 
exchange rates in the short-run up to six months (e.g., Menkhoff 1997; Cheung and Wong 2000; 
Cheung, Chinn, and Marsh 2000; Cheung and Chinn 2001). 
 
In contrast to the views of many practitioners, most academics are skeptical about 
technical analysis.  Rather, they tend to believe that markets are informationally efficient and 
hence all available information is impounded in current prices (Fama 1970).  In efficient markets, 
therefore, any attempts to make profits by exploiting currently available information are futile.  
In a famous passage, Samuelson (1965) argues that: 
 
                                                 
2 In futures markets, open interest is defined as “the total number of open transactions” (Leuthold, Junkus, and 
Cordier 1989). 
 
3 In fact, the history of technical analysis dates back to at least the 18
th century when the Japanese developed a form 
of technical analysis known as candlestick charting techniques.  This technique was not introduced to the West until 
the 1970s (Nison 1991).   2 
“…there is no way of making an expected profit by extrapolating past changes in the 
  futures price, by chart or any other esoteric devices of magic or mathematics.  The market 
  quotation already contains in itself all that can be known about the future and in that 
  sense has discounted future contingencies as much as is humanly possible.” (p. 44) 
 
Nevertheless, in recent decades rigorous theoretical explanations for the widespread use 
of technical analysis have been developed based on noisy rational expectation models (Treynor 
and Ferguson 1985; Brown and Jennings 1989; Grundy and McNichols 1989; Blume, Easley, 
and O’Hara 1994), behavioral (or feedback) models (De Long et al. 1990a, 1991; Shleifer and 
Summers 1990), disequilibrium models (Beja and Goldman 1980), herding models (Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein 1992), agent-based models (Schmidt 2002), and chaos theory (Clyde and 
Osler 1997).  For example, Brown and Jennings (1989) demonstrated that under a noisy rational 
expectations model in which current prices do not fully reveal private information (signals) 
because of noise (unobserved current supply of a risky asset) in the current equilibrium price, 
historical prices (i.e., technical analysis) together with current prices help traders make more 
precise inferences about past and present signals than do current prices alone (p. 527).   
 
Since Donchian (1960), numerous empirical studies have tested the profitability of 
technical trading rules in a variety of markets for the purpose of either uncovering profitable 
trading rules or testing market efficiency, or both.  Most studies have concentrated on stock 
markets, both in the US and outside the US, and foreign exchange markets, while a smaller 
number of studies have analyzed futures markets.  Before the mid-1980s, the majority of the 
technical trading studies simulated only one or two trading systems.  In these studies, although 
transaction costs were deducted to compute net returns of technical trading strategies, risk was 
not adequately handled, statistical tests of trading profits and data snooping problems were often 
disregarded, and out-of-sample verification along with parameter (trading rule) optimization 
were not considered in the testing procedure.  After the mid-1980s, however, technical trading 
studies greatly improved upon the drawbacks of early studies and typically included some of the 
following features in their testing procedures: (1) the number of trading systems tested increased 
relative to early studies; (2) returns were adjusted for transaction costs and risk; (3) parameter 
(trading rule) optimization and the out-of-sample verification were conducted; and (4) statistical 
tests were performed with either conventional statistical tests or more sophisticated bootstrap 
methods, or both. 
 
The purpose of this report is to review the evidence on the profitability of technical 
analysis.  To achieve this purpose, the report comprehensively reviews survey, theoretical and 
empirical studies regarding technical analysis and discusses the consistency and reliability of 
technical trading profits across markets and over time.  Despite a recent explosion in the 
literature on technical analysis, no study has surveyed the literature systematically and 
comprehensively.  The report will pay special attention to testing procedures used in empirical 
studies and identify their salient features and weaknesses.  This will improve general 
understanding of the profitability of technical trading strategies and suggest directions for future 
research.  Empirical studies surveyed include those that tested technical trading systems, trading 
rules formulated by genetic algorithms or some statistical models (e.g., ARIMA), and chart 
patterns that can be represented algebraically.  The majority of the studies were collected from   3 
academic journals published from 1960 to the present and recent working papers.  Only a few 




Survey studies attempt to directly investigate market participants’ behavior and 
experiences, and document their views on how a market works.  These features cannot be easily 
observed in typical data sets.  The oldest survey study regarding technical analysis dates back to 
Stewart (1949), who analyzed the trading behavior of customers of a large Chicago futures 
commission firm over the 1924-1932 period.  The result indicated that in general traders were 
unsuccessful in their grain futures trading, regardless of their scale and knowledge of the 
commodity traded.  Amateur speculators were more likely to be long than short in futures 
markets.  Long positions generally were taken on days of price declines, while short positions 
were initiated on days of price rises.  Thus, trading against the current movement of prices 
appeared to be dominant.  However, a representative successful speculator showed a tendency to 
buy on reversals in price movement during upward price swings and sell on upswings that 
followed declines in prices, suggesting that successful speculators followed market trends. 
 
Smidt (1965a) surveyed trading activities of amateur traders in the US commodity futures 
markets in 1961.
4  In this survey, about 53% of respondents claimed that they used charts either 
exclusively or moderately in order to identify trends.  The chartists, whose jobs hardly had 
relation to commodity information, tended to trade more commodities in comparison to the other 
traders (non-chartists).  Only 24% of the chartists had been trading for six or more years, while 
42% of non-chartists belonged to the same category.  There was a slight tendency for chartists to 
pyramid more frequently than other traders.
5  It is interesting to note that only 10% of the 
chartists, compared to 29% of the non-chartists, nearly always took long positions. 
 
The Group of Thirty (1985) surveyed the views of market participants on the functioning 
of the foreign exchange market in 1985.  The respondents were composed of 40 large banks and 
15 securities houses in 12 countries.  The survey results indicated that 97% of bank respondents 
and 87% of the securities houses believed that the use of technical analysis had a significant 
impact on the market.  The Group of Thirty reported that “Technical trading systems, involving 
computer models and charts, have become the vogue, so that the market reacts more sharply to 
short term trends and less attention is given to basic factors (p. 14).” 
 
Brorsen and Irwin (1987) carried out a survey of large public futures funds’ advisory 
groups in 1986.  In their survey, more than half of the advisors responded that they relied heavily 
on computer-guided technical trading systems.  Most fund advisors appeared to use technical 
trading rules by optimizing parameters of their trading systems over historical data whose 
amounts varied by advisors, with two years being the smallest amount.  Because of liquidity 
costs, futures funds held 80% of their positions in the nearby contract, and the average number of 
                                                 
4 In this survey, an amateur trader was defined as “a trader who was not a hedger, who did not earn most of his 
income from commodity trading, and who did not spend most of his time in commodity trading (p. 7).” 
 
5 Pyramiding occurs when a trader adds to the size of his/her open position after a price has moved in the direction 
he/she had predicted.     4 
commodities they traded had been quite constant through time.  Since technically traded public 
and private futures funds were estimated to control an average of 23% of the open interest in ten 
important futures markets, the funds seemed large enough to move prices if they traded in unison 
(p. 133). 
 
Frankel and Froot (1990) showed that switching a forecasting method for another over 
time may explain changes in the demand for dollars in foreign exchange markets.  The evidence 
provided was the survey results of Euromoney magazine for foreign exchange forecasting firms.  
According to the magazine, in 1978, nineteen forecasting firms exclusively used fundamental 
analysis and only three firms technical analysis.  After 1983, however, the distribution had been 
reversed.  In 1983, only one firm reported using fundamental analysis, and eight technical 
analysis.  In 1988, seven firms appeared to rely on fundamental analysis while eighteen firms 
employed technical analysis.     
 
Taylor and Allen (1992) conducted a survey on the use of technical analysis among chief 
foreign exchange dealers in the London market in 1988.  The results indicated that 64% of 
respondents reported using moving averages and/or other trend-following systems and 40% 
reported using other trading systems such as momentum indicators or oscillators.  In addition, 
approximately 90% of respondents reported that they were using some technical analysis when 
forming their exchange rate expectations at the shortest horizons (intraday to one week), with 
60% viewing technical analysis to be at least as important as fundamental analysis.   
 
Menkhoff (1997) investigated the behavior of foreign exchange professionals such as 
dealers or fund managers in Germany in 1992.  His survey revealed that 87% of the dealers 
placed a weight of over 10% to technical analysis in their decision making.  The mean value of 
the importance of technical analysis appeared to be 35% and other professionals also showed 
similar responses.  Respondents believed that technical analysis influenced their decision from 
intraday to 2-6 months by giving a weight of between 34% and 40%.  Other interesting findings 
were: (1) professionals preferring technical analysis were younger than other participants; (2) 
there was no relationship between institutional size and the preferred use of technical analysis; 
and (3) chartists and fundamentalists both indicated no significant differences in their 
educational level.   
 
Lui and Mole (1998) surveyed the use of technical and fundamental analysis by foreign 
exchange dealers in Hong Kong in 1995.  The dealers believed that technical analysis was more 
useful than fundamental analysis in forecasting both trends and turning points.  Similar to 
previous survey results, technical analysis appeared to be important to dealers at the shorter time 
horizons up to 6 months.  Respondents considered moving averages and/or other trend-following 
systems the most useful technical analysis.  The typical length of historical period used by the 
dealers was 12 months and the most popular data frequency was daily data.   
 
Cheung and Wong (2000) investigated practitioners in the interbank foreign exchange 
markets in Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Singapore in 1995.  Their survey results indicated that about 
40% of the dealers believed that technical trading is the major factor determining exchange rates 
in the medium run (within 6 months), and even in the long run about 17% believed technical 
trading is the most important determining factor.   5 
 
Cheung, Chinn, and Marsh (2000) surveyed the views of UK-based foreign exchange 
dealers on technical anaysis in 1998.  In this survey, 33% of the respondents described 
themselves as technical analysts and the proportion increased by approximately 20% compared 
to that of five years ago.  Moreover, 26% of the dealers responded that technical trading is the 
most important factor that determines exchange rate movements over the medium run. 
 
Cheung and Chinn (2001) published survey results for US-based foreign exchange 
traders conducted in 1998.  In the survey, about 30% of the traders indicated that technical 
trading best describes their trading strategy.  Five yeas earlier, only 19% of traders had judged 
technical trading as their trading practice.  About 31% of the traders responded that technical 
trading was the primary factor determining exchange rate movements up to 6 months.    
 
Oberlechner (2001) reported findings from a survey on the importance of technical and 
fundamental analysis among foreign exchange traders and financial journalists in Frankfurt, 
London, Vienna, and Zurich in 1996.  For foreign exchange traders, technical analysis seemed to 
be a more important forecasting tool than fundamental analysis up to a 3-month forecasting 
horizon, while for financial journalists it seemed to be more important up to 1-month.  However, 
forecasting techniques differed in trading locations on shorter forecasting horizons.  From 
intraday to a 3-month forecasting horizon, traders in smaller trading locations (Vienna and 
Zurich) placed more weight on technical analysis than did traders in larger trading locations 
(London and Frankfurt).  Traders generally used a mixture of both technical and fundamental 
analysis in their trading practices.  Only 3% of the traders exclusively used one of the two 
forecasting techniques.  Finally, comparing the survey results for foreign exchange traders in 
London to the previous results of Taylor and Allen (1992), the importance of technical analysis 
appeared to increase across all trading horizons relative to 1988 (the year when Taylor and Allen 
conducted a survey).          
   
In sum, survey studies indicate that technical analysis has been widely used by 
practitioners in futures markets and foreign exchange markets, and regarded as an important 
factor in determining price movements at shorter time horizons.  However, no survey evidence 




The Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
 
  The efficient markets hypothesis has long been a dominant paradigm in describing the 
behavior of prices in speculative markets.  Working (1949, p. 160) provided an early version of 
the hypothesis:  
 
If it is possible under any given combination of circumstances to predict future price 
  changes and have the predictions fulfilled, it follows that the market expectations must 
  have been defective; ideal market expectations would have taken full account of the 
  information which permitted successful prediction of the price changes.   
   6 
In later work, he revised his definition of a perfect futures market to “… one in which the market 
price would constitute at all times the best estimate that could be made, from currently available 
information, of what the price would be at the delivery date of the futures contracts (Working, 
1962, p. 446).”  This definition of a perfect futures market is in essence identical to the famous 
definition of an efficient market given by Fama (1970, p. 383): “A market in which prices always 
‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient’.”  Since Fama’s survey study was 
published, this definition of an efficient market has long served as the standard definition in the 
financial economics literature.   
 
A more practical definition of an efficient market is given by Jensen (1978, p. 96) who 
wrote: “A market is efficient with respect to information set  t q  if it is impossible to make 
economic profits by trading on the basis of information set  t q .”  Since the economic profits are 
risk-adjusted returns after deducting transaction costs, Jensen’s definition implies that market 
efficiency may be tested by considering the net profits and risk of trading strategies based on 
information set  t q .  Timmermann and Granger (2004, p. 25) extended Jensen’s definition by 
specifying how the information variables in  t q  are used in actual forecasting.  Their definition is 
as follows:  
 
  A market is efficient with respect to the information set,  , t q  search technologies,  , t S  and 
  forecasting models,  , t M  if it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the 
  basis of signals produced from a forecasting model in  t M  defined over predictor 
  variables in the information set  t q  and selected using a search technology in  . t S
6 
 
On the other hand, Jensen (1978, p. 97) grouped the various versions of the efficient markets 
hypothesis into the following three testable forms based on the definition of the information set 
t q : 
 
(1) the Weak Form of the Efficient markets hypothesis, in which the information set  t q  is 
taken to be solely the information contained in the past price history of the market as 
of time t.   
 
(2) the Semi-strong Form of the Efficient markets hypothesis, in which  t q  is taken to be 
all information that is publicly available at time t.  (This includes, of course, the past 
history of prices so the weak form is just a restricted version of this.) 
 
(3) the Strong Form of the Efficient markets hypothesis, in which  t q  is taken to be all 
information known to anyone at time t. 
 
Thus, technical analysis provides a weak form test of market efficiency because it heavily uses 
past price history.  Testing the efficient markets hypothesis empirically requires more specific 
                                                 
6 Timmermann and Granger used Wt as a symbol for the information set.  The symbol, Wt, has been changed to qt for 
consistency.     7 
models that can describe the process of price formation when prices fully reflect available 
information.  In this context, two specific models of efficient markets, the martingale model and 
the random walk model, are explained next. 
 
The Martingale Model 
 
In the mid-1960s, Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) independently demonstrated 
that a sequence of prices of an asset is a martingale (or a fair game) if it has unbiased price 
changes.  A martingale stochastic process  } { t P is expressed as:  
t t t t P P P P E = - + ) , , | ( 1 1 K ,                     (1) 
or equivalently,  
, 0 ) , , | ( 1 1 = - - + K t t t t P P P P E           (2)                        
where  t P  is a price of an asset at time t.  Equation (1) states that tomorrow’s price is expected to 
be equal to today’s price, given knowledge of today’s price and of past prices of the asset.  
Equivalently, (2) states that the asset’s expected price change (or return) is zero when 
conditioned on the asset’s price history.  The martingale process does not imply that successive 
price changes are independent.  It just suggests that the correlation coefficient between these 
successive price changes will be zero, given information about today’s price and past prices.  
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, p. 30) stated that: 
 
  In fact, the martingale was long considered to be a necessary condition for an efficient 
  asset market, one in which the information contained in past prices is instantly, fully, and 
  perpetually reflected in the asset’s current price.  If the market is efficient, then it should 
  not be possible to profit by trading on the information contained in the asset’s price 
  history; hence the conditional expectation of future price changes, conditional on the 
  price history, cannot be either positive or negative (if short sales are feasible) and 
  therefore must be zero. 
 
Thus, the assumptions of the martingale model eliminate the possibility of technical trading rules 
based only on price history that have expected returns in excess of equilibrium expected returns.  
Another aspect of the martingale model is that it implicitly assumes risk neutrality.  However, 
since investors are generally risk-averse, in practice it is necessary to properly incorporate risk 
factors into the model.   
   
As a special case of the fair game model, Fama (1970) suggested the sub-martingale 
model, which can be expressed as:  
    t j t t j P P E , 1 , ) |
~
( ‡ + q , or equivalently,  . 0 ) | ~ ( 1 , ‡ + t t j r E q       (3) 
where  t j P ,  is the price of security j at time t;  1 , + t j P  is its price at  ; 1 + t   1 , + t j r  is the one-period 
percentage return  t j t j t j P P P , , 1 , / ) ( - + ;  t q  is a general symbol for whatever set of information is 
assumed to be “fully reflected” in the price at t: and the tildes indicate that  1 , + t j P  and  1 , + t j r  are 
random variables at t.  This states that the expected value of next period’s price based on the 
information available at time t,  t q , is equal to or greater than the current price.  Equivalently, it 
says that the expected returns and price changes are equal to or greater than zero.  If (3) holds as   8 
an equality, then the price sequence  } { ,t j P  for security j follows a martingale with respect to the 
information sequence  } { t q .  An important empirical implication of the sub-martingale model is 
that no trading rules based only on the information set  t q  can have greater expected returns than 
ones obtained by following a buy-and-hold strategy in a future period.  Fama (1970, p. 386) 
emphasized that “Tests of such rules will be an important part of the empirical evidence on the 
efficient markets model.”   
 
Random Walk Models 
 
The idea of the random walk model goes back to Bachelier (1900) who developed several 
models of price behavior for security and commodity markets.
7  One of his models is the 
simplest form of the random walk model: if  t P  is the unit price of an asset at the end of time t, 
then it is assumed that the increment  t t P P - +t  is an independent and normally distributed random 
variable with zero mean and variance proportional to  . t   The random walk model may be 
regarded as an extension of the martingale model in the sense that it provides more details about 
the economic environment.  The martingale model implies that the conditions of market 
equilibrium can be stated in terms of the first moment, and thus it tells us little about the details 
of the stochastic process generating returns. 
 
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) summarize various versions of random walk 
models as the following three models, based on the distributional characteristics of increments.  
Random walk model 1 (RW1) is the simplest version of the random walk hypothesis in which 
the dynamics of  } { t P  are given by the following equation: 
      t t t P P e m + + = -1 ,  ), , 0 ( ~
2 s e IID t          (4) 
where  m  is the expected price change or drift, and  ) , 0 (
2 s IID  denotes that  t e  is independently 
and identically distributed with mean 0 and variance  .
2 s   The independence of increments  t e  
implies that the random walk process is also a fair game, but in a much stronger sense than the 
martingale process: independence implies not only that increments are uncorrelated, but that any 
nonlinear functions of the increments are also uncorrelated.  Fama (1970, p. 386) stated that “In 
the early treatments of the efficient markets model, the statement that the current price of a 
security ‘fully reflects’ available information was assumed to imply that successive price 
changes (or more usually, successive one-period returns) are independent.  In addition, it was 
usually assumed that successive changes (or returns) are identically distributed.”  However, the 
assumption of identically distributed increments has been questioned for financial asset prices 
over long time spans because of frequent changes in the economic, technological, institutional, 
and regulatory environment surrounding the asset prices.   
 
                                                 
7 Working (1934) independently developed the idea of a random walk model for price movements.  Although he 
never mentioned the “random walk model,” Working suggested that many economic time series resemble a 
“random-difference series,” which is simply a different label for the same statistical model.  He emphasized that in 
the statistical analysis of time series showing the characteristics of the random-difference series in important degree, 
it is essential for certain purposes to have such a standard series to provide a basis for statistical tests (p. 16), and 
found that wheat price changes resembled a random-difference series.   9 
Random walk model 2 (RW2) relaxes the assumptions of RW1 to include processes with 
independent but non-identically distributed increments  : ) ( t e  
      t t t P P e m + + = -1 ,  ). , 0 ( ~
2
t t INID s e          (5) 
RW2 can be regarded as a more general price process in that, for example, it allows for 
unconditional heteroskedasticity in the  t e ’s, a particularly useful feature given the time-variation 
in volatility of many financial asset return series.    
 
Random walk model 3 (RW3) is an even more general version of the random walk 
hypothesis, which is obtained by relaxing the independence assumption of RW2 to include 
processes with dependent but uncorrelated increments.  For example, a process that has the 
following properties satisfies the assumptions of RW3 but not of RW1 and RW2: 
0 ] , [ 1 = - t t Cov e e  for all  0 „ k , but where  0 ] , [
2
1
2 „ - t t Cov e e  for some  . 0 „ k   This process has 
uncorrelated increments but is evidently not independent because its squared increments are 
correlated.   
 
Fama and Blume (1966) argued that, in most cases, the martingale model and the random 
walk model are indistinguishable because the martingale’s degree of dependence is so small, and 
hence for all practical purposes they are the same.  Nevertheless, Fama (1970) emphasized that 
market efficiency does not require the random walk model.  From the viewpoint of the sub-
martingale model, the market is still efficient unless returns of technical trading rules exceed 
those of the buy-and-hold strategy, even though price changes (increments) in a market indicate 
small dependence.  In fact, the martingale model does not preclude any significant effects in 
higher order conditional moments since it assumes the existence of the first moment (expected 
return) only.   
 
Noisy Rational Expectations Models 
 
  The efficient markets model implies instantaneous adjustment of price to new 
information by assuming that the current equilibrium price fully impounds all available 
information.  It implicitly assumes that market participants are rational and they have 
homogeneous beliefs about information.  In contrast, noisy rational expectations equilibrium 
models assume that the current price does not fully reveal all available information because of 
noise (unobserved current supply of a risky asset or information quality) in the current 
equilibrium price.  Thus, price shows a pattern of systematic slow adjustment to new information 
and this implies the existence of profitable trading opportunities.   
 
  Noisy rational expectations equilibrium models were developed on the basis of 
asymmetric information among market participants.  Working (1958) first developed a model in 
which traders are divided into two groups: a large group of well-informed and skillful traders and 
a small group of ill-informed and unskillful traders.  In his model, some traders seek to get 
pertinent market information ahead of the rest, while others seek information that gives advance 
indication of future events.  Since there exist many different pieces of information that influence 
prices, price tends to change gradually and frequently.  The tendency of gradual price changes 
results in very short-term predictability.  In the process, traders who make their decision on the 
basis of new information may seek quick profits or take their losses quickly, because they may   10 
regard an adverse price movement as a signal that the price is reflecting other information which 
they do not possess.  Meanwhile, ill-qualified traders who have little opportunity to acquire 
valuable information early and little ability to interpret the information if any may choose to “go 
with the market.”    
 
Smidt (1965b) developed another early model in this area and provided the first 
theoretical foundation for the possibility of profitable technical trading rules by taking account of 
the speed and efficiency with which a speculative market responds to new information.  He 
hypothesized two futures markets.  The first market is an ideal one where all traders are 
immediately and simultaneously aware of any new information pertaining to the price of futures 
contracts.  The second market has two types of traders, “insiders” and “outsiders.”  While 
insiders are traders who learn about new information relatively early, outsiders are traders who 
only hear about the new information after insiders have heard about it.  According to Smidt, if all 
traders are equally well informed as in the ideal market or if insiders perfectly predict subsequent 
outsiders’ behavior, there exists only a limited possibility of profits for technical traders.  Even if 
insiders do not always perfectly anticipate outsiders, technical analysis may have no value if 
insiders are as likely to underestimate as to overestimate the outsiders’ response to new 
information.  However, if insiders do not perfectly predict outsiders’ behavior and hence there is 
a systematic tendency for a price rise or fall to be followed by a subsequent further rise or fall, 
then technical traders may earn long-run profits in a market, even in the absence of price trends.  
Thus, Smidt argued that “evidence that a trading system generates positive profits that are not 
simply the results of following a trend also constitutes evidence of market imperfections” 
(p.130).   
 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) developed a formal noisy rational expectations model 
in which there is an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium.  They demonstrated that, in a 
competitive market, no one has an incentive to obtain costly information if the market-clearing 
price reflects all available information, and thus the competitive market breaks down.  Like 
Smidt’s framework, Grossman and Stiglitz’s model also assumes two types of traders, 
“informed” and “uninformed,” depending on whether they paid a cost to obtain information.  
When price reflects all available information, each informed trader in a competitive market feels 
they could stop paying for information and do as well as uninformed traders.  But all informed 
traders feel this way.  Therefore, if a market is informationally efficient, then having any positive 
fraction informed is not an equilibrium.  Conversely, having no one informed is also not an 
equilibrium since each trader feels that they could make profits from becoming informed.   
 
Grossman and Stiglitz further demonstrated that if information is very inexpensive, or if 
informed traders have very precise information, then equilibrium exists and the speculative 
market price will reveal most of the informed traders’ information.  However, such a market will 
be very thin because it can be made of traders with almost homogeneous beliefs.  Grossman and 
Stiglitz’s model supports the weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis in which no profits 
are made from looking at price history because their model assumes uninformed traders have 
rational expectations.  What is not supported by their model is the strong form of the efficient 
markets hypothesis because prices are unable to fully reflect all private information and thus the 
informed do a better job in allocating their portfolio than the uninformed.   
   11 
In contrast to Grossman and Stiglitz, Hellwig (1982) showed that if the time span 
between successive market transactions is short, the market can approximate full informational 
efficiency closely, but the returns to the informed traders can be greater than zero.  The 
Grossman-Stiglitz conclusion resulted from the assumption that traders learn from current prices 
before any transactions at these prices take place, while Hellwig assumes that traders draw 
information only from past equilibrium prices at which transactions have actually been 
completed.  Thus, the informed have time to use their information before other traders have 
inferred it from the market price and can make positive returns, which in turn provide an 
incentive to spend resources on information.   
 
In Hellwig’s model, the market cannot be informationally efficient if traders learn from 
past prices rather than current prices, because the information contained in the current price is 
not yet ‘correctly evaluated’ by uninformed traders.  However, the deviation from informational 
efficiency is small if the period is short, since the underlying stochastic processes are continuous 
and have only small increments in a short time interval. That is, the news of any one period is 
insignificant and thus the informational advantage of informed traders is small.  This implies that 
the equilibrium price in any period must be close to an informationally efficient market level.  
Despite their small informational advantage, however, informed traders can make positive 
returns by taking very large positions in their transactions.  Therefore, the return to being 
informed in one period is prevented from being zero and the market approaches full 
informational efficiency.   
 
Treynor and Ferguson (1985) showed that if technical analysis is combined with non-
public information that may change the price of an asset, then it could be useful in achieving 
unusual profit in a speculative market.  In their model, an investor obtaining non-public 
information privately must decide how to act.  If the investor receives the information before the 
market does and establishes an appropriate position, then they can expect a profit from the 
change in price that is forthcoming when the market receives the information.  If the investor 
receives the information after the market does, then they do not take the position.  The investor 
uses past prices to compute the probability that the market has already incorporated the 
information.  Treynor and Ferguson measured such profitability using Bayes’ theorem 
conditioned on past prices.  However, they pointed out that the investor’s profit opportunity is 
created by the non-price information but not the past prices.  Past prices only help exploit the 
information efficiently.   
 
Brown and Jennings (1989) proposed a two-period noisy rational expectations model in 
which a current (second-period) price is dominated as an informative source by a weighted 
average of past (first-period) and current prices.  According to these authors, if the current price 
depends on noise (i.e., unobserved current supply of a risky asset) as well as private information 
of market participants, it cannot be a sufficient statistic for private information.  Moreover, noise 
in the current equilibrium price does not allow for price to fully reveal all publicly available 
information provided by price histories.  Therefore, past prices together with current prices 
enable investors to make more accurate inferences about past and present signals than do current 
prices alone.  Brown and Jennings demonstrated that technical analysis based on past prices has 
value in every myopic-investor economy in which current prices are not fully revealing of   12 
private information and traders have rational conjectures about the relation between prices and 
signals.   
  
Grundy and McNichols (1989) independently introduced a multi-period noisy rational 
expectations model analogous to that in Brown and Jennings (1989).  Their model is also similar 
to the model in Hellwig (1982) in that a sequence of prices fully reveals average private signals 
) (Y as the number of rounds of trade becomes infinite, although Hellwig assumed that per capita 
supply is observable but traders cannot condition their demand on the current price.  In Grundy 
and McNichols’ model, supply is unobservable but traders are able to condition their demand on 
the current price.  In particular, they conjectured that when supply is perfectly correlated across 
rounds, Y  can be revealed with just two rounds of trade.  In the first round of trade, an 
exogenous supply shock keeps price from fully revealing the average private signal  . Y   
Allowing a second round of trade leads to one of two types of equilibria: non-Y -revealing and 
Y -revealing.  In the non-Y -revealing equilibrium, traders have homogeneous beliefs concerning 
the second-round price.  Thus, traders do not learn about Y  from the second round of trade and 
continue to hold their Pareto-optimal allocations from the first round.  The market will again 
clear at the price of the first round and no trade takes place in the second round.  In the Y -
revealing equilibrium, Pareto-optimal allocations are not achieved in the first round and traders 
do not have concordant beliefs concerning the second-round price, since the sequence of prices, 
i.e., prices of the first and second rounds, reveals  . Y   Traders do not learn Y  from the second-
round price alone but do learn it from the price sequence.  Trade thus takes place at both the first 
and second rounds even without new public (or private) information.  In the Y -revealing 
equilibrium, rational traders are chartists and their risk-sharing behavior leads to trade.   
 
Blume, Easley, and O’Hara (1994) developed an equilibrium model that emphasizes the 
informational roles of volume and technical analysis.  Unlike previous equilibrium models that 
considered the aggregate supply of a risky asset as the source of noise, their model assumes that 
the source of noise is the quality of information.  They showed that volume provides 
“information about the quality of traders’ information” that cannot be conveyed by prices, and 
thus, observing the price and the volume statistics together can be more informative than 
observing the price statistic alone.  In their model, technical analysis is valuable because current 
market statistics may be insufficient to reveal all information.  They argued that “Because the 
underlying uncertainty in the economy is not resolved in one period, sequences of market 
statistics can provide information that is not impounded in a single market price” (p. 177).  The 
value of technical analysis depends on the quality of information.  Technical analysis can be 
more valuable if past price and volume data possess higher-quality information, and be less 
valuable if there is less to be learned from the data.  In any case, technical analysis helps traders 
to correctly update their views on the market.   
 
Noise Traders and Feedback Models 
 
  In the early 1990s, several financial economists developed the field of behavioral finance, 
which is “finance from a broader social science perspective including psychology and sociology” 
(Shiller 2003, p. 83).  In the behavioral finance model, there are two types of investors: 
arbitrageurs (also called sophisticated investors or smart money) and noise traders (feedback   13 
traders or liquidity traders).  Arbitrageurs are defined as investors who form fully rational 
expectations about security returns, while noise traders are investors who irrationally trade on 
noise as if it were information (Black 1986).  Noise traders may obtain their pseudosignals from 
technical analysts, brokers, or economic consultants and irrationally believe that these signals 
impound information.  The behavioralists’ approach, also known as feedback models, is then 
based on two assumptions.  First, noise traders’ demand for risky assets is affected by their 
irrational beliefs or sentiments that are not fully justified by news or fundamental factors.  
Second, since arbitrageurs are likely to be risk averse, arbitrage, defined as trading by fully 
rational investors not subject to such sentiment, is risky and therefore limited (Shleifer and 
Summers 1990, p. 19).   
 
In feedback models, noise traders buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall, like 
trend chasers.  For example, when noise traders follow positive feedback strategies (buy when 
prices rise), this increases aggregate demand for an asset they purchased and thus results in a 
further price increase.  Arbitrageurs having short horizons may think that the asset is mispriced 
above its fundamental value, and sell it short.  However, their arbitrage is limited because it is 
always possible that the market will perform very well (fundamental risk) and that the asset will 
be even more overpriced by noise traders in the near future because they can be even more 
optimistic (“noise trader risk,” De Long et al. 1990a).  As long as there exists risk created by the 
unpredictability of noise traders’ opinions, sophisticated investors’ arbitrage will be reduced 
even in the absence of fundamental risk and thus they do not fully counter the effects of the noise 
traders.  Rather, it may be optimal for arbitrageurs to jump on the “bandwagon” themselves.  
Arbitrageurs optimally buy the asset that noise traders have purchased and sell it out much later 
when its price rises high enough.  Therefore, although ultimately arbitrageurs make prices return 
to their fundamental levels, in the short run they amplify the effect of noise traders (De Long et 
al. 1990b).  On the other hand, when noise traders are pessimistic and thus follow negative 
feedback strategies, downward price movement drives further price decreases and over time this 
process eventually creates a negative bubble.  In the feedback models, since noise traders may be 
more aggressive than arbitrageurs due to their overoptimistic (or overpessimistic) or 
overconfident views on markets, they bear more risk with higher expected returns.  As long as 
risk-return tradeoffs exist, noise traders may earn higher returns than arbitrageurs.  De Long et al. 
(1991) further showed that even in the long run noise traders as a group survive and dominate the 
market in terms of wealth despite their excessive risk taking and excessive consumption.  Hence, 
the feedback models suggest that technical trading profits may be available even in the long run 
if technical trading strategies (buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall) are based on noise 
or “popular models” and not on information such as news or fundamental factors (Shleifer and 




Additional models provide support for the use of technical analysis.  Beja and Goldman 
(1980) introduced a simple disequilibrium model that explained the dynamic behavior of prices 
in the short run.  The rationale behind their model was, “When price movements are forced by 
supply and demand imbalances which may take time to clear, a nonstationary economy must 
experience at least some transient moments of disequilibrium.  Observed prices will then depend 
not only on the state of the environment, but also on the state of the market” (p. 236).  The state   14 
of the economic environment represents agents’ endowments, preferences, and information 
generally changing with time.  In the disequilibrium model, therefore, the investor’s excess 
demand function for a security includes two components: (1) fundamental demand which is the 
aggregate demand that the auctioneer would face if at time t one were to conduct a Walrasian 
auction in the economy; and (2) the difference between actual excess demand and corresponding 
fundamental demand.  With non-equilibrium trading, the demands should reflect the potential for 
direct speculation on price changes, including the price’s adjustment towards equilibrium.  In 
general, this is a function of both speculators’ average assessment of the current trend in the 
security’s price and the opportunity growth rate of alternative investments in non-equilibrium 
trading with comparable securities.  The process of trend estimation is adaptive because the price 
changes include some randomness.  Beja and Goldman showed that when trend followers have 
some market power, an increase in fundamental demand might generate oscillations, although 
the economy dominated by fundamental demand is stable and non-oscillatory.  Furthermore, 
increasing the market impact of the trend followers causes oscillations and makes the system 
unstable.  These situations imply poor signaling quality of prices.  On the other hand, they also 
demonstrated that moderate speculation might improve the quality of price signal and thus 
accelerate the convergence to equilibrium.  This happens when the speculators’ response to 
changes in price movements is relatively faster than the impact of fundamental demand on price 
adjustment. 
 
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) demonstrated that herding behavior of short-horizon 
traders can lead to informational inefficiency.  Their model showed that an informed trader who 
wants to buy or sell in the near future could benefit from their information only if it is 
subsequently impounded into the price by the trades of similarly informed speculators.  Thus, 
short-horizon traders would make profits when they can coordinate their research efforts on the 
same information.  This kind of positive informational spillover can be so powerful that herding 
traders may even analyze information that is not closely related to the asset’s long-run value.  
Technical analysis is one example.  Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein stated, “the very fact that a 
large number of traders use chartist models may be enough to generate positive profits for those 
traders who already know how to chart.  Even stronger, when such methods are popular, it is 
optimal for speculators to choose to chart” (p. 1480).  In their model, such an equilibrium is 
possible even in the condition in which prices follow a random walk and hence publicly 
available information has no value in forecasting future price changes. 
 
Clyde and Osler (1997) provide another theoretical foundation for technical analysis as a 
method for nonlinear prediction on a high dimension (or chaotic) system.  They showed that 
graphical technical analysis methods might be equivalent to nonlinear forecasting methods using 
Takens’ (1981) method of phase space reconstruction combined with local polynomial mapping 
techniques for nonlinear prediction.  In Takens’ method, the true phase space of a dynamic 
system with n state variables can be reconstructed by plotting an observable variable associated 
with the system against at least 2n of its own lagged values (p. 494).  The objective of the phase 
space reconstruction is to discover an attractor, and if an attractor is found, nonlinear prediction 
can be performed using local polynomial mapping techniques.  Forecasting using local 
polynomial mapping is related to identifying the current position on the attractor and then 
observing the evolution over time of points near the current point.  If points near the current   15 
point evolve to points that are near each other on the attractor, forecasting can be made with 
some confidence that the current point will evolve to the same region.    
 
The above process was tested by applying the identification algorithm of a “head-and-
shoulders” pattern to a simulated high-dimension nonlinear price series to see if technical 
analysis has any predictive power.  More specifically, the following two hypotheses were tested: 
(1) technical analysis has no more predictive power on nonlinear data than it does on random 
data; and (2) when applied to nonlinear data, technical analysis earns no more hypothetical 
profits than those generated by a random trading rule.  For the first hypothesis, the fraction of 
total positions that are profitable (the hit ratio) was investigated.  The result indicated that the hit 
ratios exceeded 0.5 in almost all cases when the head-and-shoulders pattern was applied to the 
nonlinear series.  Moreover, profits from applying the head-and-shoulders pattern to the 
nonlinear series exceeded the median of those from the bootstrap simulated data in almost all 
cases, even at the longer horizons.  Thus, the first hypothesis was rejected.  Similarly, the hit 
ratio tests for 100 nonlinear series also rejected the second hypothesis.  As a result, technical 
analysis seemed to work better on nonlinear data than on random data and generated more profits 
than random buying and selling when applied to a known nonlinear system.  This led Clyde and 
Osler to conclude that “Technical methods may generally be crude but useful methods of doing 
nonlinear analysis” (p. 511). 
 
Introducing a simple agent-based model for market price dynamics, Schmidt (1999, 2000, 
2002) showed that if technical traders are capable of affecting market liquidity, their concerted 
actions can move the market price in the direction favorable to their strategy.  The model 
assumes a constant total number of traders that consists of “regular” traders and “technical” 
traders.  Again, the regular traders are partitioned into buyers and sellers, and have two dynamic 
patterns in their behavior: a “fundamentalist” component and a “chartist” component.  The 
former motivates traders to buy an asset if the current price is lower than the fundamental value, 
and to sell it otherwise, while the latter leads traders to buy if the price increases and sell when 
price falls.  In the model, price moves linearly with the excess demand, which in turn is 
proportional to the excess number of buyers from both regular and technical traders.   
 
   The result is similar to those of Beja and Goldman (1980) and Froot, Scharfstein, and 
Stein (1992).  In the absence of technical traders, price dynamics formed slowly decaying 
oscillations around an asymptotic value.  However, inclusion of technical traders in the model 
increased the price oscillation amplitude.  The logic is simple: if technical traders believe price 
will fall, they sell, and thus, excess demand decreases.  As a result, price decreases, and the 
chartist component of regular traders forces them to sell.  This leads price to decrease further 
until the fundamentalist priorities of regular traders become overwhelming.  The opposite 
situation occurs if technical traders make a buy decision based on their analysis.  Hence, Schmidt 
concluded that if technical traders are powerful enough in terms of trading volume, they can 
move price in the direction favorable to their technical trading strategy.   
 
Summary of Theory 
 
In efficient market models, such as the martingale model and random walk models, 
technical trading profits are not feasible because, by definition, in efficient markets current prices   16 
reflect all available information (Working 1949, 1962; Fama 1970) or it is impossible to make 
risk-adjusted profits net of all transaction costs by trading on the basis of past price history 
(Jensen 1978).  The martingale model suggests that an asset’s expected price change (or return) 
is zero when conditioned on the asset’s price history.  In particular, the sub-martingale model 
(Fama 1970) implies that no trading rules based only on past price information can have greater 
expected returns than buy-and-hold returns in a future period.  The simplest random walk model 
assumes that successive price changes are independently and identically distributed with zero 
mean.  Thus, the random walk model has much stronger assumptions than the martingale model.   
 
In contrast, other models, such as noisy rational expectations models, feedback models, 
disequilibrium models, herding models, agent-based models, and chaos theory, postulate that 
price adjusts sluggishly to new information due to noise, market frictions, market power, 
investors’ sentiments or herding behavior, or chaos.  In these models, therefore, there exist 
profitable trading opportunities that are not being exploited.  For example, Brown and Jennings’s 
noisy rational expectations model assumes that the current price does not fully reveal private 
information because of noise (unobserved current supply of a risky asset) in the current 
equilibrium price, so that historical prices (i.e., technical analysis) together with the current price 
help traders make more precise inferences about past and present signals than does the current 
price alone.  As another example, behavioral finance models posit that noise traders, who 
misperceive noise as if it were information (news or fundamental factors) and irrationally act on 
their belief or sentiments, bear a large amount of risk relative to rational investors and thus may 
earn higher expected returns.  Since noise trader risk (future resale price risk) limits rational 
investors’ arbitrage even when there is no fundamental risk, noise traders on average can earn 
higher returns than rational investors in the short run, and even in the long run they can survive 
and dominate the market (De Long et al. 1990a, 1991).  The behavioral models suggest that 
technical trading may be profitable in the long run even if technical trading strategies (buy when 
prices rise and sell when prices fall) are based on noise or “popular models” and not on 
information (Shleifer and Summers 1990).   
 
  Nevertheless, the efficient markets hypothesis still seems to be a dominant paradigm in 
the sense that financial economists have not yet reached a consensus on a better model of price 
formation.  Over the last two decades, however, the efficient markets paradigm has been 
increasingly challenged by a growing number of alternative theories such as noisy rational 
expectations models and behavioral models.  Hence, sharp disagreement in theoretical models 
makes empirical evidence a key consideration in determining the profitability of technical 




Numerous empirical studies have tested the profitability of various technical trading 
systems, and many of them included implications about market efficiency.  In this report, 
previous empirical studies are categorized into two groups, “early” studies and “modern” studies, 
based on an overall evaluation of each study in terms of the number of technical trading systems 
considered, treatments of transaction costs, risk, data snooping problems, parameter optimization 
and out-of-sample verification, and statistical tests adopted.  Most early studies generally 
examined one or two trading systems and considered transaction costs to compute net returns of   17 
trading rules.  However, risk was not adequately handled, statistical tests of trading profits and 
data snooping problems were often disregarded, and out-of-sample verification along with 
parameter optimization were omitted, with a few exceptions.  In contrast, modern studies 
simulate up to thousands of technical trading rules with the growing power of computers, 
incorporate transaction costs and risk, evaluate out-of-sample performance of optimized trading 
rules, and test statistical significance of trading profits with conventional statistical tests or 
various bootstrap methods.   
 
Although the boundary between early and modern studies is blurred, this report regards 
Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin’s (1988) work as the first modern study since it was among the first 
technical trading studies to substantially improve upon early studies in many aspects.  They 
considered 12 technical trading systems, conducted out-of-sample testing for optimized trading 
rules with a statistical significance test, and measured performance of trading rules after 
adjusting for transaction costs and risk.  Thus, early studies commence with Donchian’s (1960) 
study and include 42 studies through 1987, while modern studies cover the 1988-2004 period 
with 92 studies.
8  Figure 1 presents the number of technical trading studies over several decades.  
It is noteworthy that during the last decade academics’ interest in technical trading rules has 
increased dramatically, particularly in stock markets and foreign exchange markets.  The number 
of technical trading studies over the 1995-2004 period amounts to about half of all empirical 
studies conducted since 1960.  In this report, representative studies that contain unique 
characteristics of each group are reviewed and discussed.  The report also includes tables that 
summarize each empirical study with regard to markets, data frequencies, in- and out-of- sample 
periods, trading systems, benchmark strategies, transaction costs, optimization, and conclusions.   
 
Technical Trading Systems 
 
Before reviewing historical research, it is useful to first introduce and explicitly define 
major types of technical trading systems.  A technical trading system comprises a set of trading 
rules that can be used to generate trading signals.  In general, a simple trading system has one or 
two parameters that determine the timing of trading signals.  Each rule contained in a trading 
system is the results of parameterizations.  For example, the Dual Moving Average Crossover 
system with two parameters (a short moving average and a long moving average) may be 
composed of hundreds of trading rules that can be generated by altering combinations of the two 
parameters.  Among technical trading systems, the most well-known types of systems are 
moving averages, channels (support and resistance), momentum oscillators, and filters.  These 
systems have been widely used by academics, market participants or both, and, with the 
exception of filter rules, have been prominently featured in well-known books on technical 
analysis, such as Schwager (1996), Kaufman (1998), and Pring (2002).  Filter rules were 
exhaustively tested by academics for several decades (the early 1960s through the early 1990s) 
before moving average systems gained popularity in academic research.  This section describes 
representative trading systems for each major category: Dual Moving Average Crossover, 




                                                 
8 Modern studies were surveyed through August 2004.   18 
Dual Moving Average Crossover 
 
Moving average based trading systems are the simplest and most popular trend-following 
systems among practitioners (Taylor and Allen 1992; Lui and Mole 1998).  According to Neftci 
(1991), the (dual) moving average method is one of the few technical trading procedures that is 
statistically well defined.  The Dual Moving Average Crossover system generates trading signals 
by identifying when the short-term trend rises above or below the long-term trend.  
Specifications of the system are as follows: 
 
A.  Definitions  
1.  Shorter Moving Average over s days at time t  , / ) (




i t t ￿ = + - =   
where 
c
t P  is the close at time t and  . t s <  
2.  Longer Moving Average over l days at time t  , / ) (




i t t ￿ = + - =  
      where  . t l s £ <  
B.  Trading rules 
1.  Go long at 
o
t P 1 +  if  , t t LMA SMA >  where 
o
t P 1 +  is the open at time  . 1 + t   
2.  Go short at 
o
t P 1 +  if  . t t LMA SMA <   
C.  Parameters:  , s   . l  
 
Outside Price Channel  
 
Next to moving averages, price channels are also extensively used technical trading 
methods.  The price channel is sometimes referred to as “trading range breakout” or “support and 
resistance.”  The fundamental characteristic underlying price channel systems is that market 
movement to a new high or low suggests a continued trend in the direction established.  Thus, all 
price channels generate trading signals based on a comparison between today’s price level with 
price levels of some specified number of days in the past.  The Outside Price Channel system is 
analogous to a trading system introduced by Donchian (1960), who used only two preceding 
calendar week’s ranges as a channel length.  More specifically, this system generates a buy 
signal anytime the closing price is outside (greater than) the highest price in a channel length 
(specified time interval), and generates a sell signal anytime the closing price breaks outside 
(lower than) the lowest price in the price channel.  Specifications of the system are as follows: 
 
A.   Definitions                    
1.  Price channel = a time interval including today, n days in length. 




t t P P HH + - - = K  where 
h
t P 1 -  is the high at time 
. 1 - t  




t t P P LL + - - = K  where 
l
t P 1 -  is the low at time 
. 1 - t  
B.   Trading rules 
  1.   Go long at 
c
t P  if  , t
c
t HH P >  where 
c
t P  is the close at time t. 
  2.   Go short at 
c
t P  if  . t
c
t LL P <      19 
  C.    Parameter:  . n  
 
Relative Strength Index 
 
The Relative Strength Index, introduced by Wilder (1978), is one of the most well-known 
momentum oscillator systems.  Momentum oscillator techniques derive their name from the fact 
that trading signals are obtained from values which “oscillate” above and below a neutral point, 
usually given a zero value.  In a simple form, the momentum oscillator compares today’s price 
with the price of n-days ago.  Wilder (1978, p. 63) explains the momentum oscillator as follows: 
 
The momentum oscillator measures the velocity of directional price movement.  When 
  the price moves up very rapidly, as some point it is considered to be overbought; when it 
  moves down very rapidly, at some point it is considered to be oversold.  In either case, a 
  reaction or reversal is imminent.   
 
Momentum values are similar to standard moving averages, in that they can be regarded as 
smoothed price movements.  However, since the momentum values generally decrease before a 
reverse in trend has taken place, momentum oscillators may identify a change in trend in advance, 
while moving averages usually cannot.  The Relative Strength Index was designed to overcome 
two problems encountered in developing meaningful momentum oscillators: (1) erroneous erratic 
movement, and (2) the need for an objective scale for the amplitude of oscillators.
9 
Specifications of the system are as follows: 
 
  A.   Definitions  








t P P - >   
c
t P  is the close at time t. 








t P P - <  
3.  Average Up Closes over n days at time t,  , 1 + t   , 2 + t  … : 
, /
1 1 n UC AUC
n
i i t t ￿ = + - =   , / ) ) 1 ( ( 1 1 n UC n AUC AUC t t t + + + - · =  
, / ) ) 1 ( ( 2 1 2 n UC n AUC AUC t t t + + + + - · =  …. 
4.  Average Down Closes over n days at time t,  , 1 + t   , 2 + t  … : 
, /
1 1 n DC ADC
n
i i t t ￿ = + - =   , / ) ) 1 ( ( 1 1 n DC n ADC ADC t t t + + + - · =  
, / ) ) 1 ( ( 2 1 2 n DC n ADC ADC t t t + + + + - · =  …. 
5.  Relative Strength at time t  . / ) ( t t t ADC AUC RS =  
6.  Relative Strength Index at time t  )). 1 /( 100 ( 100 ) ( t t RS RSI + - =  
7.  Entry Thresholds  , (ET : ) 100 ET -   RSI values beyond which buy or sell 
signals are generated. 
B.  Trading rules 
  1.   Go long when RSI falls below ET and rises back above it. 
2.   Go short when RSI rises above  ET - 100  and falls back below it.   
                                                 
9 See Wilder (1978) for detailed discussion. 
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C.  Parameters:  , n . ET
10 
 
Alexander’s Filter Rule 
 
This system was first introduced by Alexander (1961, 1964) and exhaustively tested by 
numerous academics until the early 1990s.  Since then, its popularity among academics has been 
replaced by moving average methods.  This system generates a buy (sell) signal when today’s 
closing price rises (falls) by x% above (below) its most recent low (high).  Moves less than x% in 
either direction are ignored.  Thus, all price movements smaller than a specified size are filtered 
out and the remaining movements are examined.  Alexander (1961, p. 23) argued that “If stock 
price movements were generated by a trendless random walk, these filters could be expected to 
yield zero profits, or to vary from zero profits, both positively and negatively, in a random 
manner.”  Specifications of the system are as follows: 
 
A.  Definitions and abbreviations  
1.  High Extreme Point (HEP) = the highest close obtained while in a long trade. 
2.  Low Extreme Point (LEP) = the lowest close obtained while in a short trade. 
3.  = x  the percent filter size.      
B.  Trading rules 
1.  Go long on the close, if today’s close rises x% above the LEP. 
2.  Go short on the close, if today’s close falls x% below the HEP. 
C.  Parameter:  . x  
 
These are only four examples of the very large number of technical trading systems that 
have been proposed.  For other examples, readers should see Wilder (1978), Barker (1981), or 
other books on technical analysis.  In addition, the above examples do not cover other forms of 
technical analysis such as charting.  Most books on technical analysis explain a broad category of 
visual chart patterns, and some recent academic papers (e.g., Chang and Osler 1999; Lo, 
Mamaysky, and Wang 2000) have also investigated the forecasting ability of various chart 
patterns by developing pattern recognition algorithms.   
 




  In most early studies, technical trading rules are applied to examine price behavior in 
various speculative markets, along with standard statistical analyses.  Until technical trading 
rules were dominantly used to test market efficiency, previous empirical studies had employed 
only statistical analyses such as serial correlation, runs analysis, and spectral analysis.  However, 
these statistical analyses revealed several limitations.  As Fama and Blume (1966) pointed out, 
the simple linear relationships that underlay the serial correlation model were not able to detect 
the complicated patterns that chartists perceived in market prices.  Runs analysis was too 
inflexible in that a run was terminated whenever a reverse sign occurred in the sequence of 
successive price changes, regardless of the size of the price change (p. 227).  Moreover, it was 
                                                 
10 Wilder (1978) originally set the parameter values at n = 14 and ET = 30.   21 
difficult to incorporate the elements of risk and transaction costs into statistical analyses.  Fama 
(1970) argued that “there are types of nonlinear dependence that imply the existence of profitable 
trading systems, and yet do not imply nonzero serial covariances.  Thus, for many reasons it is 
desirable to directly test the profitability of various trading rules” (p. 394).  As a result, in early 
studies technical trading rules are considered as an alternative to avoid such weaknesses of 
statistical analyses, and are often used together with statistical analyses.   
 
To detect the dependence of price changes or to test the profitability of technical trading 
rules, early studies used diverse technical trading systems such as filters, stop-loss orders, 
moving averages, momentum oscillators, relative strength, and channels.  Filter rules were the 
most popular trading system.  Although many early studies considered transaction costs to 
compute net returns of trading rules, few studies considered risk, conducted parameter 
optimization and out-of-sample tests, or performed statistical tests of the significance of trading 
profits.  Moreover, even after Jensen (1967) highlighted the danger of data snooping in technical 
trading research, none of the early studies except Jensen and Benington (1970) explicitly dealt 
with the problem.  Technical trading profits were often compared to one of several benchmarks, 
such as the buy-and-hold returns, geometric mean returns, or zero mean profits, to derive 
implications for market efficiency.   
 
Among the early studies, three representative studies, Fama and Blume (1966), Stevenson 
and Bear (1970), and Sweeney (1986), were selected for in-depth reviews.  These studies had 
significant effects on later studies.  In addition, these studies contain the aforementioned typical 
characteristics of early work, but are also relatively comprehensive compared to other studies in 
the same period.  Table 1 presents summaries of each early study in terms of various criteria such 
as markets studied, data frequencies, sample periods, trading systems, benchmark strategies, 
transaction costs, optimization, and conclusions. 
 
Representative Early Studies 
 
Fama and Blume (1966), in the best-known and most influential work on technical 
trading rules in the early period, exhaustively tested Alexander’s filter rules on daily closing 
prices of 30 individual securities in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) during the 1956-
1962 period.  They simulated 24 filters ranging from 0.5% to 50%.  Previously, Alexander (1961, 
1964) applied his famous filter rules to identify nonlinear patterns in security prices (S&P 
Industrials, Dow Jones Industrials).  He found that the small filter rules generated larger gross 
profits than the buy-and-hold strategy, and these profits were not likely to be eliminated by 
commissions.  This led him to conclude that there were trends in stock market prices.  However, 
Mandelbrot (1963) pointed out that Alexander’s computations of empirical returns included 
serious biases that exaggerated filter rule profits.  Alexander assumed that traders could always 
buy at a price exactly equal to the subsequent low plus x% and sell at the subsequent high minus 
x%.  Because of the frequency of large price jumps, however, the purchase would occur at a little 
higher price than the low plus x%, while the sale would occur at somewhat lower price than the 
high minus x%.  By accommodating this criticism, Alexander (1964) re-tested S&P Industrials 
using the closing prices of the confirmation day as transaction prices.  The results indicated that 
after commissions, only the largest filter (45.6%) beat the buy-and-hold strategy by substantial 
margin.     22 
 
Fama and Blume also argued that Alexander’s (1961, 1964) results were biased because 
he did not incorporate dividend payments into data.  In general, adjusting for dividends reduces 
the profitability of short sales and thus decreases the profitability of the filter rules.  Thus, Fama 
and Blume’s tests were performed after taking account of the shortcomings of Alexander’s 
works.  Their results showed that, when commissions (brokerage fees) were taken into account, 
only four out of 30 securities had positive average returns per filter.  Even ignoring commissions, 
the filter rules were inferior to a simple buy-and-hold strategy for all but two securities.  Fama 
and Blume split the filter rule returns before commissions into the returns for long and short 
transactions, respectively.  On short transactions, only one security had positive average returns 
per filter, while on long transactions thirteen securities had higher average returns per filter than 
buy-and-hold returns.  Hence, they argued that even long transaction did not consistently 
outperform the buy-and-hold strategy.   
 
Fama and Blume went on to examine average returns of individual filters across the 30 
securities.  When commissions were included, none of the filter rules consistently produced large 
returns.  Although filters between 12% and 25% produced positive average net returns, these 
were not substantial when compared to buy-and-hold returns.  However, when trading positions 
were broken down into long and short positions, three small filters (0.5%, 1.0%, and 1.5%) 
generated greater average returns on long positions than those on the buy-and-hold strategy.
11  
For example, the 0.5% filter rule generated an average gross return of 20.9% and an average net 
return of 12.5% after 0.1% clearing house fee per round-trip transaction.  The average net return 
was about 2.5% points higher than the average return (9.86%) of the buy-and-hold strategy.  
Fama and Blume, however, claimed that the profitable long transactions would not have been 
better than a simple buy-and-hold strategy in practice, if the idle time of funds invested, 
operating expenses of the filter rules, and brokerage fees of specialists had been considered.  
Hence, Fama and Blume concluded that for practical purposes the filter technique could not be 
used to increase the expected profits of investors. 
 
Stevenson and Bear (1970) conducted a similar study on July corn and soybean futures 
from 1957 through 1968.  They tested three trading systems related to the filter technique: stop-
loss orders attributed to Houthakker (1961), filter rules by Alexander and Fama and Blume, and 
combinations of both rules.  The stop-loss order works as follows: an investor buys a futures 
contract at the opening on the first day of trading and places a stop-loss order x% below the 
purchase price.  If the order is not executed, the investor holds the contract until the last possible 
date prior to delivery.  If the order is executed, no further position is assumed until the opening 
day of trading of the next contract.  For each system, three filter sizes (1.5%, 3%, and 5%) were 
                                                 
11 Dryden (1969) argued that Fama and Blume’s results were biased because they assumed that the short rate-of-
return for a transaction is simply the negative of the corresponding long rate-of-return.  Dryden illustrated this 
problem with a simple example: “If a transaction is initiated at a price of 100 and concluded at a price of 121, 
assuming the duration of the transaction is two days, the rate of return is 10% if the filter rule signaled a long 
transaction, and -11.1% if the transaction is a short one” (p. 322).  Thus, the long rate-of-return is always less 
(absolutely) than the short rate-of-return except in cases that either the total number of days for which the filter had 
open positions equals one or an opening price equals a closing price.  As a result, the rate of return of the buy-and-
hold strategy may be overestimated.  Dryden argued that about a 20% reduction of Fama and Blume’s buy-and-hold 
rate was appropriate.  In this case, additional six filters would have long rates of return in excess of the buy-and-hold 
rate.     23 
selected and commissions charged were 0.5 cents per bushel for both corn and soybeans.  The 
results indicated that for soybeans the stop-loss order with a 5% filter outperformed a buy-and-
hold strategy by a large amount, while for corn it greatly reduced losses relative to the 
benchmark across all filters.  The pure filter systems appeared to have relatively poor 
performance.  For corn, all filters generated negative net returns, although 3% and 5% filters 
performed better than the buy-and-hold strategy.  For soybeans, 1.5% and 3% filters were 
inferior to the buy-and-hold strategy because they had losses, while a 5% filter rule outperformed 
the benchmark with positive net returns.  The combination system was the best performer among 
systems.  For soybeans, all filters beat the buy-and-hold strategy, and particularly 3% and 5% 
filters generated large net returns.  The 3% and 5% filters also outperformed the buy-and-hold 
strategy for corn.  On the other hand, the combination system against market (counter trend 
system) indicated nearly opposite results.  Overall, stop-loss orders and combination rules were 
profitable in an absolute sense, outperforming the buy-and-hold strategy.  Profits of technical 
trading rules led Bear and Stevenson to cast considerable doubt on the applicability of the 
random walk hypothesis to the price behavior of commodity futures markets.   
 
Sweeney (1986) carried out comprehensive tests on various foreign exchange rates by 
considering risk, transaction costs, post-sample performance, and statistical tests.  Based on the 
assumption that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) can explain excess returns to both 
filter rules and the buy-and-hold strategy and that risk premia are constant over time, Sweeney 
developed a risk-adjusted performance measure, the so-called X-statistic, in terms of filter 
returns in excess of buy-and-hold returns.  The X-statistic is defined as technical trading returns 
in excess of buy-and-hold returns plus an adjustment factor which takes account of different risk 
premia of the two trading strategies.  Using the X statistic as a risk-adjusted performance 
measure, Sweeney tested daily data on the dollar-German mark ($/DM) exchange rate from 1975 
through 1980, with filters ranging from 0.5% to 10%.  The results indicated that all filters but 
10% beat the buy-and-hold strategy and that the X statistic was statistically significant for filters 
of 0.5% and 1%.  The results were mostly retained even after transaction costs of 0.125% per 
round-trip were considered, with slight reductions in returns (annual mean excess returns of 
1.6%-3.7% over the buy-and-hold strategy).  Moreover, even when interest-rate differentials in 
the statistic X were neglected, the results were similar to those of the X-statistic.  Indeed, this 
makes filter tests for foreign exchange rates quite convenient because it is hard to collect the 
daily interest-rate differentials.  As a result, Sweeney additionally tested 10 foreign currencies 
over the 1973-1980 period, without considering the interest-rate differentials.  The time period 
was divided into two parts, the first 610 days and the remaining 1,220 days.  For the first period, 
the filter rules statistically significantly outperformed the buy-and-hold strategy in 22 out of 70 
cases (7 rules for 10 countries).  Results for the second period were similar, indicating 21 
significant cases.  In general, smaller filters (0.5% to 3%) showed better performance than larger 
filters.  Transaction costs affected the results to about the same degree as in the case of the 
dollar-DM rate.   
 
  In Sweeney’s model, the CAPM explains returns to the buy-and-hold strategy and the 
filter rules, and implies that expected excess returns to the filter rule over the buy-and-hold 
strategy should be equal to zero.  Thus, the significant returns of the filter rules suggest that the 
CAPM cannot explain price behavior in foreign exchange markets.  Sweeney concluded that 
major currency markets indicated serious signs of inefficiency over the first eight years of the   24 
generalized managed floating beginning in March 1973.  However, he also pointed out that the 
results could be consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis if risk premia vary over time.  In 
this case, the filter rule on average puts investors into the foreign currency market when the risk 
premia or the expected returns are larger than average.  Then, positive returns on the filter rule 
may not be true profits but just a reflection of higher average risk borne.   
 
Summary of Early Studies  
 
  As summarized in Table 1, early empirical studies examined the profitability of technical 
trading rules in various markets.  The results varied greatly from market to market as the three 
representative studies indicated.  For 30 individual stock markets, Fama and Blume (1966) found 
that filter rules could not outperform the simple buy-and-hold strategy after transaction costs.  
For July corn and soybean futures contracts, Stevenson and Bear’s (1970) results indicated that 
stop-loss orders and combination rules of filters and stop-loss orders generated substantial net 
returns and beat the buy-and-hold strategy.  For 10 foreign exchange rates, Sweeney (1986) 
found that small (long) filter rules generated statistically significant risk-adjusted net returns.  
Overall, in the early studies, very limited evidence of the profitability of technical trading rules 
was found in stock markets (e.g., Fama and Blume 1966; Van Horne and Parker 1967; Jensen 
and Benington 1970), while technical trading rules often realized sizable net profits in futures 
markets and foreign exchange markets (e.g., for futures markets, Stevenson and Bear 1970; Irwin 
and Uhrig 1984; Taylor 1986; for foreign exchange markets, Poole 1967; Cornell and Dietrich 
1978; Sweeney 1986).  Thus, stock markets appeared to be efficient relative to futures markets or 
foreign exchange markets during the time periods examined.   
 
Nonetheless, the early studies exhibited several important limitations in testing 
procedures.  First, most early studies exhaustively tested one or two popular trading systems, 
such as the filter or moving average.  This implies that the successful results in the early studies 
may be subject to data snooping (or model selection) problems.  Jensen and Benington (1970) 
argued that “given enough computer time, we are sure that we can find a mechanical trading rule 
which works on a table of random numbers - provided of course that we are allowed to test the 
rule on the same table of numbers which we used to discover the rule.  We realize of course that 
the rule would prove useless on any other table of random numbers, and this is exactly the issue 
with Levy’s
12 results” (p. 470).  Indeed, Dooly and Shafer (1983) and Tomek and Querin (1984) 
proved this argument by showing that when technical trading rules were applied to randomly 
generated price series, some of the series could be occasionally profitable by chance.  Moreover, 
popular trading systems may be ones that have survivorship biases.
13  Although Jensen (1967) 
suggested replicating the successful results on additional bodies of data and for other time 
periods to judge the impact of data snooping, none of the early studies except Jensen and 
Benington (1970) followed this suggestion.   
 
Second, the riskiness of technical trading rules was often ignored.  If investors are risk 
averse, they will always consider the risk-return tradeoffs of trading rules in their investment.  
Thus, large trading rule returns do not necessarily refute market efficiency since returns may be 
                                                 
12 Levy (1967a) showed that some relative strength rules outperformed a benchmark of the geometric average. 
  
13 Problems caused by the survivorship biases will be discussed in the next section.   25 
improved by taking greater risks.  For the same reason, when comparing between trading rule 
returns and benchmark returns, it is necessary to make explicit allowance for difference of 
returns due to different degrees of risk.  Only a few studies (Jensen and Benington 1970; Cornell 
and Dietrich 1978; Sweeney 1986) adopted such a procedure. 
 
Third, most early studies lacked statistical tests of technical trading profits.  Only four 
studies (James 1968; Peterson and Leuthold 1982; Bird 1985; Sweeney 1986) measured 
statistical significance of returns on technical trading rules using Z- or t-tests under the 
assumption that trading rule returns are normally distributed.  However, applying conventional 
statistical tests to trading rule returns may be invalid since a sequence of trading rule returns 
generally does not follow the normal distribution.  Talyor (1985) argued that “the distribution of 
the return from a filter strategy under the null hypothesis of an efficient market is not known, so 
that proper significance tests are impossible” (p. 727).  In fact, Lukac and Brorsen (1990) found 
that technical trading returns were positively skewed and leptokurtic, and thus argued that past 
applications of t-tests to technical trading returns might be biased.  Moreover, in the presence of 
data snooping, significance levels of conventional hypothesis tests are exaggerated (Lovell 1983; 
Denton 1985). 
 
Fourth, Taylor (1986, p. 201) argued that “Most published studies contain a dubious 
optimization.  Traders could not guess the best filter size (g) in advance and it is unlikely an 
optimized filter will be optimal in the future.  The correct procedure is, of course, to split the 
prices.  Then choose g using the first part and evaluate this g upon the remaining prices.”  If the 
optimal parameter performs well over in- and out-of-sample data, then the researcher may have 
more confidence in the results.  Only three studies (Irwin and Uhrig 1984; Taylor 1983, 1986) 
used this procedure. 
 
Fifth, technical trading profits were often compared to the performance of a benchmark 
strategy to derive implications for market efficiency.  Benchmarks used in early studies were 
buy-and-hold returns, geometric mean returns, interest rates for bank deposit, or zero mean 
profits.  However, there was no consensus on which benchmark should be used for a specific 
market.   
 
Finally, the results of the technical trading studies in the earlier period seem to be 
difficult to interpret because the performance of trading rules was often reported in terms of an 
“average” across all trading rules or all assets (i.e., stocks, currencies, or futures contracts) 
considered, rather than best-performing rules or individual securities (or exchange rates or 
contracts).  For example, in interpreting their results, Fama and Blume (1966) relied on average 
returns across all filters for a given stock or across all stocks for a given filter.  If they evaluated 
the performance of the best rules or each individual stock, then their conclusion might have been 
different.  Sweeney (1988) pointed out that “The averaging presumably reduces the importance 
of aberrations where a particular filter works for a given stock as a statistical fluke.  The 
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  As noted previously, “modern” empirical studies are assumed to commence with Lukac, 
Brorsen, and Irwin (1988), who provide a more comprehensive analysis than any early study.  
Although modern studies generally have improved upon the limitations of early studies in their 
testing procedures, treatment of transaction costs, risk, parameter optimization, out-of-sample 
tests, statistical tests, and data snooping problems still differ considerably among them.  Thus, 
this report categorizes all modern studies into seven groups by reflecting the differences in 
testing procedures.  Table 2 provides general information about each group. “Standard” refers to 
studies that included parameter optimization and out-of-sample tests, adjustment for transaction 
cost and risk, and statistical tests.  “Model-based bootstrap” studies are ones that conducted 
statistical tests for trading returns using a model-based bootstrap approach introduced by Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992).  “Genetic programming” and “Reality Check” indicate studies 
that attempted to solve data snooping problems using the genetic programming technique 
introduced by Koza (1992) and the Bootstrap Reality Check methodology developed by White 
(2000), respectively.  “Chart patterns” refers to studies that developed and applied recognition 
algorithms for chart patterns.  “Nonlinear” studies are those that applied nonlinear methods such 
as artificial neural networks or feedforward regressions to recognize patterns in prices or 
estimate the profitability of technical trading rules.  Finally, “Others” indicates studies that do 
not belong to any categories mentioned above.   
 
Modern studies, which are summarized in Tables 3 to 9, include 92 studies dating from 
Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin (1988) through Sapp (2004).  As with the early studies, a 
representative study from each of the seven categories is reviewed in detail.  They are Lukac, 
Brorsen, and Irwin (1988), Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), Allen and Karjalainen 
(1999), Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999), Chang and Osler (1999), Gençay (1998a), and 
Neely (1997).   
 




Studies in this category incorporate transaction costs and risk into testing procedures 
while considering various trading systems.  Trading rules are optimized in each system based on 
a specific performance criterion and out-of-sample tests are conducted for the optimal trading 
rules.  In particular, the parameter optimization and out-of-sample tests are significant 
improvements over early studies, because these procedures are close to actual traders’ behavior 
and may partially address data snooping problems (Jensen 1967; Taylor 1986).   
 
A representative study among the standard studies is Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin (1988).  
Based on the efficient markets hypothesis and the disequilibrium pricing model suggested by 
Beja and Goldman (1980), they proposed three testable hypotheses: the random walk model, the 
traditional test of efficient markets, and the Jensen test of efficient markets.  Each test was   27 
performed to check whether the trading systems could produce positive gross returns, returns 
above transaction costs, and returns above transaction costs plus returns to risk.  Over the 1975-
1984 period, twelve technical trading systems were simulated on price series from 12 futures 
markets across commodities, metals and financials.  The 12 trading systems consisted of 
channels, moving averages, momentum oscillators, filters (or trailing stops), and a combination 
system, some of which were known to be widely used by fund managers and traders.  The nearby 
contracts were used to overcome the discontinuity problem of futures price series.  That is, the 
current contract is rolled over to the next contract prior to the first notice date and a new trading 
signal is generated using the past data of the new contract.  Technical trading was simulated over 
the previous three years and parameters generating the largest profit over the period were used 
for the next year's trading.  At the end of the next year, new parameters were again optimized, 
and so on.
14  Therefore, the optimal parameters were adaptive and the simulation results were 
out-of-sample.  Two-tailed t-tests were performed to test the null hypothesis that gross returns 
generated from technical trading are zero, while one-tailed t-tests were conducted to test the 
statistical significance of net returns after transaction costs.  In addition, Jensen’s a  was 
measured by using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to determine whether net returns 
exist above returns to risk.  Results of normality tests indicated that, for aggregate monthly 
returns from all twelve systems, normality was not rejected and the returns showed negative 
autocorrelation.  Thus, t-tests for portfolio returns were regarded as an appropriate procedure.   
 
  The results of trading simulations showed that seven of twelve systems generated 
statistically significant monthly gross returns.  In particular, four trading systems, the close 
channel, directional parabolic, MII price channel, and dual moving average crossover, yielded 
statistically significant monthly portfolio net returns ranging from 1.89% to 2.78% after 
deducting transaction costs.
15  The corresponding return of a buy-and-hold strategy was -2.31%.  
Deutschmark, sugar, and corn markets appeared to be inefficient because in these markets 
significant net returns across various trading systems were observed.  Moreover, estimated 
results of the CAPM indicated that the aforementioned four trading systems had statistically 
significant intercepts (Jensen’s  ) a  and thus implied that trading profits from the four systems 
were not a compensation for bearing systematic risk during the sample period.  Thus, Lukac, 
Brorsen, and Irwin construed that there might be additional causes of market disequilibrium 
beyond transaction costs and risk.  They concluded that the disequilibrium model could be 
considered a more appropriate model to describe the price movements in the futures markets for 
the 1978-1984 period. 
 
  Other studies in this category are summarized in Table 3.  Lukac and Brorsen (1990) used 
similar procedures to those in Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin (1988), but extended the number of 
systems, commodities, and test periods.  They investigated 30 futures markets with 23 technical 
trading systems over the 1975-1986 period.  They also used dominant contracts as in Lukac, 
                                                 
14 Because of this three-year re-optimization method, the out-of-sample period in Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin’s work 
was from 1978-1984. 
 
15 These returns are based on the total investment method in which total investment was composed of a 30% initial 
investment in margins plus a 70% reserve for potential margin calls.  The percentage returns can be converted into 
simple annual returns (about 3.8%-5.6%) by a straightforward arithmetic manipulation.   
   28 
Brorsen, and Irwin (1988), but skipped trading in months in which a more distant contract was 
consistently dominant in order to reduce liquidity costs.  Parameters were re-optimized by 
cumulative methods.  That is, in each year optimal parameters were selected by simulating data 
from 1975 to the current year.  The parameter producing the largest profit over the period was 
used for the next year's trading.  They found that aggregate portfolio returns of the trading 
systems were normally distributed, but market level returns were positively skewed and 
leptokurtic.  Thus, they argued that past research that used t-tests on individual commodity 
returns might be biased.  The results indicated that 7 out of 23 trading systems generated 
monthly net returns above zero at a 10 percent significance level after transaction costs were 
taken into account.  However, most of the profits from the technical trading rules appeared to be 
made during the 1979-1980 period.  In the individual futures markets, exchange rate futures 
earned highest returns, while livestock futures had the lowest returns.   
 
Most studies in this category, with a few exceptions, investigated foreign exchange 
markets.  Taylor and Tari (1989), Taylor (1992, 1994), Silber (1994), and Szakmary and Mathur 
(1997) all showed that technical trading rules could yield annual net returns of 2%-10%
16 for 
major currency futures markets from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.  Similarly, Menkoff and 
Schlumberger (1995), Lee and Mathur (1996a, 1996b), Maillet and Michel (2000), Lee, Gleason, 
and Mathur (2001), Lee, Pan, and Liu (2001), and Martin (2001) found that technical trading 
rules were profitable for some spot currencies in each sample period they considered.  However, 
technical trading profits in currency markets seem to gradually decrease over time.  For example, 
Olson (2004) reported that risk-adjusted profits of moving average crossover rules for an 18-
currency portfolio declined from over 3% between the late 1970s and early 1980s to about zero 
percent in the late 1990s.  Kidd and Brorsen (2004) provide some evidence that the reduction in 
returns to managed futures funds in the 1990s, which predominantly use technical analysis, may 
have been caused by structural changes in markets, such as a decrease in price volatility and an 
increase in large price changes occurring while markets are closed.  For the stock market, Taylor 
(2000) investigated a wide variety of US and UK stock indices and individual stock prices, 
finding an average breakeven one-way transaction cost of 0.35% across all data series.  In 
particular, for the DJIA index, an optimal trading rule (a 5/200 moving average rule) estimated 
over the 1897-1968 period produced a breakeven one-way transaction cost of 1.07% during the 
1968-1988 period.  Overall, standard studies indicate that technical trading rules generated 
statistically significant economic profits in various speculative markets, especially in foreign 
exchange markets and futures markets.  Despite the successful results of standard studies, there 
still exists a possibility that they were spurious because of data snooping problems.  Although 
standard studies optimized trading rules and traced the out-of-sample performance of the optimal 
trading rules, a researcher can obtain a successful result by deliberately searching for profitable 
choice variables, such as profitable “families” of trading systems, markets, in-sample estimation 
periods, out-of-sample periods, and trading model assumptions including performance criteria 
and transaction costs.   
 
Model-based Bootstrap Studies 
 
  Studies in this category apply a model-based bootstrap methodology to test statistical 
significance of trading profits.  Although some other recent studies of technical analysis use the 
                                                 
16 These are unlevered returns.   29 
bootstrap procedure, model-based bootstrap studies differ from other studies in that they usually 
analyzed the same trading rules (the moving average and the trading range break-out) that Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron investigated, without conducting trading rule optimization and out-of-
sample verification.  Among modern studies, one of the most influential works on technical 
trading rules is therefore Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992).  The reason appears to be 
their use of a very long price history and, for the first time, model-based bootstrap methods for 
making statistical inferences about technical trading profits.  Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron 
recognized data snooping biases in technical trading studies and attempted to mitigate the 
problems by (1) selecting technical trading rules that had been popular over a very long time; (2) 
reporting results from all their trading strategies; (3) utilizing a very long data series; and (4) 
emphasizing the robustness of results across various non-overlapping subperiods for statistical 
inference (p. 1734).   
 
According to Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron, there are several advantages of using the 
bootstrap methodology.  First, the bootstrap procedure makes it possible to perform a joint test of 
significance for different trading rules by constructing bootstrap distributions.  Second, the 
traditional t-test assumes normal, stationary, and time-independent distributions of data series.  
However, it is well known that the return distributions of financial assets are generally 
leptokurtic, autocorrelated, conditionally heteroskedastic, and time varying.  Since the bootstrap 
procedure can accommodate these characteristics of the data using distributions generated from a 
simulated null model, it can provide more powerful inference than the t-test.  Third, the bootstrap 
method also allows estimation of confidence intervals for the standard deviations of technical 
trading returns.  Thus, the riskiness of trading rules can be examined more rigorously.   
 
The basic approach in a bootstrap procedure is to compare returns conditional on buy (or 
sell) signals from the original series to conditional returns from simulated comparison series 
generated by widely used models for stock prices.  The popular models used by Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron were a random walk with drift, an autoregressive process of order one 
(AR (1)), a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in-mean model (GARCH-
M), and an exponential GARCH (EGARCH).  The random walk model with drift was simulated 
by taking returns (logarithmic price changes) from the original series and then randomly 
resampling them with replacement.  In other models (AR (1), GARCH-M, EGARCH), 
parameters and residuals were estimated using OLS or maximum likelihood, and then the 
residuals were randomly resampled with replacement.  The resampled residuals coupled with the 
estimated parameters were then used to generate a simulated return series.  By constraining the 
starting price level of the simulated return series to be exactly as its value in the original series, 
the simulated return series could be transformed into price levels.  In this manner, 500 bootstrap 
samples were generated for each null model, and each technical trading rule was applied to each 
of the 500 bootstrap samples.  From these calculations, the empirical distribution for trading 
returns under each null model was estimated.  The null hypothesis was rejected at the a  percent 
level if trading returns from the original series were greater than the a  percent cutoff level of the 
simulated trading returns under the null model.   
 
Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron tested two simple technical trading systems, a moving 
average-oscillator and a trading range breakout (resistance and support levels), on the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) from 1897 through 1986.  In moving average rules, buy and sell   30 
signals are generated by two moving averages: a short-period average and a long-period average.  
More specifically, a buy (sell) position is taken when the short-period average rises above (falls 
below) the long-period average.  Five popular combinations of moving averages (1/50, 1/150, 
5/150, 1/200, and 2/200, where the first figure represents the short period and the second figure 
does the long period) were selected with and without a 1% band and these rules were tested with 
and without a 10-day holding period for a position.  A band around the moving average is 
designed to eliminate “whipsaws” that occur when the short and long moving averages move 
closely.  In general, introducing a band reduces the number of trades and therefore transaction 
costs.  Moving average rules were divided into two groups depending on the presence of the 10-
day holding period: variable-length moving average (VMA) and fixed-length moving average 
(FMA).  FMA rules have fixed 10-day holding periods after a crossing of the two moving 
averages, while VMA rules do not.  Trading range breakout (TRB) rules generate a buy (sell) 
signal when the current price penetrates a resistance (support) level, which is a local maximum 
(minimum) price.  The local maximums and minimums were computed over the past 50, 150, 
and 200 days, and each rule was tested with and without a 1% band.  With a 1% band, trading 
signals were generated when the price level moved above (below) the local maximum 
(minimum) by 1%.  For trading range breakout rules, 10-day holding period returns following 
trading signals were computed.  Transaction costs were not taken into account. 
 
  Results for the VMA rules indicated that buy returns were all positive with an average 
daily return of 0.042% (about 12% per year), while sell returns were all negative with an average 
daily return of -0.025% (about -7% per year).  For buy returns, six of the ten rules rejected the 
null hypothesis that the returns equal the unconditional returns (daily 0.017%), at the 5% 
significance level using two-tailed t-tests.  The other four rules were marginally significant.  For 
sell returns, t-statistics were all highly significant.  All the buy-sell spreads were positive with an 
average of 0.067%, and the t-statistics for these differences were highly significant, rejecting the 
null hypothesis of equality with zero.  The 1% band increased the spread in every case.  For the 
FMA rules, all buy returns were greater than the unconditional 10-day return with an average of 
0.53%.  Sell returns were all negative with an average of -0.40%.  The buy-sell differences were 
positive for all trading rules with an average of 0.93%.  Seven of the ten rules rejected the null 
hypothesis that the difference equals zero at the 5% significance level.  For the trading range 
breakout rules, buy returns were positive across all the rules with an average of 0.63%, while sell 
returns were all negative with an average of -0.24%.  The average buy-sell return was 0.86% and 
all six rules rejected the null hypothesis of the buy-sell spread differences being equal to zero.   
 
The bootstrap results showed that all null models could not explain the differences 
between the buy and sell returns generated by the technical trading rules.  For example, the 
GARCH-M generated the largest buy-sell spread (0.018%) for the VMA rules among the null 
models, but the spread was still smaller than that (0.067%) from the original Dow series.  Similar 
results were obtained from the FMA and TRB rules.  Standard deviations for buys and sells from 
the original Dow series were 0.89 and 1.34%, respectively, and thus the market was less volatile 
during buy periods relative to sell periods.  Since the buy signals also earned higher mean returns 
than the sell signals, these results could not be explained by the risk-return tradeoff.  Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron concluded their study by writing, “the returns-generating process of 
stocks is probably more complicated than suggested by the various studies using linear models.  
It is quite possible that technical rules pick up some of the hidden patterns” (p. 1758).   31 
 
  Despite its contribution to the statistical tests in the technical trading literature, Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s study has several shortcomings in testing procedures.  First, only 
gross returns of each trading rule were calculated without incorporating transaction costs, so that 
no evidence about economic profits was presented.  Second, trading rule optimization and out-
of-sample tests were not conducted.  As discussed in the previous section, these procedures may 
be important ingredients in determining the genuine profitability of technical trading rules.  
Finally, results may have been “contaminated” by data snooping problems.  Since moving 
average and trading range breakout rules have kept their popularity over a very long history, 
these rules were likely to have survivorship biases.  If a large number of trading rules are tested 
over time, some rules may work by pure chance even though they do not possess real predictive 
power for returns.  Of course, inference based on the subset of the surviving trading rules may be 
misleading because it does not account for the full set of initial trading rules (Sullivan, 
Timmermann, and White 1999, p. 1649).
17   
 
Table 4 presents summaries of other model-based bootstrap studies.  As indicated in the 
table, a number of studies in this category either tested the same trading rules as in Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) or followed their testing procedures.  For example, Levich and 
Thomas (1993) tested two popular technical trading systems, filter rules and moving average 
crossover systems, on five currency futures markets (the Deutsche mark, Japanese yen, British 
pound, Canadian dollar, and Swiss franc) during the period 1976-1990.  To measure the 
significance level of profits obtained from the trading rules, they constructed the empirical 
distribution of trading rule profits by randomly resampling price changes in the original series 
10,000 times and then applying the trading rules to each simulated series.  They found that, 
across trading rules from both trading systems, average profits of all currencies except the 
Canadian dollar were substantial (about 6% to 9%) and statistically significant, even after 
deducting transaction costs of 0.04% per one-way transaction.   
 
Bessembinder and Chan (1998) evaluated the same 26 technical trading rules as in Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) on dividend-adjusted DJIA data over the period 1926-1991.  
As Fama and Blume (1966) pointed out, incorporating dividend payments into data tends to 
reduce the profitability of short sales and thus may decrease the profitability of technical trading 
rules.  Bessembinder and Chan also argued that “Brock et al. do not report any statistical tests 
that pertain to the full set of rules.  Focusing on those rules that are ex post most (or least) 
successful would also amount to a form of data snooping bias” (p. 8).  This led them to evaluate 
                                                 
17 The following parable on the testing of coin-flipping abilities provided by Merton (1987, p. 104) clarifies this 
problem.  “Some three thousand students have taken my finance courses over the years, and suppose that each had 
been asked to keep flipping a coin until tails comes up. At the end of the experiment, the winner, call her A, is the 
person with the longest string of heads.  Assuming no talent, the probability is greater than a half that A will have 
flipped 12 or more straight heads.  As the story goes, there is a widely believed theory that no one has coin-flipping 
ability, and, hence, a researcher is collecting data to investigate this hypothesis.  Because one would not expect 
everyone to have coin-flipping ability, he is not surprised to find that a number of tests failed to reject the null 
hypothesis.  Upon hearing of A’s feat (but not of the entire environment in which she achieved it), the researcher 
comes to MIT where I certify that she did, indeed, flip 12 straight heads.  Upon computing that the probability of 
such an event occurring by chance alone is 2
–12, or .00025, the researcher concludes that the widely believed theory 
of no coin-flipping ability can be rejected at almost any confidence level.” 
   32 
the profitability and statistical significance of returns on portfolios of the trading rules as well as 
returns on individual trading rules.  For the full sample period, the average buy-sell differential 
across all 26 trading rules was 4.4% per year (an average break-even one-way transaction cost
18 
of 0.39%) with a bootstrap p-value of zero.  Nonsynchronous trading with a one-day lag reduced 
the differential to 3.2% (break-even one-way transaction costs of 0.29%) with a significant 
bootstrap p-value of 0.002.  However, the average break-even one-way transaction cost has 
declined over time, and, for the most recent subsample period (1976-1991) it was 0.22%, which 
was compared to estimated one-way transaction costs of 0.24%-0.26%.
19  Hence, Bessembinder 
and Chan concluded that, although the technical trading rules used by Brock, Lakonishok, and 
LeBaron revealed some forecasting ability, it was unlikely that traders could have used the 
trading rules to improve returns net of transaction costs.   
 
The results of the model-based bootstrap studies varied enormously across markets and 
sample periods tested.  In general, for (spot or futures) stock indices in emerging markets, 
technical trading rules were profitable even after transaction costs (Bessembinder and Chan 
1995; Raj and Thurston 1996; Ito 1999; Ratner and Leal 1999; Coutts and Cheung 2000; 
Gunasekarage and Power 2001), while technical trading profits on stock indices in developed 
markets were negligible after transaction costs or have decreased over time (Hudson, Dempsey, 
and Keasey 1996; Mills 1997; Bessembinder and Chan 1998; Ito 1999; Day and Wang 2002).  
For example, Ratner and Leal (1999) documented that Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s 
moving average rules generated statistically significant net returns in four equity markets 
(Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines) over the1982-1995 period.  For the FT30 index 
in the London Stock Exchange, Mills (1997) showed that mean daily returns produced from 
moving average rules were much higher (0.081% and 0.097%) than buy-and-hold returns for the 
1935-1954 and 1955-1974 periods, respectively, although the returns were insignificantly 
different from a buy-and-hold return for the 1975-1994 period.  On the other hand, LeBaron 
(1999), Neely (2002), and Saacke (2002) reported the profitability of moving average rules in 
currency markets.  For example, LeBaron (1999) found that for the mark and yen, a 150 moving 
average rule generated Sharpe ratios of 0.60-0.98 after a transaction cost of 0.1% per round-trip 
over the 1979-1992 period.  These Sharpe ratios were much greater than those (0.3-0.4) for buy-
and-hold strategies on aggregate US stock portfolios.  However, Kho (1966) and Sapp (2004) 
showed that trading rule profits in currency markets could be explained by time-varying risk 
premia using some version of the conditional CAPM.  In addition, there has been serious 
disagreement about the source of technical trading profits in the foreign exchange market.  
LeBaron (1999) and Sapp (2004) reported that technical trading returns were greatly reduced 
after active intervention periods of the Federal Reserve were eliminated, while Neely (2002) and 
Saacke (2002) showed that trading returns were uncorrelated with foreign exchange 
interventions of central banks.  Most studies in this category have similar problems to those in 
Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992).  Namely, trading rule optimization, out-of-sample 
                                                 
18 Break-even one-way transaction costs are defined as the percentage one-way trading costs that eliminate the 
additional return from technical trading (Bessembinder and Chan, 1995, p. 277).  They can be calculated by dividing 
the difference between portfolio buy and sell means by twice the average number of portfolio trades.                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 This result contrasts sharply with that of Taylor (2000), who found a break-even one-way transaction cost of 
1.07% for the DJIA data during the 1968-1988 period using an optimized moving average rule.   33 
verification, and data snooping problems were not seriously considered, although several recent 
studies incorporated parameter optimization and transaction costs into their testing procedures.   
 
Genetic Programming Studies 
 
Genetic programming, introduced by Koza (1992), is a computer-intensive search 
procedure for problems based on the Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest.  In this 
procedure, a computer randomly generates a set of potential solutions for a specific problem and 
then allows them to evolve over many successive generations under a given fitness 
(performance) criterion.  Solution candidates (e.g., technical trading rules) that satisfy the fitness 
criterion are likely to reproduce, while ones that fail to meet the criterion are likely to be 
replaced.  The solution candidates are represented as hierarchical compositions of functions like 
tree structures in which the successors of each node provide the arguments for the function 
identified with the node.  The terminal nodes without successors include the input data, and the 
entire tree structure as a function is evaluated in a recursive manner by investigating the root 
node of the tree.  The structure of the solution candidates, which is not pre-specified as a set of 
functions, can be regarded as building blocks to be recombined by genetic programming. 
 
When applied to technical trading rules, the building blocks consist of various functions 
of past prices, numerical and logical constants, and logical functions that construct more 
complicated building blocks by combining simple ones.  The function set can be divided into two 
groups of functions: real and Boolean.  The real-valued functions are arithmetic operators (plus, 
minus, times, divide), average, maximum, minimum, lag, norm, and so on, while Boolean 
functions include logical functions (and, or, not, if-then, if-then-else) and comparisons (greater 
than, less than).  There are also real constants and Boolean constants (true or false).  As a result, 
these functions require the trading systems tested to be well defined.   
 
The aforementioned unique features of genetic programming may provide some 
advantages relative to traditional studies with regard to testing technical trading rules.  
Traditional technical trading studies investigate a pre-determined parameter space of trading 
systems, whereas the genetic programming approach examines a search space composed of 
logical combinations of trading systems or rules.  Thus, the fittest or optimized rule identified by 
genetic programming can be regarded as an ex ante rule in the sense that its parameters are not 
determined before the test.  Since the procedure makes researchers avoid much of the 
arbitrariness involved in selecting parameters, it can substantially reduce the risk of data 
snooping biases.  Of course, it cannot completely eliminate all potential bias because in practice 
its search domain (i.e., trading systems) is still constrained to some degree (Neely, Weller, and 
Dittmar 1997).   
 
Allen and Karjalainen (1999) applied the genetic programming approach to the daily 
S&P 500 index from 1928-1995 to test the profitability of technical trading rules.  They built the 
following algorithm to find the fittest trading rules (p. 256): 
 
  Step 1.  Create a random rule.  Compute the fitness of the rule as the excess return in the 
  training period above the buy-and-hold strategy.  Do this 500 times (this is the initial 
  population).   34 
   
  Step 2.  Apply the fittest rule in the population to the selection period and compute the 
  excess return.  Save this rule as the initial best rule.                                                    
 
Step 3.  Pick two parent rules at random, using a probability distribution skewed towards 
the best rule.  Create a new rule by breaking the parents apart randomly and recombining 
the pieces (this is a crossover).  Compute the fitness of the new rule in the training period.  
And then replace one of the old rules by the new rule, using a probability distribution 
skewed towards the worst rule.  Do this 500 times to create a new generation. 
 
Step 4.  Apply the fittest (best) rule in the new generation to the selection period and 
compute the excess return.  If the excess return improves upon the previous best rule, 
save as the new best rule.  Stop if there is no improvement for 25 generations or after a 
total of 50 generations.  Otherwise, go back to Step 3.   
 
This procedure describes one trial, and each trial starting from a different random population 
generates one best rule.  The best rule is then tested in the validation (out-of-sample) period 
immediately following the selection period.  If no rule better than the buy-and-hold strategy in 
the training period is produced in the maximum number of generations, the trial is discarded.  In 
Allen and Karjalainen’s study, the size of the genetic structures was bounded to 100 nodes and to 
a maximum of ten levels of nodes.  The search space as building blocks was also constrained to 
logical combinations of simple rules, which are moving averages and maxima and minima of 
past prices.   
 
The data used was the S&P 500 index over the 1928-1995 period.  To identify optimal 
trading rules, 100 independent trials were conducted by saving one rule from each trial. The 
fitness criterion was maximum excess return over the buy-and-hold strategy after taking account 
of transaction costs.  The excess returns were calculated only on buy positions with several one-
way transaction costs (0.1%, 0.25%, and 0.5%).  To avoid potential data snooping in the 
selection of time periods, ten successive training periods were employed.  The 5-year training 
and 2-year selection periods began in 1929 and were repeated every five years until 1974, with 
each out-of-sample test beginning in 1936, 1941, and so on, up to 1981.  For example, the first 
training period was from 1929-1933, the selection period from 1934-1935, and the test period 
from 1936-1995.  For each of the ten training periods, ten trials were executed.  The out-of-
sample results indicated that trading rules optimized by genetic programming failed to generate 
consistent excess return after transaction costs.  After considering the most reasonable 
transaction costs of 0.25%, average excess returns were negative for nine of the ten periods.  
Even after transaction costs of 0.1%, the average excess returns were negative for six out of the 
ten periods.  For most test periods, only a few trading rules indicated positive excess returns.  
However, in most of the training periods, the optimized trading rules showed some forecasting 
ability because the difference between average daily returns during days in the market and out of 
the market was positive, and the volatility during ‘in’ days was generally lower than during ‘out’ 
days.  Allen and Karjalainen tried to explain the volatility results by the negative relationship 
between ex post stock market returns and unexpected changes in volatility.  For example, when 
volatility is higher than expected, investors revise their volatility forecasts upwards, requiring 
higher expected returns in the future, or lower stock prices and hence lower realized returns at   35 
present.  It is interesting that these results are analogous to Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s 
finding (1992).   
 
The structure of the optimal trading rules identified by genetic programming varied 
across different trials and transaction costs.  For instance, with 0.25% transaction costs the most 
optimal rules were similar to a 250-day moving average rule, while with 0.1% transaction costs 
approximately half of the rules resembled a rule comparing the normalized price to a constant, 
and the rest of the rules were similar to either 10- to 40-day moving average rules or a trading 
range breakout rule comparing today’s price to a 3-day minimum price.  However, the optimal 
trading rules in several training periods were too complex to be matched with simple technical 
trading rules.  Overall, throughout the out-of-sample simulations, the genetically optimized 
trading rules did not realize excess returns over a simple buy-and-hold strategy after transaction 
costs.  Hence, Allen and Karjalainen concluded that their results were generally consistent with 
market efficiency.   
 
Table 5 presents summaries of other genetic programming studies.  Using similar 
procedures to those used in Allen and Karjalainen (1999), Neely, Weller, and Dittmar (1997) 
investigated six foreign exchange rates (mark, yen, pound, Swiss franc, mark/yen, and 
pound/Swiss franc) over the 1974-1995 period.  For all exchange rates, they used 1975-1977 as 
the training period, 1978-1980 as the selection period, and 1981-1995 as the validation period.  
They set transaction costs of 0.1% per round-trip in the training and selection periods, and 0.05% 
in the validation period.  Results indicated that average annual net returns from each portfolio of 
100 optimal trading rules for each exchange rate ranged 1.0%-6.0%.  Trading rules for all 
currencies earned statistically significant positive net returns that exceeded the buy-and-hold 
returns.  In addition, when returns were measured using a median portfolio rule in which a long 
position was taken if more than 50 rules signaled long and a short position otherwise, net returns 
in the dollar/mark, dollar/yen, and mark/yen were substantially increased.  Similar results were 
obtained for the Sharpe ratio criterion.  However, in many cases the optimal trading rules 
appeared to be too complex to simplify their structures.  The trading rule profits did not seem to 
be compensation for bearing systematic risk, since most of the betas estimated for four 
benchmarks (the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world equity market index, the 
S&P 500, the Commerzbank index of German equity, and the Nikkei) were negative.  In only 
one case (dollar/yen on the MSCI World Index), beta was significantly positive with a value of 
0.17.  To determine whether the performance of trading rules can be explained by a given model 
for the data-generating process, Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s bootstrap procedures were 
used with three null models (a random walk, ARMA, and ARMA-GARCH (1,1)).  The best-
performing ARMA model could explain only about 11% of the net returns to the dollar/mark rate 
yielded by 10 representative trading rules.   
   
Ready (2002) compared the performance of technical trading rules developed by genetic 
programming to that of moving average rules examined by Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron 
(1992) for dividend-adjusted DJIA data.  Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s best trading rule 
(1/150 moving average without a band) for the 1963-1986 period generated substantially higher 
excess returns than the average of trading rules formed by genetic programming after transaction 
costs.  For the 1957-1962 period, however, the moving average rule underperformed every one 
of genetic trading rules.  Thus, it seemed unlikely that Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s   36 
moving average rules would have been chosen by a hypothetical trader at the end of 1962.  This 
led Ready to conclude that “the apparent success (after transaction costs) of the Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) moving average rules is a spurious result of data snooping” (p. 
43).  He further found that genetic trading rules performed poorly for each out-of-sample period, 
i.e., 1963-1986 and 1987-2000.   
 
Similarly, Wang (2000) and Neely (2003) reported that genetically optimized trading 
rules failed to outperform the buy-and-hold strategy in both S&P 500 spot and futures markets.  
For example, Neely (2003) showed that genetic trading rules generated negative mean excess 
returns over the buy-and-hold strategy during the entire out-of-sample periods, 1936-1995.  On 
the other hand, Neely and Weller (1999, 2001) documented the profitability of genetic trading 
rules in various foreign exchange markets, although trading profits appeared to gradually decline 
over time.  Neely and Weller’s (2001) finding indicated that technical trading profits for four 
major currencies were 1.7%-8.3% per year over the 1981-1992 period, but near zero or negative 
except for the yen over the 1993-1998 period.  By testing intra-daily data in 1996, Neely and 
Weller (2003) also found that genetic trading rules realized break-even transaction costs of less 
than 0.02% for most major currencies, under realistic trading hours and transaction costs.  
Roberts (2003) documented that during the 1978-1998 period genetic trading rules generated a 
statistically significant mean net return (a daily mean profit of $1.07 per contract) in comparison 
to a buy-and-hold return (-$3.30) in a wheat futures market.  For corn and soybeans futures 
markets, however, genetic trading rules produced both negative mean returns and negative ratios 
of profit to maximum drawdown.  In sum, technical trading rules formulated by genetic 
programming appeared to be unprofitable in stock markets, particularly in recent periods.  In 
contrast, genetic trading rules performed well in foreign exchange markets with their decreasing 
performance over time.  In grain futures markets, the results were mixed.   
 
The genetic programming approach may avoid data snooping problems caused by ex post 
selection of technical trading rules in the sense that the rules are chosen by using price data 
available before the beginning of the test period and thus all results are out-of-sample.  However, 
the results of genetic programming studies may be confronted with a similar problem.  That is, 
“it would be inappropriate to use a computer intensive genetic algorithm to uncover evidence of 
predictability before the algorithm or computer was available” (Cooper and Gulen 2003, p. 9).  
In addition, it is questionable whether trading rules formed by genetic programming have been 
used by real traders.  A genetically trained trading rule is a “fit solution” rather than a “best 
solution” because it depends on the evolution of initially chosen random rules.  Thus, numerous 
“fit” trading rules may be identified on the same in-sample data.  For this reason, most 
researchers using the genetic programming technique have evaluated the “average” performance 
of 10 to 100 genetic trading rules.  More importantly, trading rules formulated by a genetic 
program generally have a more complex structure than that of typical technical trading rules used 
by technical analysts.  This implies that the rules identified by genetic programming may not 
approximate real technical trading rules applied in practice.  Hence, studies applying genetic 
programming to sample periods ahead of its discovery violate the first two conditions suggested 
by Timmermann and Granger (2004), which indicate that forecasting experiments need to 
specify (1) the set of forecasting models available at any given point in time, including 
estimation methods; (2) the search technology used to select the best (or a combination of best) 
forecasting model(s).     37 
 
Reality Check Studies 
 
According to White (2000), “Data snooping occurs when a given set of data is used more 
than once for purposes of inference or model selection” (p. 1097).  He argued that when such 
data re-use occurs, any satisfactory results obtained may simply be due to chance rather than to 
any merit inherent in the method yielding the results.  Lo and MacKinlay (1990) also argued that 
“the more scrutiny a collection of data is subjected to, the more likely will interesting (spurious) 
patterns emerge” (p. 432).  Indeed, in empirical studies of prediction, when there is little 
theoretical guidance regarding the proper selection of choice variables such as explanatory 
variables, assets, in-sample estimation periods, and others, researchers may select the choice 
variables “in either (1) an ad-hoc fashion, (2) to make the out-of-sample forecast work, or (3) by 
conditioning on the collective knowledge built up to that point (which may emanate from (1) 
and/or (2)), or some combination of the three” (Cooper and Gulen 2003, p. 3).  Such data 
snooping practices inevitably overstate significance levels (e.g., t-statistic or 
2 R ) of 
conventional hypothesis tests (Lovell 1983; Denton 1985; Lo and MacKinlay 1990; Sullivan, 
Timmermann, and White 1999; Cooper and Gulen 2003).   
 
In the literature on technical trading strategies, a fairly blatant form of data snooping is an 
ex post and “in-sample” search for profitable trading rules.  Jensen (1967) argued that “if we 
begin to test various mechanical trading rules on the data we can be virtually certain that if we 
try enough rules with enough variants we will eventually find one or more which would have 
yielded profits (even adjusted for any risk differentials) superior to a buy-and-hold policy.  But, 
and this is the crucial question, does this mean the same trading rule will yield superior profits 
when actually put into practice?” (p. 81).  More subtle forms of data snooping are suggested by 
Cooper and Gulen (2003).  Specifically, a set of data in technical trading research can be 
repeatedly used to search for profitable “families” of trading systems, markets, in-sample 
estimation periods, out-of-sample periods, and trading model assumptions including performance 
criteria and transaction costs.  As an example, a researcher may deliberately investigate a number 
of in-sample optimization periods (or methods) on the same data to select one that provides 
maximum profits.  Even if a researcher selects only one in-sample period in an ad-hoc fashion, it 
is likely to be strongly affected by similar previous research.  Moreover, if there are many 
researchers who choose one individual in-sample optimization method on the same data, they are 
collectively snooping the data.  Collective data snooping is potentially the most dangerous 
because it is not easily recognized by each individual researcher (Denton 1985).   
 
White (2000) developed a statistical procedure that, unlike the genetic programming 
approach, can assess the effects of data snooping in the traditional framework of pre-determined 
trading rules.  The procedure, which is called the Bootstrap Reality Check methodology, tests a 
null hypothesis that the best trading rule performs no better than a benchmark strategy.  In this 
approach, the best rule is searched by applying a performance measure to the full set of trading 
rules, and a desired p-value can be obtained from comparing the performance of the best trading 
rule to approximations to the asymptotic distribution of the performance measure.  Thus, White’s 
approach takes account of dependencies across trading rules tested. 
   38 
Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999) applied White’s Bootstrap Reality Check 
methodology to 100 years of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), from 1897 through 1996.  
They used the sample period (1897-1986) studied by Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) 
for in-sample tests and an additional 10 years from 1987-1996 for out-of-sample tests.  S&P 500 
index futures from 1984 through 1996 were also used to test the performance of trading rules.  
For the full set of technical trading rules, Sullivan, Timmermann, and White considered about 
8,000 trading rules drawn from 5 simple technical trading systems that consisted of filters, 
moving averages, support and resistance, channel breakouts, and on-balance volume averages.  
Two performance measures, the mean return and the Sharpe ratio, were employed.  A benchmark 
for the mean return criterion was the “null” system, which means out of market.  In the case of 
the Sharpe ratio criterion, a benchmark of a risk-free rate was used, implying that technical 
trading rules earn the risk-free rate on days when a neutral signal is generated.  Transaction costs 
were not incorporated directly. 
 
  The results for the mean return criterion indicated that during the 1897-1996 period the 
best rule was a 5-day moving average that produced an annual mean return of 17.2% with a 
Bootstrap Reality Check p-value of zero, which ensures that the return was not the result of data 
snooping.  Since the average return was obtained from 6,310 trades (63.1 per year), the break-
even transaction cost level was 0.27% per trade.  The universe of 26 trading rules used by Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) was also examined.  Among the trading rules, the best rule was 
a 50-day variable moving average rule with a 1% band, generating an annualized return of 9.4% 
with the Bootstrap Reality Check p-value of zero.  Thus, the results of Brock, Lakonishok, and 
LeBaron (1992) were robust to data snooping biases.
20  These returns were compared with the 
average annual return of 4.3% on the buy-and-hold strategy during the same sample period.  
Similar results were obtained for the Sharpe ratio criterion.  Over the full 100-year period, the 
buy-and-hold strategy generated a Sharpe ratio of 0.034, while Sharpe ratios for the best rules in 
Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s universe and the full universe were 0.39 and 0.82, 
respectively.  Although the Bootstrap Reality Check p-values were all zero for both cases, the 
best rules in Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s study appeared to have insignificant p-values in 
several subperiods.  Out-of-sample results were relatively disappointing.  Over the 10-year 
(1987-1996) sample on the DJIA, the 5-day moving average rule selected as the best rule from 
the full universe over the 1897-1986 period yielded a mean return of 2.8% per year with a 
nominal p-value
21 of 0.32, indicating that the best rule did not continue to generate valuable 
economic signals in the subsequent period.  For the S&P 500 futures index over the period 1984-
1996, the best rule generated a mean return of 9.4% per year with a nominal p-value of 0.04.  At 
first glance, thus, the rule seemed to produce a statistically significant return.  However, the p-
value adjusted for data snooping was 0.90, suggesting that the return was a result of data 
snooping.  Sullivan, Timmermann, and White construed that the poor out-of-sample performance 
relative to the significant in-sample performance of technical trading rules might be related to the 
                                                 
20 This result contrasts sharply with the result of Ready (2002), who argued that Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s 
results were spurious because of the data snooping problem.   
 
21 The nominal p-value was obtained from applying the Bootstrap Reality Check methodology only to the best rule, 
thereby ignoring the effect of data snooping.   
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recent improvement of the market efficiency due to the cheaper computing power, lower 
transaction costs, and increased liquidity in the stock market.    
 
Table 6 presents summaries of the Reality Check studies.  Sullivan, Timmermann, and 
White (2003) expanded the universe of trading rules by combining technical trading rules and 
calendar frequency trading rules
22 tested in their previous works (Sullivan, Timmermann, and 
White 1999, 2001).  The augmented universe of trading rules was comprised of 17,298 trading 
rules.  The results indicated that for the full sample period (1897-1998), the best of the 
augmented universe of trading rules, which was a 2-day-on-balance volume strategy, generated 
mean return of 17.1% on DJIA data with a data snooping adjusted p-value of zero and 
outperformed a buy-and-hold strategy (a mean return of 4.8%).  For a recent period (1987-1996), 
the best rule was a week-of-the-month strategy with a mean return of 17.3% being slightly higher 
than a buy-and-hold return (13.6%).  However, the return was not statistically significant with a 
data snooping adjusted p-value of 0.98.  Similar results were found for the S&P 500 futures data.  
The best rule (a mean return of 10.7%) outperformed the benchmark (a mean return of 8.0%) 
during the 1984-1996 period, but a data snooping adjusted p-value was 0.99.  Hence, they argued 
that it might be premature to conclude that both technical trading rules and calendar rules 
outperformed the benchmark in the stock market.   
 
Qi and Wu (2002) applied White’s Bootstrap Reality Check methodology to seven 
foreign exchange rates during the 1973-1998 period.  They created the full set of rules with four 
trading systems (filters, moving averages, support and resistance, and channel breakouts) among 
five technical trading systems employed in Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999).  Results 
indicated that the best trading rules, which were mostly moving average rules and channel 
breakout rules, produced positive mean excess returns over the buy-and-hold benchmark across 
all currencies and had significant data snooping adjusted p-values for the Canadian dollar, the 
Italian lira, the French franc, the British pound, and the Japanese yen.  The mean excess returns 
were economically substantial (7.2% to 12.2%) for all the five currencies except for the 
Canadian dollar (3.6%), even after adjustment for transaction costs of 0.04% per one-way 
transaction.  In addition, the excess returns could not be explained by systematic risk.  Similar 
results were found for the Sharp ratio criterion, and the overall results appeared robust to 
incorporation transaction costs into the general trading model, changes in a vehicle currency, and 
changes in the smoothing parameter in the stationary bootstrap procedure.  Hence, Qi and Wu 
concluded that certain technical trading rules were genuinely profitable in foreign exchange 
markets during the sample period.   
 
By using White’s Bootstrap Reality Check methodology, Sullivan, Timmermann, and 
White (1999, 2003) corroborated academics’ belief regarding technical trading rules in their out-
of-sample tests.  However, several problems are found in their work.  First, the universe of 
trading rules considered by Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999, 2003) may not represent 
the true universe of trading rules.  For example, their first study assumed that rules from five 
simple technical trading systems represented the full set of technical trading rules.  However, 
there may be numerous different technical trading systems such as various combination systems 
                                                 
22 These calendar frequency trading rules are based on calendar effects documented in finance studies.  Several 
famous calendar effects are the Monday effect, the holiday effect, the January effect, and the turn-of-the-month 
effect.  See Schwert (2003) for further details.   40 
that were not included in their full set of technical trading rules.  If a set of trading rules tested is 
a subset of an even larger universe of rules, White’s Bootstrap Reality Check methodology 
delivers a p-value biased toward zero under the assumption that the included rules in the 
“universe” performed quite well during the historical sample period.  This can be illustrated by 
comparing the results of Sullivan, Timmermann, and White’s studies.  When only technical 
trading rules were tested on DJIA data over the 1987-1996 period, the best rule (a 200-day 
channel rule with 0.150 width and a 50-day holding period) generated an annual mean return of 
14.41% with a p-value of 0.341.  However, the best (a week-of-the-month rule) of the augmented 
universe of trading rules yielded an annual mean return of 17.27% with a p-value of 0.98 for the 
same data.  Obviously, the former has a downward biased p-value.  Second, transaction costs 
were not directly incorporated into the trading model.  Transaction costs may have a significant 
effect on selection of the optimal trading rules.  If Sullivan, Timmermann, and White considered 
mean net return as a performance measure, their best trading rules for the full in-sample period 
might be changed because incorporating transaction costs into a performance measure tends to 
penalize trading rules that generate more frequent transactions.  In fact, Qi and Wu (2002) found 
that when they changed a performance measure from mean returns to mean net returns, the best 
trading rules selected were rules that generated less frequent trading signals than in case of the 
mean return criterion.  Third, the data snooping effects of the best trading rule measured in terms 
of the Bootstrap Reality Check p-value in a sample period cannot be assessed in a different 
sample period (e.g., an out-of-sample period), because the best trading rule usually differs 
according to sample periods considered.   
 
A final problem arises from White’s (2000) procedure itself.  In the testing procedure for 
superior predictive ability (SPA) such as White’s procedure, the null hypothesis typically 
consists of multiple inequalities, which lead to a composite null hypothesis.  One of the 
complications of testing a composite hypothesis is that the asymptotic distribution of the test 
statistic is not unique under the null hypothesis.  The typical solution for the ambiguity in the 
null distribution is to apply the least favorable configuration (LFC), which is known as the points 
least favorable to the alternative hypothesis.  This is exactly what White (2000) has done.  
However, Hansen (2003) showed that such a LFC-based test has some limitations because it 
does not ordinarily meet an “asymptotic similar condition” which is necessary for a test to be 
unbiased, and as a result it may be sensitive to the inclusion of poor forecasting models.  In fact, 
the simulation and empirical results in Hansen (2003, 2004) indicated that the inclusion of a few 
poor-performing models severely reduces rejection probabilities of White’s Reality Check test 
under the null, causing the test to be less powerful under the alternative.  In research on technical 
trading systems, researchers generally search over a large number of parameter values in each 
trading system tested, because there is no theoretical guidance with respect to the proper 
selection of parameters.  Thus, poor-performing trading rules are inevitably included in the 
analysis, and testing these trading rules with the Reality Check procedure may produce biased 
results.
23  Despite these limitations, Reality Check studies can be regarded as a substantial 
improvement over previous technical trading studies in that they attempted to explicitly quantify 
data snooping biases regarding the selection of technical trading rules. 
 
 
                                                 
23 See Hansen (2003, 2004) for detailed discussion.   
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Chart Pattern Studies 
 
Chart pattern studies test the profitability or forecasting ability of visual chart patterns 
widely used by technical analysts.  Well-known chart patterns, whose names are usually derived 
from their shapes in bar charts, are gaps, spikes, flags, pennants, wedges, saucers, triangles, 
head-and-shoulders, and various tops and bottoms (see e.g.  Schwager (1996) for detailed 
charting discussion).  Previously, Levy (1971) documented the profitability of 32 five-point chart 
formations for NYSE securities.  He found that none of the 32 patterns for any holding period 
generated profits greater than average purchase or short-sale opportunities.  However, a more 
rigorous study regarding chart patterns was provided by Chang and Osler (1999).
24  
 
Chang and Osler evaluated the performance of the head-and-shoulders pattern using daily 
spot rates for 6 currencies (mark, yen, pound, franc, Swiss franc, and Canadian dollar) during the 
entire floating rate period, 1973-1994.  The head-and-shoulders pattern can be described as a 
sequence of three peaks with the highest in the middle.  The center peak is referred to as ‘head’, 
the left and right peaks around the head as ‘shoulders’, and the straight line connecting the 
troughs separating the head from right and left shoulders as ‘the neckline’.  The pattern is 
considered ‘confirmed’ when the price path penetrates the neckline after forming the right 
shoulder.  Head-and-shoulders can occur both at peaks and at troughs, where they are called 
‘tops’ and ‘bottoms’, respectively.  After developing the head-and-shoulders identification and 
profit-taking algorithm, Chang and Osler established a strategy for entering and exiting positions 
based on such recognition.  The entry position is taken when a current price breaks the neckline, 
while the timing of exit can be determined arbitrarily.  They set up two kinds of exit rules: an 
endogenous rule and an exogenous rule.  The endogenous rule includes both stop-loss and 
bounce.  The stop-loss is triggered at 1% of the entry price to limit losses whenever price moves 
in the opposite direction to that expected by the head-and-shoulders.  The bounce possibility is 
captured by the following strategy: if the down-trend of prices following a confirmed head-and-
shoulders top turns up-trend before falling by at least 25% of the vertical distance from the head 
to the neckline, then investors hold their current positions until either prices cross back over the 
neckline by at least 1% (stop-loss) or a second trough (of any size) is reached in the zigzag.  The 
exogenous rule is to close an open position after an exogenously specified number of days from 
the entry point.  One to 60 (1, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, and 60) days were considered. 
 
For the endogenous exit rule, head-and-shoulders rules generated statistically significant 
returns of about 13% and 19% per year for the mark and yen, respectively, but not for the other 
exchange rates.  Returns from the exogenous exit rule appeared to be insignificant in most cases.  
The trading profits from the endogenous exit rules were substantially higher than either the 
annual buy-and-hold returns of 2.5% for the mark and 4.4% for the yen or annual average stock 
yield of 6.8% measured on the S&P 500 index.  The head-and-shoulders returns for the mark and 
yen were also significantly greater than those derived from 10,000 simulated random walk data 
series obtained from a bootstrap method and were substantial even after adjusting for transaction 
costs of 0.05% per round-trip, interest differential, and risk.  For example, the Sharpe ratios for 
the mark and yen were1.00 and 1.47, respectively, while the Sharpe ratio for the S&P 500 was 
0.32.  Moreover, it turned out that the returns were not compensation for bearing systematic risk, 
                                                 
24 In fact, Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s trading range breakout rules (support and resistance levels) can be 
regarded as chart patterns.     42 
since none of the estimated betas were statistically significantly different from zero with the 
largest beta being 0.03.  Profits for the mark and yen were also robust to changes in the 
parameters of the head-and-shoulders recognition algorithm, changes in the sample period, and 
the assumption that exchange rates follow a GARCH (1,1) process rather than the random walk 
model.  Over the sample period, a portfolio that consisted of all six currencies earned total 
returns of 69.9%, which were significantly higher than returns produced in the simulated data.   
 
Chang and Osler further investigated the performance of moving average rules and 
momentum rules and compared the results with the observed performance of the head-and-
shoulders rule.  Returns from the simple technical trading systems appeared statistically 
significant for all six currencies and the simpler rules easily outperformed the head-and-
shoulders rules in terms of total profits and the Sharpe ratios.  To evaluate the incremental 
contribution of the head-and-shoulders rule when combined with each of simpler rules, 
combination rules of both strategies were simulated on the mark and yen.  Results indicated that 
each combination rule generated slightly higher returns than the simple rule alone, but 
significantly increased risk (daily variation of returns).  Hence, Chang and Osler concluded that, 
although the head-and-shoulders patterns had some predictive power for the mark and yen during 
the period of floating exchange rates, the use of the head-and-shoulders rule did not seem to be 
rational, because they were easily dominated by simple moving average rules and momentum 
rules and increased risk without adding significant profits when used in combination with the 
simpler rules. 
 
Table 7 summarizes other chart pattern studies.  Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2000) 
examined more chart patterns.  They evaluated the usefulness of 10 chart patterns, which are the 
head-and-shoulders (HS) and inverse head-and-shoulders (IHS), broadening tops (BTOP) and 
bottoms (BBOT), triangle tops (TTOP) and bottoms (TBOT), rectangle tops (RTOP) and 
bottoms (RBOT), and double tops (DTOP) and bottoms (DBOT).  To see whether these technical 
patterns are informative, goodness-of-fit and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were applied to the 
daily data of individual NYSE/AMEX stocks and Nasdaq stocks during the 1962-1996 period.  
The goodness-of-fit test compares the quantiles of returns conditioned on technical patterns with 
those of unconditional returns.  If the technical patterns provide no incremental information, both 
conditional and unconditional returns should be similar.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic was 
designed to test the null hypothesis that both conditional and unconditional empirical cumulative 
distribution functions of returns are identical. In addition, to evaluate the role of volume, Lo, 
Mamaysky, and Wang constructed three return distributions conditioned on (1) technical 
patterns; (2) technical patterns and increasing volume; and (3) technical patterns and decreasing 
volume.   
 
  The results of the goodness-of-fitness test indicated that the NYSE/AMEX stocks had 
significantly different relative frequencies on the conditional returns from those on the 
unconditional returns for all but 3 patterns, which were BBOT, TTOP, and DBOT.  On the other 
hand, Nasdaq stocks showed overwhelming significance for all the 10 patterns.  The results of 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that, for the NYSE/AMEX stocks, 5 of the 10 patterns 
(HS, BBOT, RTOP, RBOT, and DTOP) rejected the null hypothesis, implying that the 
conditional distributions of returns for the 5 patterns were significantly different from the 
unconditional distributions of returns.  For the Nasdaq stocks, in contrast, all the patterns were   43 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  However, volume trends appeared to provide little 
incremental information for both stock markets with a few exceptions.  The difference between 
the conditional distributions of increasing and decreasing volume trends was statistically 
insignificant for most patterns in both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq markets.  Hence, Lo, 
Mamaysky, and Wang concluded that technical patterns did provide some incremental 
information, especially, for the NASDAQ stocks.  They argued that “Although this does not 
necessarily imply that technical analysis can be used to generate ‘excess’ trading profits, it does 
raise the possibility that technical analysis can add value to the investment process” (p. 1753).  In 
terms of trading profits, Dawson and Steeley (2003) confirmed the argument by applying the 
same technical patterns as in Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2000) to UK data.  Although they found 
return distributions conditioned on technical patterns were significantly different from the 
unconditional distributions, an average market adjusted return turned out to be negative across all 
technical patterns and sample periods they considered.      
 
Caginalp and Laurent (1998) reported that candlestick reversal patterns generated 
substantial profits in comparison to an average gain for the same holding period.  For the S&P 
500 stocks over the 1992-1996 period, down-to-up reversal patterns produced an average return 
of 0.9% during a two-day holding period (annually 309% of the initial investment).  The profit 
per trade ranged from 0.56%-0.76% even after adjustment for commissions and bid-ask spreads 
on a $100,000 trade, so that the initial investment was compounded into 202%-259% annually.  
Leigh, Paz, and Purvis (2002) and Leigh et al. (2002) also noted that bull flag patterns for the 
NYSE Composite Index generated positive excess returns over a buy-and-hold strategy before 
transaction costs.  However, Curcio et al. (1997), Guillaume (2000), and Lucke (2003) all 
showed limited evidence of the profitability of technical patterns in foreign exchange markets, 
with trading profits from the patterns declining over time (Guillaume 2000).  In general, the 
results of chart pattern studies varied depending on patterns, markets, and sample periods tested, 
but suggested that some chart patterns might have been profitable in stock markets and foreign 
exchange markets.  Nevertheless, all studies in this category, except for Leigh, Paz, and Purvis 
(2002), neither conducted parameter optimization and out-of-sample tests, nor paid much 




Nonlinear studies attempted to directly measure the profitability of a trading rule derived 
from a nonlinear model, such as the feedforward networks or the nearest neighbors regressions, 
or evaluate the nonlinear predictability of asset returns by incorporating past trading signals from 
simple technical trading rules (e.g., moving average rules) or lagged returns into a nonlinear 
model.  A single layer feedforward network regression model with d hidden layer units and with 
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where  t y  is an indicator variable which takes either a value of 1 (for a long position) or –1 (for a 
short position) and  ) / log( 1 - - - - = i t i t i t P P r  is the return at time  . i t -  Sometimes, the lagged returns  
are replaced with trading signals generated by a simple technical trading rule such as a moving 
average rule.  Each hidden layer unit receives the weighted sum of all inputs and a bias term and   44 
generates an output signal through the hidden transfer function (G), where  ij g  is the weight of its 
connection from the ith input unit to the jth hidden layer unit.  In the similar manner, the output 
unit receives the weighted sum of the output signals of the hidden layer and generates a signal 
through the output transfer function (F), where  j b  is the weight of the connection from the jth 
hidden layer unit.  For example, in Gençay (1998a), the number of hidden layer units was 
selected to be {1, 2, …, 15} and p was set to 9.  Gençay argued that “under general regularity 
conditions, a sufficiently complex single hidden layer feedforward network can approximate any 
member of a class of functions to any desired degree of accuracy where the complexity of a 
single hidden layer feedforward network is measured by the number of hidden units in the 
hidden layer” (p. 252). 
 
Gençay (1998a) tested the profitability of simple technical trading rules based on a 
feedforward network using DJIA data for 1963-1988.  Across 6 subsample periods, the technical 
trading rules generated annual net returns of 7%-35% after transaction costs and easily 
dominated a buy-and-hold strategy.  The results for the Sharpe ratio were similar.  Hence, the 
technical trading rule outperformed the buy-and-hold strategy after transaction costs and risk 
were taken into account.  In addition, correct sign predictions for the recommended positions 
ranged 57% to 61%.   
 
Other nonlinear studies are summarized in Table 8.  Gençay (1998b, 1999) further 
investigated the nonlinear predictability of asset returns by incorporating past trading signals 
from simple technical trading rules, i.e., moving average rules, or lagged returns into a nonlinear 
model, either the feedforward network or the nearest neighbor regression.  Out-of-sample results 
regarding correct sign predictions and the mean square prediction error (MSPE) indicated that, in 
general, both the feedforward network model and the nearest neighbor model yielded substantial 
forecast improvement and outperformed the random walk model or GARCH (1,1) model in both 
stock and foreign exchange markets.  In particular, the nonlinear models based on past buy-sell 
signals of the simple moving average rules provided more accurate predictions than those based 
on past returns.  Gençay and Stengos (1998) extended previous nonlinear studies by 
incorporating a 10-day volume average indicator into a feedforwad network model as an 
additional regressor.  For the same DJIA data as used in Gençay (1998a), the nonlinear model 
produced an average of 12% forecast gain over the beanchmark (an OLS model with lagged 
returns as regressors) and provided much higher correct sign predictions (an average of 62%) 
than other linear and nonlinear models.  Fernández-Rodríguez, González-Martel, and Sosvilla-
Rivero (2000) applied the feedback network regression to the Madrid Stock index, finding that 
their technical trading rule outperformed the buy-and-hold strategy before transaction costs.  
Sosvilla-Rivero, Andrada-Félix, and Fernández-Rodríguez (2002) also showed that a trading rule 
based on the nearest neighbor regression earned net returns of 35% and 28% for the mark and 
yen, respectively, during the 1982-1996 period, and substantially outperformed buy-and-hold 
strategies.  They further showed that when eliminating days of US intervention, net returns from 
the trading strategy substantially declined to -10% and -28% for the mark and yen, respectively.  
Fernández-Rodríguez, Sosvilla-Rivero, and Andrada-Félix (2003) found that simple trading rules 
based on the nearest neighbors model were superior to moving average rules in European 
exchange markets for 1978-1994.  Their nonlinear trading rules generated statistically significant 
annual net returns of 1.5%-20.1% for the Danish krona, French franc, Dutch guilder, and Italian 
lira.  In general, technical trading rules based on nonlinear models appeared to have either   45 
profitability or predictability in both stock and foreign exchange markets.  However, nonlinear 
studies have a similar problem to that of genetic programming studies.  That is, as suggested by 
Timmermann and Granger (2004), it may be improper to apply the nonlinear approach that was 
not available until recent years to reveal the profitability of technical trading rules.  Furthermore, 
these studies typically ignored statistical tests for trading profits, and might be subject to data 
snooping problems because they incorporated trading signals from only one or two popular 




Other studies are ones that do not belong to any categories reviewed so far.  In general, 
these studies are similar to the early studies in that they did not conduct trading rule optimization 
and out-of-sample verification and address data snooping problems, although several studies 
(Sweeney 1988; Farrell and Olszewski 1993; Irwin et al. 1997) performed out-of-sample tests. 
 
Neely (1997) tested the profitability of filter rules and moving average rules on four 
major exchange rates (the mark, yen, pound sterling, and Swiss franc) over the 1974-1997 period.   
Filter rules included six filters from 0.5% to 3% with window lengths of 5 business days to 
identify local extremes and moving average rules consisted of four dual moving averages (1/10, 
1/50, 5/10, 5/50).  The results indicated that trading rules yielded positive net returns in 38 of the 
40 cases after deducting transaction costs of 0.05% per round-trip. Specifically, for the mark, 9 
of the 10 trading rules generated positive net returns with an annual mean net return of 4.4%.  
These trading profits did not seem to be compensation for bearing risk.  In terms of Sharpe ratios, 
every moving average rule (average of 0.6) and two filter rules outperformed a buy-and-hold 
strategy (0.3) in the S&P 500 Index over the same sample period.  The CAPM betas estimated 
from the 10 trading rules also generally indicated zero or negative correlation with the S&P 500 
monthly returns.  The results for other exchange rates were similar.  Hence, the trading rules, 
especially moving average rules, appeared to be profitable beyond transaction costs and risk.  
However, Neely argued that the apparent success of the technical trading rules might not 
necessarily implicate market inefficiency because of problems in testing procedure, such as 
difficulties in getting actual prices and interest rates, the absence of a proper measure of risk, and 
data snooping.  In particular, he emphasized data snooping problems in studies of technical 
analysis by noting that “the rules tested here are certainly subject to a data-mining bias, since 
many of them had been shown to be profitable on these exchange rates over at least some of the 
subsample” (p. 32).    
  
Table 9 summarizes other studies in this category.  As an exceptional case among the 
studies, Neftci’s (1991) work is close to a theoretical study.  Using the notion of Markov times, 
he demonstrated that the moving average rule was one of the few mathematically well-defined 
technical analysis rules.  Markov times are defined as random time periods, whose value can be 
determined by looking at the current information set (p. 553).  Therefore, Markov times do not 
rely on future information.  If a trading rule generates a sequence of trading signals that fail to be 
Markov times, it would be using future information to emit such signals.  However, various 
patterns or trend crossings in technical analysis, such as “head-and-shoulders” and “triangles,” 
did not appear to generate Markov times.  To verify whether 150-day moving average rule has 
predictive value, Neftci incorporated trading signals of the moving average rule into a dummy   46 
variable in an autoregression equation.  For the Dow-Jones Industrials, F-test results on the 
variable were insignificant over the 1795-1910 period but highly significant over the 1911-1976 
period.  Hence, the moving average rule seemed to have some predictive power beyond the own 
lags of the Dow-Jones Industrials.   
 
Pruitt and White (1988) and Pruitt, Tse, and White (1992) documented that a 
combination system consisting of cumulative volume, relative strength, and moving average 
(CRISMA) was profitable in stock markets.  For example, Pruitt, Tse, and White (1992) obtained 
annual excess returns of 1.0%-5.2% after transaction costs of 2% over the 1986-1990 period and 
found that the CRISMA system outperformed the buy-and-hold or market index strategy.  
Sweeney (1988) and Corrado and Lee (1992) also found that filter-based rules outperformed 
buy-and-hold strategies after transaction costs in stock markets.  Schulmeister (1988) and 
Dewachter (2001) reported the profitability of various technical trading rules in foreign exchange 
markets, but Marsh (2000) showed that technical trading profits in foreign exchange markets 
decreased in the recent period.  Irwin et al. (1997) compared the performance of the channel 
trading system to ARIMA models in soybean-related futures markets.  During their out-of-
sample period (1984-1988), the channel system generated statistically significant mean returns 
ranging 5.1%-26.6% across the markets and beat the ARIMA models in every market.  Overall, 
studies in this category indicated that technical trading rules performed quite well in stock 
markets, foreign exchange markets, and grain futures markets.  As noted above, however, these 
studies typically omitted trading rule optimization and out-of-sample verification and did not 
address data snooping problems. 
 
Summary of Modern Studies 
 
  Modern studies greatly improved analytic techniques relative to those of early studies, 
with more advanced theories and statistical methods spurred on by rapid growth of computing 
power.  Modern studies were categorized into seven groups based on their testing procedures.  
“Standard” studies (Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin 1988; Lukac and Brorsen 1990; and others) 
comprehensively tested the profitability of technical trading rules using parameter optimization, 
out-of-sample verification, and statistical tests for trading profits.  In addition, transaction costs 
and risk were incorporated into the general trading model.  Standard studies, in general, found 
that technical trading profits were available in speculative markets.  Taylor (2000) obtained a 
break-even one-way transaction cost of 1.07% for the DJIA data during the 1968-1988 period 
using an optimized moving average rule.  Szakmary and Mathur (1997) showed that moving 
average rules produced annual net returns of 3.5%-5.4% in major foreign exchange markets for 
1978-1991, although the profits of moving average rules in foreign exchange markets tend to 
dissipate over time (Olsen 2004).  Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin (1988) also found that four 
technical trading systems, the dual moving average crossover, close channel, MII price channel, 
and directional parabolic, yielded statistically significant portfolio annual net returns ranging 
from 3.8%-5.6% in 12 futures markets during the 1978-1984 period.  Nevertheless, since these 
studies did not explicitly address data snooping problems, there is a possibility that the 
successful results were caused by chance. 
 
“Model-based bootstrap” studies (Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron 1992; Levich and 
Thomas 1993; Bessembinder and Chan 1998; and others) conducted statistical tests for trading   47 
returns using model-based bootstrap approaches pioneered by Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron 
(1992).  In these studies, popular technical trading rules, such as moving average rules and 
trading range breakout rules, were tested in an effort to reduce data snooping problems.  The 
results of the model-based bootstrap studies differed across markets and sample periods tested.  
In general, technical trading strategies were profitable in several emerging (stock) markets and 
foreign exchange markets, while they were unprofitable in developed stock markets (e.g., US 
markets).  Ratner and Leal (1999) found that moving average rules generated statistically 
significant annual net returns of 18.2%-32.1% in stock markets of Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, 
and the Philippines during the 1982-1995 period.  LeBaron (1999) also showed that a 150 
moving average rule for the mark and yen generated Sharpe ratios of 0.60-0.98 after a 
transaction cost of 0.1% per round-trip over the 1979-1992 period, which were much greater than 
those (0.3-0.4) for buy-and-hold strategies on aggregate US stock portfolios.  However, 
Bessembinder and Chan (1998) noted that profits from Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron’s 
(1992) trading rules for the DJIA index declined substantially over time.  In particular, an 
average break-even one-way transaction cost across the trading rules in a recent period (1976-
1991) was 0.22%, which was compared to estimated one-way transaction costs of 0.24%-0.26%.  
As pointed out by Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999), on the other hand, popular trading 
rules may have survivorship bias, which implies that they may have been profitable over a long 
historical period by chance.  Moreover, model-based bootstrap studies often omitted trading rule 
optimization and out-of-sample verification. 
 
“Genetic programming” studies (Neely, Weller, and Dittmar 1997; Allen and Karjalainen 
1999; Ready 2002; and others) attempted to avoid data snooping problems by testing ex ante 
trading rules optimized by genetic programming techniques.  In these studies, out-of-sample 
verification for the optimal trading rules was conducted together with statistical tests, and 
transaction costs and risk were incorporated into the testing procedure.  Genetic programming 
studies generally indicated that technical trading rules formulated by genetic programming might 
be successful in foreign exchange markets but not in stock markets.  For example, Allen and 
Karjalainen (1999), Ready (2002), and Neely (2003) all documented that over a long time period, 
genetic trading rules underperformed buy-and-hold strategies for the S&P 500 index or the DJIA 
index.  In contrast, Neely and Weller (2001) obtained annual net profits of 1.7%-8.3% for four 
major currencies over the 1981-1992 period, although profits decreased to around zero or were 
negative except for the yen over the 1993-1998 period.  The results for futures markets varied 
depending on markets tested.  Roberts (2003) obtained a statistically significant daily mean net 
profit of $1.07 per contract in the wheat futures market for 1978-1998, which exceeded a buy-
and-hold return of -$3.30 per contract, but found negative mean net returns for corn and soybean 
futures markets.  The genetic programming technique may become an alternative approach to 
test technical trading rules because it provides a sophisticated search procedure.  However, it was 
not applied to technical analysis until the mid-1990s, and moreover, the majority of optimal 
trading rules identified by a genetic program appeared to have more complex structures than that 
of typical technical trading rules.  Hence, there has been strong doubt as to whether actual traders 
could have used these trading rules.  Cooper and Gulen (2003) and Timmermann and Granger 
(2004) suggested that the genetic programming method must not be applied to sample periods 
before its discovery.   
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“Reality Check” studies (Sullivan, Timmermann, and White 1999, 2003; Qi and Wu 
2002) use White’s Bootstrap Reality Check methodology to directly quantify the effects of data 
snooping.  White’s methodology delivers a data snooping adjusted p-value by testing the 
performance of the best rule in the context of the full universe of trading rules.  Thus, the 
approach accounts for dependencies across trading rules tested.  Reality Check studies by 
Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999, 2003) provide some evidence that technical trading 
rules might be profitable in the stock market until the mid-1980s but not thereafter.  For example, 
Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999) obtained an annual mean return of 17.2% (a break-
even transaction cost of 0.27% per trade) from the best rule for the DJIA index over the 1897-
1996 period, with a data-snooping adjusted p-value of zero.  However, in an out-of-sample 
period (1987-1996), the best rule optimized over the 1897-1986 period yielded an annual mean 
return of only 2.8%, with a nominal p-value of 0.32.  For the foreign exchange market, on the 
other hand, Qi and Wu (2002) obtained economically and statistically significant technical 
trading profits over the 1973-1998 period.  They found mean excess returns of 7.2%-12.2% 
against the buy-and-hold strategy for major currencies except for the Canadian dollar (3.63%) 
after adjustment for transaction costs and risk.  Despite the fact that Reality Check studies use a 
statistical procedure that can account for data snooping effects, they also have some problems.  
For example, there is difficulty in constructing the full universe of technical trading rules.  
Furthermore, if a set of trading rules tested is selected from an even larger universe of rules, a p-
value calculated by the methodology could be biased toward zero under the assumption that the 
included rules in the “universe” performed quite well during the sample period.     
 
   “Chart patterns” studies (Chang and Osler 1999; Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang 2000; and 
others) developed and simulated algorithms that can recognize visible chart patterns used by 
technical analysts.  In general, the results of chart pattern studies varied depending on patterns, 
markets, and sample periods tested, but suggested that some chart patterns might have been 
profitable in stock markets and foreign exchange markets.  For example, Chang and Osler (1999) 
showed that the head-and-shoulders pattern generated statistically significant returns of about 
13% and 19% per year for the mark and yen, respectively, for 1973-1994.  These returns 
appeared to be substantially higher than either buy-and-hold returns or average stock yields on 
the S&P 500 index, and were still retained after taking account of transaction costs, interest 
differential, and risk.  Similarly, Caginalp and Laurent (1998) found that for the S&P 500 stocks, 
down-to-up candlestick reversal patterns earned mean net returns of 0.56%-0.76% during a two-
day holding period (annually 202%-259% of the initial investment) after transaction costs over 
the 1992-1996 period.  Nevertheless, most studies in this category neither conducted parameter 
optimization and out-of-sample tests, nor paid much attention to data snooping problems. 
 
“Nonlinear” studies (Gençay 1998a; Gençay and Stengos 1998; Fernández-Rodríguez, 
González-Martel, and Sosvilla-Rivero 2000; and others) investigated either the informational 
usefulness or the profitability of technical trading rules based on nonlinear methods, such as the 
nearest neighbor or the feedforward network regressions.  Nonlinear studies showed that 
technical trading rules based on nonlinear models possessed profitability or predictability in both 
stock and foreign exchange markets.  Gençay (1998a) found that simple technical trading rules 
based on a feedforward network for the DJIA index generated annual net returns of 7%-35% 
across 6 subsample periods over the 1963-1988 period and easily dominated a buy-and-hold 
strategy.  Sosvilla-Rivero, Andrada-Félix, and Fernández-Rodríguez (2002) also showed that a   49 
trading rule based on the nearest neighbor regression earned net returns of 35% and 28% for the 
mark and yen, respectively, during the 1982-1996 period, and substantially outperformed buy-
and hold strategies.  However, nonlinear studies have a similar problem to that of genetic 
programming studies.  That is, it may be improper to apply the nonlinear approach that was not 
available until recent years to reveal the profitability of technical trading rules.  Furthermore, 
these studies typically ignored statistical tests for trading profits, and might be subject to data 
snooping problems because they incorporated trading signals from only one or two popular 
technical trading rules into the models.   
 
“Other studies” include all studies that do not belong to any categories described in the 
above.  Testing procedures of these studies are similar to those of the early studies, in that they 
did not conduct trading rule optimization and out-of-sample verification, with a few exceptions.  
Studies in this category suggested that technical trading rules performed quite well in stock 
markets, foreign exchange markets, and grain futures markets.  Neely (1997) tested filter rules 
and moving average rules on four major exchange rates over the 1974-1997 period and obtained 
positive net returns in 38 of the 40 cases after adjusting for transaction costs.  Pruitt, Tse, and 
White (1992) found that the CRISMA (combination of cumulative volume, relative strength, and 
moving average) system earned annual mean excess returns of 1.0%-5.2% after transaction costs 
in stock markets for 1986-1990 and outperformed the B&H or market index strategy.  For 
soybean-related futures markets, Irwin et al. (1997) reported that channel rules generated 
statistically significant mean returns ranging 5.1%-26.6% over the 1984-1988 period and beat the 
ARIMA models in every market they tested.  However, it is highly likely that these successful 
findings were attainable due to data snooping. 
   
Table 10 summarizes the results of modern studies.  As shown in the table, the number of 
studies that identified profitable technical trading strategies is far greater than the number of 
studies that found negative results.  Among a total of 92 modern studies, 58 studies found 
profitability (or predictability) in technical trading strategies, while 24 studies reported negative 
results.  The rest (10 studies) indicated mixed results.  In every market, the number of profitable 
studies is twice that of unprofitable studies.  However, modern studies also indicated that 
technical trading strategies had been able to yield economic profits in US stock markets until the 
late 1980s, but not thereafter (Bessembinder and Chan 1998; Sullivan, Timmermann, and White 
1999; Ready 2002).  Several studies found economic profits in emerging (stock) markets, 
regardless of sample periods considered (Bessembinder and Chan 1995; Ito 1999; Ratner and 
Leal 1999).  For foreign exchange markets, it seems evident that technical trading strategies have 
made economic profits over the last few decades, although some studies suggested that technical 
trading profits have declined or disappeared in recent years (Marsh 2000; Neely and Weller 
2001; Olson 2004).  For futures markets, technical trading strategies appeared to be profitable 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.  No study has yet comprehensively documented the 
profitability of technical trading strategies in futures markets after that period.   
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
  This report reviewed survey studies, theories and empirical work regarding technical 
trading strategies.  Most survey studies indicate that technical analysis has been widely used by 
market participants in futures markets and foreign exchange markets, and that at least 30% to   50 
40% of practitioners regard technical analysis as an important factor in determining price 
movement at shorter time horizons up to 6 months.   
 
In the theoretical literature, the conventional efficient markets models, such as the 
martingale and random walk models, rule out the existence of profitable technical trading rules 
because both models assume that current prices fully reflect all available information.  On the 
other hand, several other models, such as noisy rational expectations models, feedback models, 
disequilibrium models, herding models, agent-based models, and chaos theory, suggest that 
technical trading strategies may be profitable because they presume that price adjusts sluggishly 
to new information due to noise, market power, traders’ irrational behavior, and chaos.  In these 
models, thus, there exist profitable trading opportunities that are not being exploited.  Such sharp 
disagreement in theoretical models makes empirical evidence a key consideration in determining 
the profitability of technical trading strategies.   
 
More than 130 empirical studies have examined the profitability of technical trading rules 
over the last four decades.  In this report, empirical studies were categorized into two groups, 
“early” studies and “modern” studies depending on the characteristics of testing procedures.  In 
general, the majority of early studies examined one or two technical trading systems, and 
deducted transaction costs to compute net returns of trading rules.  In these studies, however, risk 
was not adequately handled, statistical tests of trading profits and data snooping problems were 
often ignored, and out-of-sample tests along with parameter optimization were not conducted, 
with a few exceptions.  The results of early studies varied from market to market.  Overall, 
studies of stock markets found very limited evidence of the profitability of technical trading 
strategies, while studies of foreign exchange markets and futures markets frequently obtained 
sizable net profits.  For example, Fama and Blume (1966) reported that for 30 individual 
securities of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) over the 1956-1962 period, long signals 
of a 0.5% filter rule generated an average annual net return of 12.5% that was not much different 
from the buy-and-hold returns.  In contrast, Sweeney (1986) found that for the majority of 10 
major currencies small filter rules produced economically and statistically significant mean 
excess returns (3%-7%) over the buy-and-hold returns during the 1973-1980 period.  Irwin and 
Uhrig (1984) also reported that several technical trading systems such as channel, moving 
average, and momentum oscillator systems generated substantial net returns in corn, cocoa, sugar, 
and soybean futures markets over the 1973-1981 period.   
 
Modern studies improved upon the drawbacks of early studies and typically included 
some of the following features in their testing procedures: (1) the number of trading systems 
tested increased relative to early studies; (2) transaction costs and risk were incorporated (3) 
parameter (trading rule) optimization and the out-of-sample verification were conducted; and (4) 
statistical tests were performed with either conventional statistical tests or more sophisticated 
bootstrap methods, or both.  In this report, modern studies were divided into seven groups based 
on their testing procedures:  ) i  standard,  ) ii  model-based bootstrap,  ) iii  genetic programming, 
) iv  Reality Check,  ) v  chart patterns,  ) vi  nonlinear, and  ) vii  others.  Modern studies indicated 
that technical trading strategies had been able to yield economic profits in US stock markets until 
the late 1980s, but not thereafter (Bessembinder and Chan 1998; Sullivan, Timmermann, and 
White 1999; Ready 2002).  For example, Taylor (2000) obtained a break-even one-way 
transaction cost of 1.07% per transaction for the DJIA data over the 1968-1988 period using a   51 
5/200-day moving average rule optimized over the 1897-1968 period,
25 while Sullivan, 
Timmermann, and White (1999) showed that the best rule (a 1/5-day moving average rule) 
optimized over the 1897-1986 period yielded a statistically insignificant annual mean return of 
only 2.8% for 1987-1996.  Several studies found economic profits in emerging (stock) markets, 
regardless of the sample periods tested (Bessembinder and Chan 1995; Ito 1999; Ratner and Leal 
1999).  For foreign exchange markets, it seems evident that technical trading strategies had been 
profitable at least until the early 1990s, because many modern studies found net profits of around 
5%-10% for major currencies (the mark, yen, pound, and Swiss franc) in their out-of-sample 
tests (Taylor 1992, 1994; Silber 1994; Szakmary and Mathur 1997; Olsen 2004).  However, a 
few studies suggested that technical trading profits in foreign exchange markets have declined in 
recent years (Marsh 2000; Neely and Weller 2001; Olson 2004).
26  For example, Olson (2004) 
reported that risk-adjusted profits of moving average rules for an 18-currency portfolio declined 
from over 3% between the late 1970s and early 1980s to about zero percent in the late 1990s.  
For futures markets, technical trading strategies appeared to be profitable between the mid-1970s 
and the mid-1980s.  For example, Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin (1988) found that several technical 
trading systems, such as the dual moving average crossover, close channel, MII price channel, 
and directional parabolic systems, yielded statistically significant portfolio annual net returns 
ranging from 3.8%-5.6% in 12 futures markets during the 1978-1984 period.  However, no study 
has yet comprehensively documented the profitability of technical trading strategies after that 
period.   
 
Despite positive evidence about profitability and improved procedures for testing 
technical trading strategies, skepticism about technical trading profits remains widespread among 
academics.  For example, in a recent and highly-regarded textbook on asset pricing, Cochrane 
(2001) argues that: “Despite decades of dredging the data, and the popularity of media reports 
that purport to explain where markets are going, trading rules that reliably survive transactions 
costs and do not implicitly expose the investor to risk have not yet been reliably demonstrated (p. 
25).”  As Cochrane points out, the skepticism seems to be based on data snooping problems and 
potentially insignificant economic profits after appropriate adjustment for transaction costs and 
risk.  In this context, Timmermann and Granger (2004, p. 16) provide a detailed guide to the key 
issues that future studies of the profitability of technical trading systems must address:  
 
1.  The set of forecasting models available at any given point in time, including 
estimation methods. 
2.  The search technology used to select the best (or a combination of best) forecasting   
model(s). 
3.  The available ‘real time’ information set, including public versus private information 
and ideally the cost of acquiring such information. 
4.  An economic model for the risk premium reflecting economic agents’ trade-off 
between current and future payoffs. 
                                                 
25 Readers should carefully interpret this result.  A break-even one-way transaction cost indicates gross return per 
trade.  For instance, if the trading rule generates ten trades per year, the corresponding annual mean return would be 
10.7%.  
 
26 One notable exception is the Japanese yen market in which the three studies found net profits even in recent 
periods.   52 
5.  The size of transaction costs and the available trading technologies and any 
restrictions on holdings of the asset in question.    
 
The first two issues above focus squarely on the question of data snooping.  In many 
previous studies, technical trading rules that produced significant returns were selected for 
investigation ex post.  These profitable trading rules may have been selected because they were 
popular or widely used over time.  However, there is no guarantee that the trading rules were 
chosen by actual investors at the beginning of the sample period.  Similarly, studies using genetic 
algorithm or artificial neural networks often apply these relatively new techniques to the sample 
period before their discovery.  Results of these studies are likely to be spurious because the 
search technologies were hardly available during the sample period.  Therefore, the set of trading 
models including trading rules and other assumptions and the search technologies need to be 
specified.   
 
Two possible approaches to handle data snooping problems in studies of technical trading 
strategies have been proposed.  The first is to simply replicate previous results on a new set of 
data (e.g., Lovell 1983; Lakonishok and Smidt 1988; Lo and MacKinlay 1990; Schwert 2003; 
Sullivan, Timmermann, and White 2003).  If another successful result is obtained from a new 
dataset by using the same procedure as used in an original study, we can be more confident the 
profitability (or predictability) of the original procedure.  For a study to be replicated, however, 
the following three conditions should be satisfied: (1) the markets and trading systems tested in 
the original study should be comprehensive, in the sense that results can be considered broadly 
representative of the actual use of technical systems; (2) testing procedures must be carefully 
documented, so they can be “frozen” at the point in time the study was published, and (3) the 
original work should be published long enough ago that a follow-up study can have a sufficient 
sample size.  Thus, if there is no sufficient new data or a lack of rigorous and comprehensive 
documentation about trading model assumptions and procedures, this approach may not be valid.  
Another approach is to apply White’s (2000) Bootstrap Reality Check methodology, in which the 
effect of data snooping is directly quantified by testing the null hypothesis that the performance 
of the best rule in the full universe of technical trading rules is no better than the performance of 
a benchmark.  This approach thus accounts for dependencies across all technical trading rules 
tested.  However, a problem with White’s bootstrap methodology is that it is difficult to 
construct the full universe of technical trading rules.  Moreover, there still remain the effects of 
data snooping from other choice variables, such as markets, in-sample estimation periods, out-of-
sample periods, and trading model assumptions including performance criteria and transaction 
costs, because White’s procedure only captures data snooping biases caused by the selection of 
technical trading rules.   
 
The third issue raised by Timmermann and Granger may not be a critical factor in 
technical trading studies because the information set used typically consists of prices and volume 
that are easily obtainable in real time, with low costs.  The fourth and the fifth issues have the 
potential to be major factors.  It is well known that risk is difficult to estimate because there is no 
generally accepted measure or model.  Timmermann and Granger (2004) argue that “most 
models of the risk premium generate insufficient variation in economic risk-premia to explain 
existing asset pricing puzzles” (p. 18).  In studies of technical analysis, the Sharpe ratio and the 
CAPM beta may be the most widely used risk measures.  However, these measures have some   53 
well-known limitations.  For example, the Sharpe ratio penalizes the variability of profitable 
returns exactly the same as the variability of losses, despite the fact that investors are more 
concerned about downside volatility in returns rather than total volatility (i.e., the standard 
deviation).  This leads Schwager (1985) and Dacorogna et al. (2001) to propose different risk-
adjusted performance measures that take into account drawbacks of the Sharpe ratio.  These 
measures may be used as alternatives or in conjunction with the Sharpe ratio.  The CAPM beta is 
also known to have the joint-hypothesis problem.  Namely, when abnormal returns (positive 
intercept) are found, researchers can not differentiate whether they were possible because 
markets were truly inefficient or because the CAPM was a misspecified model.  It is well-known 
that the CAPM and other multifactor asset pricing models such as the Fama-French three factor 
model are subject to “bad model” problems (Fama 1998).  The CAPM failed to explain average 
returns on small stocks (Banz 1981), and the Fama-French three factor model does not seem to 
fully explain average returns on portfolios built on size and book-to-market equity (Fama and 
French 1993).  Cochrane (2001, p. 465) suggests that some version of the consumption-based 
model, such as Constantinides and Duffie’s (1996) model with uninsured idiosyncratic risks and 
Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) habit persistence model, may be an answer to the bad model 
problems in the stock market and even explain the predictability of returns in other markets (like 
bond and foreign currency markets).   
 
The last issue is associated with market microstructure.  Transaction costs generally 
consist of two components: (1) brokerage commissions and fees and (2) bid-ask spreads.  
Commissions and fees are readily observable, although they may vary according to investors 
(individuals, institutions, or market makers) and trade size. Data for bid-ask spreads (also known 
as execution costs, liquidity costs, or slippage costs), however, have not been widely available 
until recent years.  To account for the impact of the bid-ask spread on asset returns, various bid-
ask spread estimators were introduced by Roll (1984), Thompson and Waller (1987), and Smith 
and Whaley (1994).  However, these estimators may not work particularly well in approximating 
the actual ex post bid-ask spreads if the assumptions underlying the estimators do not correspond 
to the actual market microstructure (Locke and Venkatesh 1997).
27  Although data for calculating 
actual bid-ask spreads generally is not publicly available, obtaining the relevant dataset seems to 
be of particular importance for the accurate estimation of bid-ask spreads.  It is especially 
important because such data would reflect market-impact effects, or the effect of trade size on 
market price.  Market-impact arises in the form of price concession for large trades (Fleming, 
Ostdiek, and Whaley 1996).  A larger trade tends to move the bid price downward and move the 
ask price upward.  The magnitude of market-impact depends on the liquidity and depth of a 
market.
28  The more liquid and deeper a market is, the less the magnitude of the market-impact.  
In addition to obtaining appropriate data sources regarding bid-ask spreads, either using 
transaction costs much greater than the actual historical commissions (Schwager 1996) or 
                                                 
27 Using the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) audit trail transaction records (complete trade 
history), Locke and Venkatesh (1997) estimated the actual transaction costs of 12 futures contracts, which were 
measured by the difference between the average purchase price and the average sale price for all customers 
including market makers and floor brokers, with prices weighted by trade size. They found that the actual 
transaction costs were generally lower than the minimum price changes (tick) or customer-market maker spreads, 
with the exception of several currency futures. 
 
28 Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) quantified the magnitude of market-impact in the stock market by applying 
the ordered probit model to transactions data from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM).   54 
assuming several possible scenarios for transaction costs may be considered as plausible 
alternatives.  
 
Other aspects of market microstructure that may affect technical trading returns are 
nonsynchronous trading and daily price limits, if any.  Many technical trading studies assume 
that trades can be executed at closing prices on the day when trading signals are generated.  
However, Day and Wang (2002), who investigated the impact of nonsynchronous trading on 
technical trading returns estimated from the DJIA data, argued that “… if buy signals tend to 
occur when the closing level of the DJIA is less than the true index level, estimated profits will 
be overstated by the convergence of closing prices to their true values at the market open” (p. 
433).  This problem may be mitigated by using either the estimated ‘true’ closing levels for any 
asset prices (Day and Wang 2002) or the next day’s closing prices (Bessembinder and Chan 
1998).  On the other hand, price movements are occasionally locked at the daily allowable limits, 
particularly in futures markets.  Since trend-following trading rules typically generate buy (sell) 
signals in up (down) trends, the daily price limits enforce buy (sell) trades to be executed at 
higher (lower) prices than those at which trading signals were generated. This may results in 
seriously overstated trading returns.  Thus, researchers should incorporate accurate daily price 
limits into the trading model.  Many issues with respect to market microstructure including ones 
mentioned above are now being resolved with the advent of detailed transactions databases 
including transaction price, time of trade, volume, bid-ask quotes and depths, and various codes 
describing the trade (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, p. 107).  
 
In conclusion, we found consistent evidence that simple technical trading strategies were 
profitable in a variety of speculative markets at least until the early 1990s.  As discussed above, 
however, most previous studies are subject to various problems in their testing procedures.  
Future research must address these problems in testing before conclusive evidence on the 
profitability of technical trading strategies is provided. 
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Table 1  Summary of early technical analysis studies published between 1961 and 1987 
 
                         




Markets considered  

















1. Donchian  









The current price was compared to the two preceding week’s ranges.  This 
trading rule generated net gains of $3,488 and $1,390, on margin of 
$1,000, for a single contract of the December 1959 delivery of copper and 
the December 1960 delivery, respectively.    
2. Alexander   







Filter                           
(11 rules from 5.0 
to 50%) 
Buy & hold  Not adjusted  Trading rules with 5, 6, and 8% filters generated larger gross profits than 
the B&H (buy-and-hold) strategy.  All the profits were not likely to be 
eliminated by commissions.  This led Alexander to conclude that there 
were trends in stock market prices.   
 
3. Houthakker 
    (1961) 
 
 









(11 rules from 0 to 
100%) 
 
Buy & hold, 




Most stop-loss orders generated higher profits than the B&H or a sell and 
hold strategy.  Long transactions indicated better performance than short 
transactions. 
 
4. Cootner (1962) 
 
 





Moving average  
(1/200 days with 
and without a 5% 
band) 
 
Buy & hold 
 
Commissions 




Although net returns from moving average rules were not much different 
from those from the B&H strategy, long transactions generated higher 
returns than the B&H strategy.   Moreover, the variance of the trading rule 
was 30% less than that of the B&H.   
 
5. Gray & Nielsen  











(10 rules from 1 to 
100%) 
 
Buy & hold, 




When applying stop-loss order rules to dominant contracts, there was little 
evidence of non-randomness in wheat futures prices.  They argued that 
Houthakker’s results were biased because he used remote contracts and 
that post-war seasonality of wheat futures prices was induced by 
government loan programs.   
 
6. Alexander  
    (1964) 
 











Buy & hold 
 
Commissions 
of 2% for each 
round-trip 
 
After commissions, only the largest filter (45.6%) rule beat the B&H 
strategy by a substantial margin.  Most of the other trading systems earned 
higher gross profits than filter rules or the B&H strategy.  However, after 
commissions they could not beat the B&H. 
 
7. Smidt (1965a) 
 
 



















About 70% of trading rules tested generated positive returns after 
commissions.  Moreover, half of trading rules returned 7.5% per year or 
more.   
 
8. Fama & Blume     
    (1966) 
 
 
30 individual stocks 







(24 rules from 0.5 
to 50%) 
 






After commissions, only 4 of 30 securities had positive average returns per 
filter.  Even before commissions, filter rules were inferior to the B&H 
strategy for all but two securities.  Although three small filter rules (0.5, 
1.0, and 1.5%) earned higher gross average returns (11.4%-20.9% per 
year) per security when considering only long positions, net returns after 
transaction costs were not much different from B&H returns. 
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Markets considered  


















9. Levy (1967a) 
 
 
















Net returns of several well-performing rules were nearly two or three times 
the return of the geometric average, although these rules possessed slightly 
higher standard deviations relative to the geometric average.   
 
10. Levy (1967b) 
 
















Stocks having the historically strongest relative strength showed an 
average price appreciation of 9.6% over 26 weeks (about 20.1% per year).  
An annual price appreciation of all stocks was 12.8%.  In general, stocks 
that had been both relatively strong and relatively volatile produced higher 
profits. 
 
11. Poole (1967) 
 
 








Filter (10 rules 
from 0.1 to 2%) 
 
 




Four of nine exchange rates had average annual gross returns more than 
25% for the best filter rules, and three of them (Belgium, France, and Italy) 
generated returns above 44%.  Filter rules beat the B&H strategy by large 
differences in returns. 
 
12. Van Horne & 
      Parker (1967) 
 






(100, 150, and 200 
days with 0, 2, 5, 
10, and 15% 
bands) 
 







No trading rule earned a total closing balance nearly as large as that 
generated under the B&H strategy.  Even before transaction costs, gross 
profits from each moving average rule were less than that from the B&H. 
 
 
13. James (1968) 
 
232 to 1376 stocks 
from the CRSP at 





Moving average  
(7 months = 200 
days with 2 and 
5% bands)  
 




Moving average rules could not beat the B&H strategy.  The largest 
average dollar difference between the moving average rules and the B&H 
strategy was very small.   
 
 
14. Van Horne &  






30 NYSE stocks  
/ Daily 
 






days with 0, 5, 10, 
and 15% bands) 
 






When applying trading rules to long positions, only 55 of 480 cases (16 
different combinations of rules multiplied by 30 stocks) realized profits 
greater than those from the B&H strategy.  For long plus short positions, a 
smaller number of trading rules (36 out of 480 cases) outperformed the 
B&H.     
 
15. Jensen &   
      Benington    
      (1970) 
 
29 portfolio samples 





Relative strength  
(2 rules from Levy 
(1967a)) 
 
Buy & hold 
 
Actual round 
lot rate  
 
After transaction costs, Levy’s trading rules did not perform better than the 
B&H strategy.  In fact, after explicit adjustment for the level of risk, the 
trading rules on average generated net returns less than the risk-adjusted 
B&H returns.   
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Markets considered  


















16. Stevenson &  
      Bear (1970) 
 
July corn and 










Buy & hold 
 
0.5 cents per 
bushel for both 
commodities 
 
For all systems, a 5% filter rule worked best, which generated larger net 
profits or greatly reduced losses relative to the B&H strategy.  The filter 
rule also outperformed B&H for both corn and soybean futures.   
 
17. Dryden  
      (1970a) 
 
 
U.K. stock indices, 







Filter (12 rules 
from 0.1 to 5%) 
 







Without transaction costs, filter rules consistently beat the B&H strategy 
for both indices and an individual stock.  With transaction costs, the 
returns from the best filter rules were similar to those from the B&H, but 
long transactions beat the B&H. 
 
18. Dryden   
      (1970b) 
 
 







Filter (14 rules 
from 0.2 to 6%) 
 
 




There was considerable variation among individual stocks’ returns.  On 
average, filter returns were less than the corresponding B&H returns 
except for two smallest filter rules.  However, returns only from long 
transactions were much higher than the B&H returns. 
 











32 forms of a five-
point chart pattern  
 





After transaction costs, none of the 32 patterns for any holding period 
generated profits greater than average purchase or short-sale opportunities.  
Even the best-performing pattern produced adjusted relative-to-market 
returns of -1.1% and -0.1% for one-week and 4-week holding periods, 
respectively.    
 
20. Leuthold  
      (1972) 
 














of $36 per 
round-trip 
 
Four of six filters were profitable after transaction costs.  In particular, a 
3% filter rule generated an annual net return of 115.8% during the sample 
period. 
 
21. Martell &  
      Philippatos 














model and pure 
information model 
 







As an optimal filter size for period t, the adaptive model utilizes a filter 
size which has yielded the highest profits in t-1, subject to some minimum 
value of the average relative information gain.  The pure information 
model chooses as an optimal filter size in period t the one with the highest 
relative average information gain in period t-1.  Both models yielded 
higher net returns than the B&H only for wheat futures.  However, the 
variance in net profits was consistently smaller than that of the B&H in 
both markets. 
 
* Years in parentheses indicate out-of-sample periods.   75 
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Markets considered  


















22. Praetz (1975) 
 
 






Filter (24 rules 
from 0.5 to 25%) 
 




For 12 of all 21 contracts of 18-month length and all three 8-year price 
series, the B&H strategy showed better performance than filter rules, with 
average differences of 0.1% and 2%, respectively.  For the same data set, 
in 10 of 24 filters the B&H returns were greater than average filter returns.  
Thus, filter rules did not seem to outperform the B&H strategy 
consistently. 
 















models and pure 
information model 
 







A new adaptive model was developed and applied to the same data set as 
that used in Martell and Philippatos (1974).  The new model selects its 
optimal filter size for next period based on profitability (e.g., the highest 
cumulative net profits) and information gain.  Although the model 
outperformed the previous adaptive model for around 80% of the sample 
period, it neither indicated any stability with respect to the information 
constraint nor beat the pure information model that allows a filter size in a 
particular period to reflect new information.    
 
24. Akemann &  
      Keller (1977) 
 
Industry groups 














The relative strength rule is designed to buy the strongest stock group in a 
given thirteen-week period and sell it after 52 weeks.  After adjustment for 
transaction costs, the mean return differential between all 378 possible 
trials and the market index appeared to be 14.6%, although the differentials 
were quite volatile.   
 
25. Logue &  









Filter (14 rules 
from 0.7 to 5%) 
 






Most trading rules (13 out of 14 rules) outperformed the B&H strategy 
after considering transaction costs.  Compared to the buy and hold and 
invest in French government securities strategy, only four filters failed to 
generate higher profits.   
 
26. Cornell &  
      Dietrich  
(1978) 
 




Swiss franc, and 





Filter (13 rules 
from 0.1 to 5%), 
and moving 
average (10, 25, 
and 50 days with 
0.1 to 2% bands) 
 





ask spread for 
all trades. 
 
For the Dutch guilder, German mark, and Swiss franc, the best rules from 
each trading system generated over 10% annual net returns.  Although the 
net returns were relatively small (1% to 4%) for the British pound, 
Canadian dollar, and Japanese yen, they all beat the B&H strategy.  
Moreover, since none of the systematic risk (beta) estimates exceeded 
0.12, high returns of the three currencies were less likely to be 
compensation for bearing systematic risk. 
 
27. Logue,  
      Sweeney, &  
      Willett (1978) 
 







Filter (11 rules 
from 0.5 to 15%) 
 




For every exchange rate (the mark, pound, yen, lira, France franc, Swiss 
franc, and Dutch guilder), profits from the best filter rules exceeded those 
from the B&H strategy by differences ranging from 9.3% to 32.9%.   
 
* Years in parentheses indicate out-of-sample periods.   76 
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Markets considered  
























500 stocks from 
both the S&P 500 














Regression results indicated that for the base periods of 1 week to 18 
weeks, the correlation between the change in (beta-adjusted) relative 
strength during the base period and that during any subsequent period was 
strongly negative.  Hence, careless use of relative strength might lead to 
serious money loss. 
 
29. Dale &  
      Workman   
      (1980) 
 
90-day T-bill futures 















For each individual contract, the best trading rules generated positive net 
returns, although the rules did not indicate consistent performances over 
the sample period.    
 














Buy & hold 
on S&P 500 
Index 
 
2% per year 
 
There was a strong correlation between the performance of the strongest 
and weakest industry groups in one year and that of the following years, 
although the performance of the other groups did not have much predictive 
significance.  For example, quintile 1 portfolio, which consists of the top 
20% of industry groups, generated a return of 76% higher than the B&H 
on the market index, while the market outperformed quintile 5 portfolio by 
80%.    
 
31. Solt &  
      Swanson  
      (1981) 
 
 
Gold from London 
Gold Market and 






Filter (0.5 to 50%) 
and moving 
average (26, 52, 
and 104 weeks 
with filters) 
 






annual fees  
 
For gold, a 10% filter rule outperformed the B&H strategy after 
adjustment for transaction costs.  However, none of the filter rules 
dominated the B&H strategy for either gold or silver.  Moving average 
rules were not able to improve the returns for the filter rules as well.   
 
32. Peterson &  
      Leuthold      
      (1982) 
 
7 hog futures 





Filter (10 rules 
from 1 to 10% and 
additional 10 rules 





Not adjusted  
 
All 20 filter rules produced considerable mean gross profits.  It seemed 
that these profit levels exceeded any reasonable commission charges in 
most cases.  In general, mean gross profits increased with larger filters, as 
did variance of profits.   
 
33. Dooley &  
      Shafer  (1983) 
 
9 foreign currencies 







Filter (7 rules from 








Although results were slightly different for each currency, small filter rules 
(1, 3, and 5%) generally produced high profits, while larger filter rules 
showed consistent losses.     77 
Table 1 continued. 
 
                         




Markets considered  


















34. Brush &  

















optimized on the 
development data 
base over 26 
separate 6-month 












The top decile annualized excess return of the best model was 7.1% per 
year over the equal-weighted 168-stock return, after adjustment for risk, 
dividend yield, and transaction costs.  The model also produced a 
compounded growth of 15.2% per year after considering dividend yield 




35. Irwin & Uhrig  





futures: corn, cocoa, 
soybeans, wheat, 
sugar, copper, live 



























ask spread (not 
specified) 
 
Trading rule profits during in-sample periods were substantial and similar 
across all four trading systems.  Out-of-sample results for optimal trading 
rules also indicated that during the 1979-81 period most trading systems 
were profitable in corn, cocoa, sugar, and soybean futures markets.  The 
trading rule profits appeared to be concentrated in the 1973-81 period. 
 
36. Neftci &  
      Policano  
      (1984) 
 
4 futures: copper, 







(25, 50, and 100 








Trading signals were incorporated as a dummy variable into a regression 
equation for the minimum mean square error prediction.  Then the 
significance of the dummy variable was evaluated using F-tests.  Overall, 
moving average rules indicated some predictive power for T-bills, gold, 
and soybeans, while the slope method showed mixed results.    
 
37. Tomek &  




3 random price 
series (each series 
consists of 300 
prices) generated 
from corn prices for 
each sample period 
















From each of three random prices series, 20 sets of prices were replicated.  
The first 20 sets had moderate price variability, the second set large price 
variability, and the third set drift in prices.  Both trading rules failed to 
generate positive average net profits for all three groups with an exception 
of the 10/40 rule for the relatively volatile price group.  The results imply 
that technical trading rules may earn positive net returns by chance, 
although they on average could not generate positive net profits. 
 
38. Bird (1985) 
 
 
Cash and forward 
contracts of copper, 
lead, tin, and zinc 









(25 rules from 1 to 
25%) 
 





For cash and forward (futures) copper, over 2/3 of filter rules beat the 
B&H strategy.  Similar results were obtained for lead and zinc but with 
weaker evidence.  For tin, the results were inconsistent.  Filter rules 
performed substantially better in the earlier period (1972-77). 
* Years in parentheses indicate out-of-sample periods.   78 
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Markets considered  








































By avoiding the year-end effect and exploiting beta corrections and the 
negative predictive power of one-month trends, the best model, which was 
the generalized least squares beta approach, generated an annual excess 
return of more than 5% over the equal-weighted S&P 500, after transaction 
costs.   
 
40. Sweeney  

















(7 rules from 0.5 
to 10%) 
 




1/8 of 1% of 
asset value per 
round-trip 
 
Both in- and out-of-sample tests, small filter rules (0.5% to 5%) 
consistently beat the B&H strategy, and transaction costs did not eliminate 
the risk-adjusted excess returns of filter rules.  Eight filter rules across 6 
exchange rates produced statistically significant excess returns over the 
B&H in both in- and out-of sample periods.    
 





coffee, and sugar, 
Chicago IMM 
currency futures: 
sterling, mark, and 
Swiss franc 















Buy & hold 
and interest 













Taylor (1986) adds one more out-of-sample year (i.e., 1981) to the sample 
period in his 1983’s work.  For sugar, an average net return of the trading 
rule was higher than that of the B&H strategy by 27% per annum.  For 
cocoa and coffee, returns from both the trading rule and the B&H were not 
much different.  Trading gains for currencies during 1979-80 were 
negligible, but in 1981 all currencies generated substantial gains of around 
7% higher than the bank deposit rate. 
 
42. Thompson &  








Coffee and cocoa 
futures in the NY 
Coffee, Sugar, and 
Cocoa Exchange 
/ 6 weekly sets of 
transaction-to-
transaction prices 






(for coffee, 5¢ 
through 35¢ in 
multiples of 5¢ per 
100 lb; for cocoa, 









For both nearby and distant coffee and cocoa contracts, filter rules 
generated average profits per trade per contract substantially lower than 
estimated execution costs per contract in all cases in which profits were 
statistically significantly greater than zero.  The estimated execution costs 
per trade per contract were $32.25 (nearby) and $69.75 (distant) for coffee 
futures contracts and $12.60 (nearby) and $21.80 (distant) for cocoa 
futures contracts.   
* Years in parentheses indicate out-of-sample periods. 
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v 





Use model-based bootstrap methods for 
statistical tests.  No parameter optimization 






















Use genetic programming techniques to 




















Use White’s Reality Check Bootstrap 













     
v 
   


















   
Use nearest neighbors and/or feedforward 












     
v 
   
Most studies in this category lack trading rule 
optimization and out-of-sample tests, and do 
not address data-snooping problems.  
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Table 3  Summary of standard technical analysis studies published between 1988 and 2004 
 
 




Markets considered  




















1. Lukac,  
    Brorsen, 
    & Irwin (1988) 
 
 











12 systems  
(3 channels, 
3 moving averages, 3 
oscillators,  












Out-of-sample results indicated that 4 of 12 systems generated 
significant aggregate portfolio net returns and 8 of the 12 commodities 
earned statistically significant net returns from more than one trading 
system.  Mark, sugar, and corn markets appeared to be most profitable 
during the sample period.  In addition, Jensen test confirmed that the 
same four trading systems having large net returns still produced 
significant net returns above risk.   
 
2. Lukac &  
    Brorsen (1989) 
 
 














systems had 12 
parameters ranging 5 
days to 60 days in 
increments of 5) 
 







Technical trading rule profits were measured based on various 
optimization methods, which included 10 re-optimization strategies, one 
random strategy, and 12 fixed parameter strategies.  The two trading 
systems generated portfolio mean net returns significantly greater than 
the B&H strategy.  However, the trading systems yielded similar profits 
across different optimization strategies and even different parameters.  
Thus, the parameter optimization appeared to have little value.        
 
3. Sweeney &  
    Surajaras  
















Filter, single moving 
average, double 
moving average, and 
the best system  
 







Most trading systems generated risk-adjusted mean net profits after 
transaction costs, and the single moving average rule performed best.  
The variably-weighted portfolio approach generally outperformed the 
equally-weighted approach.  Changing neither parameters for each 
trading system on a yearly basis nor amounts of data used to select 
optimal parameters seem to improve trading profits.   
  
4. Taylor & Tari 




mark, and Swiss 
franc; London 
agricultural futures: 























futures: 1%  
 
 
During the out-of-sample period, 1979-87, the trading rule earned 
aggregate mean net return of 4.3% per year for three currency futures.  
The mark was the most profitable contract (5.4% per year).  From 1982-
85, the trading rule generated a mean net return of 4.8% for cocoa, -
4.26% for coffee, and 18.8% for sugar, outperforming the B&H strategy 
for cocoa and sugar futures.      
 
5. Lukac & 
    Brorsen (1990) 
 














trailing stops, point 
and figure, a counter-













Only 3 of 23 trading systems had negative mean monthly portfolio net 
returns after transaction costs, and 7 of 23 systems generated net returns 
significantly above zero at 10% level.  Most of the trading profits 
appeared to be made over the 1979-80 period.  In the individual 
commodity markets, currency futures produced the highest returns, 
while livestock futures yielded the lowest returns.   
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Markets considered  
























4 currency futures 
from IMM of the 
CME:  pound, 
mark, yen, and 
Swiss franc 






3 technical trading 
systems (filter, 
channel, moving 
average), 2 statistical 
price-trend models  
 







All trading rules outperformed the B&H strategy across all currency 
futures.  Among trading rules, three technical trading systems and a 
revised statistical trend model generated statistically significant and 
much higher mean net returns (3.0% to 4.0%) than that (2.0%) of the 
original price-trend model for most currencies.  These returns could not 
be explained by nonsynchronous trading or time-varying risk premia.   
 
7. Farrell &  
    Olszewski  











A nonlinear trading 
strategy based on 













Although the nonlinear trading strategy were slightly more profitable 
than the B&H strategy, the result was statistically insignificant.  For the 
in-sample period, the nonlinear optimal trading strategy was more 
profitable than the B&H by nearly 5%, while for the out-of-sample 
period, the trading strategy was better by 3%.  Meanwhile, the three 
trend following strategies were more profitable than the nonlinear 
trading strategy by around 5% to 11% during the out-of-sample period, 
depending on the trading strategy.   
 
8. Silber (1994) 
 
 
12 futures markets: 
foreign currencies, 
short-term interest 
rates, metals, oil, 









(short averages: 1 
day to 15 days; long 




Buy & hold 








crude oil and 
gold; 1 tick 
for the rest 
of contracts) 
 
After transaction costs, average annual net returns were positive for all 
contracts but gold, silver, and the S&P 500.  In particular, most currency 
futures earned higher net profits (1.9% to 9.8%).  For those profitable 
markets, moving average rules beat the B&H strategy except for 3-
month Eurodollars.  Test results using a Sharpe ratio criterion were 
similar.  Hence, trading profits appeared to be robust to transaction costs 
and risk.  Central bank intervention is one of possible explanations for 
the trading profits. 
 





4 currency futures 
from IMM: pound, 




















For price series generated by ARIMA(1,1,1) model, channel rules 
correctly identified the sign of conditional expected returns with around 
60% probability.  During 1982-90, optimal channel rules produced an 
average net return of 6.9% per year.  The t-test indicated that the return 
was significant at the 2.5% level.  The best trading opportunities 
occurred for 1985-87.   
 
10. Menkhoff &  
      Schlumberger  
      (1995) 
 















and momentum (10 












for 1 yen; 
0.003 DM 




During the out-of-sample period, 84% out of 129 technical trading rules 
tested outperformed the B&H strategy across exchange rates, after 
adjustment for transaction costs and risk.  However, superiority of 
optimal trading rules during the in-sample period deteriorated in the out-
of-sample period, even though they still outperformed the B&H strategy.   
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Markets considered  




















11. Lee &  
      Mathur  












averages: 1 day to 9 
days; long moving 
averages: 10, 15, 20, 










Results of in-sample tests indicated that the trading rules did not yield 
significantly positive returns for all cross rates but yen/mark and 
yen/Swiss franc (11.5% and 8.8% per year, respectively).  Out-of-
sample results were even worse.  Most cross rates earned negative 
trading returns, although long positions for the yen/mark produced 
marginally significant positive returns. 
 
12. Lee &  
      Mathur  
      (1996b) 
 
 









averages: 1 day to 9 
days; long moving 
averages: 10, 15, 20, 
25, and 30 days) and 











During in-sample periods, moving average rules in general produced 
negative or statistically insignificantly positive net returns except the 
mark/yen (11.5% per year) and the Swiss franc/yen (8.8% per year).  
Similar results were found for channel rules.  During out-of-sample 
periods, overall returns of the trading rules were negative or statistically 
insignificantly positive.  Only for the mark/lira, both long positions of 
moving average rules and channel rules generated statistically 
significant profits. 
 
13. Szakmary &  
      Mathur  
      (1997) 
 
 
5 IMM foreign 
currency futures 
and spots: mark, 










averages: 1 day to 9 
days; long moving 
averages: 10, 15, 20, 










In-sample results indicated that moving average rules generated both 
statistically and economically significant returns for all currency futures 
but the Canadian dollar.  Similar results were reported for both out-of-
sample data (annual net returns ranged from 5.5% to 9.6%) and spot 
rates.  Further analyses showed that the moving average rule profits 
resulted from the central bank’s “leaning against the wind intervention.”  
 
14. Goodacre,  
      Bosher, &    




254 companies in 
the FTSE 350 
Index and 64 




















0 to 2% per 
round-trip 
 
The CRISMA trading system generated annualized profits ranging 
6.9% to 19.3% depending on transaction costs, while an annualized 
return on the FTSE All Share Index over the same time period was 
14.0%.  When adjusted for market movements and risk, however, mean 
excess returns for nonzero levels of transaction costs were significantly 
negative.  Moreover, performance of the trading system was not stable 
over time.  With option trading, the system generated mean return of 
10.2% per trade even in the presence of maximum retail costs, but only 
55% of trades were profitable.   
 
15. Kwan, Lam,  
      So, & Yu  
      (2000) 
 
 


















The price-trend model performed poorer than the B&H strategy in the 
periods 1991-93 and 1995-96 when the market was bullish.  However, 
the trading rule produced larger profits than the B&H in the years, 90, 
94, 97, and 98 when the market became up and down.  Across all years 
and transaction costs considered, an average net return (10.1%) of the 
trading rule was slightly smaller than that (13.5%) of the B&H strategy. 
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16. Maillet &  
      Michel  
      (2000) 
 
 
12 exchange rates 
(combinations of 
U.S. dollar, mark, 









averages: 1 day to 14 
days; long moving 











Optimized moving average rules generated statistically significant 
returns and outperformed the corresponding B&H strategies with the 
exception of the mark/franc rate.  Bootstrap tests generally confirmed the 
results with the rejection of higher returns only in 4 out of 12 rates: the 
mark/dollar, mark/franc, yen/dollar, and yen/franc.  Moreover, riskiness 
of both moving average rules and the B&H strategy, which was 
measured by their standard deviations, appeared to be not much 
different.   
 






1) Financial Times 
(FT) All-Share 
index; 2) UK 12-
share index; 3) 12 
UK stocks; 4) FT 
100 index and 
index futures; 5) 
DJIA index; 6) 




1), 2), and 
3): 1972-91;  






Moving average   
(short moving 
averages: 1, 2, and 5 
days; long moving 
averages: 50, 100, 
150, and 200, with 















The results of optimized moving average rules indicated that differences 
of mean returns between buy and sell positions were substantially 
positive and statistically significant for the FTA index, all versions of the 
12-share index, 4 of the 12 UK firms, and the DJIA index for 3 out of 5 
subperiods.  No significant results were found for the FTSE 100 and 
S&P 500 indices.  Buy positions also appeared to have lower standard 
deviations than sell positions for all but two series.  An average 
breakeven one-way transaction cost across all data series was 0.35%.  In 
particular, for the DJIA index, a trading rule (a 5/200 moving average 
rule) optimized over the 1897-1968 period produced a breakeven one-
way transaction cost of 1.07% during the 1968-88 period.    
 
18. Goodacre &  
      Kohn- 
      Spreyer 





A random sample 
of 322 companies 



















0 to 2% per 
round-trip 
 
The CRISMA system generated annualized profits ranging 6.2% to 
17.6% depending on transaction costs, while the annualized return on the 
S&P 500 Index over the same time period was 14.2%.  However, when 
adjusted for market movements and risk, mean excess returns for 
nonzero levels of transaction costs were significantly negative across all 
return-generating models.  Moreover, the results were not stable over 
time, although trades on larger firms generally performed better than 
small ones. 
 
19. Lee,  
      Gleason,  
      & Mathur  

















averages: 1 day to 9 
days; long moving 
averages: 10 to 30 
days) and channel (2 











Out-of-sample results showed that moving average rules generated 
significantly positive returns for currencies of four countries: Brazil, 
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.  Channel rules also produced significant 
profits for the same currencies except that of Peru.  When only long 
positions were considered, there was a marginal improvement to five and 
four currencies for moving average rules and channel rules, respectively.     84 
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20. Lee, Pan, &  
      Liu (2001) 
 







The same trading 
rules as in Lee, 











Out-of-sample tests indicated that four exchange rates from Korea, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan yielded positive profits for both moving 
average rules and channel rules.  However, these profits were not 
significantly different from zero, except that of the Taiwan dollar.   
 
21. Martin  
















averages: 1 day to 9 
days; long moving 












Out-of-sample, moving average rules generated positive mean net 
returns in 10 of 12 currencies, and the returns were greater than 0.14% 
daily (35% per year) in 5 currencies.  However, Sharpe ratios indicated 
that moving average rules did not generate superior returns on a risk-
adjusted basis.   
 
22. Skouras  














Moving average  
(2 to 200 days with 
bands of 0, 0.5, 1, 
1.5, and 2%) 
 





levels from 0 




Out-of-sample returns were estimated on a daily basis.  Time-varying 
estimated rules (by an Artificial Technical Analyst) outperformed 
various fixed moving average rules employed by Brock et al. (1992) as 
well as the B&H strategy.  When considering transaction costs, however, 
mean returns from the optimized trading rule were higher than the B&H 
mean return only after transaction costs of less than 0.06%.   
 
23. Olson (2004) 
 












averages: 1 day to 12 
days; long moving 
averages: 5 to 200 
days)   
 








Out-of-sample results indicated that risk-adjusted trading profits for 
individual currencies and an equal-weighted 18-currency portfolio 
declined over time.  For the 18-currency portfolio, annualized risk-
adjusted returns decreased from an average of over 3% in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s to about zero percent in the late 1990s.  Overall, profits 
of moving average rules in foreign exchange markets have declined over 
time.   
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Markets considered  


















1. Brock,  
    Lakonishok,  &  













(1/50, 1/150, 5/150, 
1/200, and 2/200 
days with 0 and 1% 
bands) and trading 
range breakout (50, 
150 and 200 days 









Before transaction costs, buy (sell) positions across all trading rules 
consistently generated higher (lower) mean returns than unconditional 
mean returns, and these results were highly significant in most cases.  
For example, a mean buy return from variable moving average rules was 
about 12% per year and a mean sell return was about -7%.  Moreover, 
the buy returns were even less volatile than the sell returns.  Simulated 
series from a random walk with a drift, AR (1), GARCH-M, and 
EGARCH models using a bootstrap method could not explain returns 
and volatility of the actual Dow series.    
 
2. Levich &  
    Thomas  




5 IMM currency 
futures: mark, yen, 
pound, Canadian 






Filters (0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5%) and moving 
average (1/5, 5/20, 
1/200 days) 
 







After adjustment for transaction costs and risk, every filter rule and 
moving average rule generated substantial positive mean net returns for 
all currencies but the Canadian dollar.  Moreover, the results of the 
bootstrap simulation indicated that, for both trading systems, the null 
hypothesis that there is no information in the original time series was 
rejected in 25 of 30 cases.   
 
3. Bessembinder  













The same trading 
rules as in Brock et 
al. (1992) 
 
Buy & hold 
 




Across all markets and trading rules tested, average mean returns on buy 
days exceeded those on sell days by 26.8% per year, and an average 
break-even round-trip transaction cost for the full sample was 1.57%.  In 
particular, technical signals generated by the U.S.  markets appeared to 
have substantial forecast power for returns in the Asian markets.  
Overall, trading rules generated higher net profits (12.2% to 21.2% per 
year) in the Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan stock markets. 
 
4. Hudson,  
    Dempsey, 
    & Keasey  





Index (FT30) in the 
U.K. 




The same trading 














Before transaction costs, buy (sell) positions across all trading systems 
consistently generated higher (lower) returns than unconditional returns.  
However, an extra return per round-trip transaction averaged across all 
systems appeared to be about 0.8%, which was relatively smaller than 
the round-trip transaction costs of 1%.   
 





4 currency futures 
from IMM: pound, 








(1/20, 1/30, 1/50, 
2/20, 2/30, 2/50 
weeks with bands of 










Initially, moving average rules generated substantial mean returns 
between 9.9% and 11.1% per year from buy signals.  These trading 
returns could not be explained by the empirical distribution of the 
univariate GARCH-M model as well as transaction costs or serial 
correlations in futures returns.  However, the returns appeared to be 
insignificant when time-varying risk premia, which were estimated from 
a general model of the conditional CAPM, were taken into account.     
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6. Raj & Thurston 
    (1996) 
 
 
Hang Seng Futures 







The same trading 
rules as in Brock et 
al. (1992), without 
1/150 and 2/200 








Without considering transaction costs, average buy returns generated 
from both trading systems were much higher than the unconditional one-
day mean.  In particular, the trading range breakout system generated 
significantly higher annual returns (457% to 781%) in four out of six 
rules relative to that (39%) of the B&H strategy.  On the other hand, 
average sell returns obtained from both systems were negative. 
 

















The same trading 









For moving average rules, each mean daily buy-sell return difference 
(0.081% and 0.097%) for 1935-54 and 1955-74 was much greater than 
corresponding unconditional mean returns (0.013% and 0%).  For the 
latest subperiod, 1975-94, however, the mean buy-sell difference was 
insignificantly different from the unconditional return.  Trading range 
breakout rules showed similar results.  None of simulated series 
generated by AR-ARCH bootstraps earned mean buy-sell differences 
larger than the actual difference.   
 
8. Bessembinder  














The same trading 
rules as in Brock et 
al. (1992) 
 









The DJIA data in this study includes dividend payments.  Over the full 
sample period, an average buy-sell return difference across all 26 trading 
rules was 4.7%, generating a break-even one-way transaction cost of 
0.39%.  However, break-even transaction costs have declined over time 
with 0.22% for the most recent subperiod (1976-91).  It was compared 
with an estimated transaction cost of 0.25%.   
 





















The same trading 
rules as in Brock et 
al. (1992) 
 










After transaction costs, technical trading rules outperformed the B&H 
strategy for all indices but U.S.  indices, and generated higher profits for 
emerging markets (Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan) than for developed 
markets.  The trading profits could not be explained by nonsynchronous 
trading.  However, some conditional asset pricing models (in particular, 
the asset pricing model under mild segmentation) were able to explain 
trading rule profits for Japan, the U.S., the second subperiod of Canada, 
and Taiwan stock indices.  These results suggest that technical trading 
profits were a fair compensation for risk of trading rules.    
 
10. LeBaron  




currencies from the 
London close: 
mark and yen 






















Mean returns of the trading rule for the two currencies were statistically 
significantly different from zero.  Their Sharpe ratios (0.60 to 0.98) were 
also higher than those (0.3 or 0.4) for the B&H on U.S.  stock portfolios 
even after adjustment for a transaction cost of 0.1% per round-trip.  In 
general, interest differentials and transaction costs did not alter the result 
greatly.  However, trading returns were dramatically reduced when 
active intervention periods of the Federal Reserve were eliminated.   
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11. Ratner & Leal  
      (1999) 
 
 
10 equity indices in 
Asia and Latin 
America 






(1/50, 1/150, 5/150, 
1/200, and 2/200 
days with bands of 
zero and one 
standard deviation) 
 








After transaction costs, 21 out of 100 trading rules that were applied to 
the 10 indexes generated statistically significant returns (18.2% to 32.1% 
per year), with the profitability concentrated in four markets: Mexico, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines.  When statistical significance was 
ignored, however, 82 out of the 100 rules appeared to have forecasting 
ability in emerging markets.   
 
12. Coutts &  
      Cheung   
      (2000) 
 
Hang Seng Index 







The same trading 









Across all trading rules tested, buy (sell) signals generated significantly 
higher (lower) mean returns than unconditional mean returns.  In 
particular, buy (sell) signals of the trading range breakout system earned 
substantial average 10-day cumulative return of 1.6% (-5%), which was 
higher (lower) than that of the moving average system. 
 
13. Parisi &  
      Vasquez  










The same trading 











Across trading rules, mean returns on buy signals were consistently 
higher than those on sell signals or unconditional mean returns.  In fact, 
sell signals yielded negative mean returns for most trading rules.  
Although variable-length moving average rules generated significant 
returns, it was unlikely that these rules were profitable if high transaction 
costs were taken into account.    
 
14. Raj (2000) 
 
 
Yen and mark 











average, and channel 
 






None of technical trading rules except one rule (2/200 moving average 
rule with a 1% band) generated statistically significant returns after 
adjustment for transaction costs and risk.  However, some trading rules 
appeared to produce economically significant returns.  For instance, for 
the mark a 1/50 moving average rule with a 1% band generated a risk-
adjusted net return of 8.8% over the two-year period.   
 
15. Gunasekarage  
      & Power  
      (2001) 
 











(1/50, 1/100, 1/150, 
1/200, 2/100, 2/150, 
2/200, 5/200, and 
1/50 with 1% band) 
 
Buy & hold 
 
Not adjusted  
 
For variable moving average rules, buy signals generated positive 
returns of more than 44.2% per year and sell signals generated negative 
returns of less than -20.8% per year.  These returns, on average, were 
significantly different from the B&H returns.  Similar results were 
obtained for fixed-length moving average rules with 10-day holding 
periods.   
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16. Day & Wang  










(1/50 and 1/150 days 
with 0 and 1% 
bands) and 
trading range 
breakout (50 and 150 
days with 0 and 1% 
bands) 
 






Variable-length moving average rules generated daily excess returns of 
more than 0.027% over the B&H strategy for 1962-86, and all the 
returns were statistically significant.  For closing levels of the DJIA that 
were estimated to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading, the 
trading rules also outperformed the B&H, although returns were reduced 
relative to previous ones and not all were statistically significant.  For 
1987-96, however, the performance of the trading rules was inferior to 
the B&H strategy in most cases.   
 
17. Kwon & Kish  

















combination of   
moving average and 
momentum,  
and combination of 
moving averages for 








Combination moving average rules of price and volume generated the 
highest daily average return of 0.13% over the full sample period.  
Across all subperiods but the recent 1985-96 period, returns of the 
trading system were statistically significantly different from 
unconditional mean returns.  Similar results were obtained for the other 
two trading systems.  Simulated series from three popular models 
(random walk, GARCH-M, and GARCH-M with instrument variable) 
could not explain returns and volatility of the technical trading systems.    
 
18. Neely (2002) 
 
4 foreign exchange 
rates: mark, yen, 
Swiss franc, and 
Australia dollar 













With daily data, the moving average rule generated positive annual mean 
returns for all series ranging from 2.4% for the Australian dollar to 8.7% 
for the yen.  However, when intervention periods of central banks were 
removed, the trading rule returns were greatly reduced, ranging from –
2.3% to 4.5%.  With intra-daily data, the highest US, Swiss, and German 
excess returns appeared to precede business hours and thus precede 
intervention.  Hence, intervention was less likely to be a cause that 
generated trading rule profits. 
 




exchange rate in 






Moving average  








Moving average rules below 170 days earned positive net returns.  
Bootstrapping simulations based on a random walk with drift and a 
GARCH model could not account for the size of trading rule returns.  
Moving average rules appeared to be highly profitable on days when 
central banks intervened.  However, since trading rule returns in periods 
that neither coincided with nor were preceded by interventions were also 
sizable, interventions did not seem to be the only cause of the trading 
rule profitability.   
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Markets considered  


















20. Fang & Xu 














time series models, 
and 
combination of 
moving average and 
time series models 
 





When the market was bullish (bearish), technical trading rules performed 
in general better (worse) than trading strategies based on time series 
models.  When a monthly interest rate of 0.30% was assumed over the 
full sample period, combination rules produced average break-even 
transaction costs of about 1.01%, 1.96%, and 1.76% for the Industrial, 
Transportation, and Utilities Averages, respectively, with non-
synchronous trading adjustment.  These figures appeared to be 
substantial improvement on those of moving average rules (0.60%, 
0.84%, and 0.80%, respectively).   
 





















During the 1980-94 period, moving average rules generated statistically 
and economically significant returns.  Positive but insignificant returns 
after 1995 seemed to be related with a decrease in central bank 
intervention activities.  Transaction costs did not affect technical trading 
returns except for a few short-term trading rules.  Over the 1980-98 
period, annualized Sharpe ratios for a 150-day trading rule and investing 
in the S&P500 were 0.65 and 0.49, respectively.  However, a 
preliminary analysis using an international CAPM indicated that the 
hypothesis that there was a time-varying risk premium in the technical 
trading returns correlated with central bank interventions could not be 
rejected. 
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Markets considered  




















1. Neely, Weller,   
    & Dittmar          




6 exchange rates: 
mark, yen, pound, 
Swiss franc, and 











100 trading rules 


















Out-of-sample, genetic trading rules generated positive mean excess 
returns after transaction costs for every currency tested.  The mean 
excess return across all currencies was 2.9% per year, being higher than 
the B&H return (0.6%).  Since betas for these trading rule returns against 
various world market indices were negative, the excess returns did not 
seem to be compensation for bearing systematic risk.  In addition, the 
superior performance of trading rules could not be explained by standard 
statistical models such as a random walk, ARMA, and ARMA-GARCH. 
 
2. Allen &  
    Karjalainen  











100 trading rules 













After considering reasonable one-way transaction costs of 0.25%, 
average excess returns of optimal trading rules were negative for 9 of 10 
out-of-sample periods.  Even after transaction costs of 0.1%, average 
excess returns were negative for 6 out of the 10 periods.  In most 
periods, only a few trading rules indicated positive excess returns.  
Overall, genetically formulated trading rules did not generate excess 
returns over the B&H strategy after transaction costs. 
 
3. Fyfe, Marney,  
    & Tarbert  











The fittest trading 
rule generated by 
genetic programming 
during an in-sample 
period 
 








Although an optimal trading rule performed well during the out-of-
sample period, it appeared to have a similar structure to the B&H 
strategy.  When the optimal trading rule was applied to price series 
bootstrapped by three popular statistical models (a random walk, AR (1), 
AR (1)–ARCH (3)), only the AR (1) model explained about 40% of the 
original excess trading returns.   
 
4. Neely & Weller  

















100 trading rules 
generated by genetic 
programming, 
moving average 
(1/10, 1/50, 5/10, and 
5/50 days), and filter 
(0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2%) 
 














During the out-of-sample period, annual mean excess returns averaged 
across 100 rules after transaction costs were positive for all four 
currencies, ranging 0.1% for the mark/guilder to 2.8% for the 
mark/pound.  In contrast, moving average rules and filter rules generated 
annual mean excess returns of -0.1% and -0.2% across all currencies, 
respectively.  There was no evidence that the excess returns to genetic 
trading rules were compensation for bearing systematic risk. 
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Markets considered  
























S&P Index and 






10 trading rules 



















For S&P futures, 36 out of 120 trading rules over the entire sample 
period outperformed the B&H strategy in terms of net returns.  However, 
the results varied from year-to-year.  Similar results were found when 
both S&P spot and futures markets were simultaneously considered for 
trading.  When risk-adjusted returns were assessed, 57 out of 120 rules 
beat the B&H strategy.  Although the performance of trading rules was 
still inconsistent over sample periods, more than 40% of the rules 
appeared to have some market-timing capability.     
 
6. Neely &   
    Weller (2001) 
 
4 foreign exchange 
rates: mark, yen, 











100 trading rules 


















Over the period 1981-92, intervention information from the Fed 
substantially improved the profitability of optimal trading rules for 
pound and Swiss franc.  For example, the median portfolio rule 
increased annual excess returns from 0.5% to 7.2% per year for the 
pound.  In contrast, over the 1993-98 period, intervention information 
decreased the profitability of trading rules for all currencies but the 
mark.  Thus, intervention activity did not seem to be a general source of 
profits for technical traders.    
 
7. Korczak &  
    Roger (2002) 
 
 
24 stocks of the 
CAC40 Index of 


























Out-of-sample results indicated that genetic trading rules outperformed 
both B&H strategies in 9 out of 10 cases.  Although newly generated 
trading rules performed well over time and relative to the old rules, all 
rules showed good and stable performance over the out-of-sample 
periods.  No trading rule consistently performed better than others.   
 

















trading rules and 4 
moving average rules 
from Brock et al. 
(1992)  
 











Moving average rules generated positive excess returns after transaction 
costs for the period 1963-86, although they yielded negative excess 
returns for the period 1987-2000.  However, because moving average 
rules performed poorly from 1939-62, they were less likely to be chosen 
by traders at the beginning of 1963.  In fact, every genetic trading rule 
created over the period 1957-60 outperformed the moving average rules.  
Similar results were found for the period 1987-2000.  Hence, Ready 
concluded that Brock et al.’s (1992) results for the period 1963-86 were 
spurious.     
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Markets considered  




















9. Neely (2003)  
 
 






10 trading rules 













During in-sample periods, genetic trading rules generated an about 5% 
annual mean excess return over the B&H strategy.  During out-of-
sample periods, however, genetic trading rules generated negative mean 
excess returns over the B&H strategy.  The risk-adjusted performance 
based on several risk-adjusted return measures was inferior to that of the 
B&H strategy.  In addition, trading rules optimized by various risk-
adjusted criteria also failed to outperform the B&H strategy. 
 
10. Neely &  
      Weller  
      (2003) 
 
4 foreign exchange 
rates: mark, yen, 







25 trading rules 
generated by genetic 
programming for 














There was strong evidence of predictability in exchange rate series tested 
because genetically trained trading rules yielded annual returns of over 
100% with zero transaction costs in 3 of the 4 cases.  However, under 
realistic trading hours and transaction costs (0.025%), genetic trading 
rules realized break-even transaction costs of less than 0.02% per one-
way trade in all the exchange rates but the pound.  Moreover, genetic 
trading rules appeared to be inferior to the autoregressive linear 
forecasting model in most cases, although their performances were not 
much different.   
 
11. Roberts  











The best of ten rules 
optimized during 
each in-sample 

















Although genetically trained rules produced positive mean net returns 
only for wheat futures in out-of-sample tests, only trading rules that use 
the ratio of profit to maximum drawdown as a performance measure 
generated a statistically significant mean daily net profit of $0.93 per 
contract.  This was compared to the B&H profit of -$3.30 per contract.  
For corn and soybean futures, however, genetic trading rules produced 
both negative mean returns and negative ratios of profit to maximum 
drawdown during the sample period. 
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Markets considered  




















1. Sullivan,  
    Timmermann, 




















average, support and 
resistance, channel 
breakout, on-balance 













During the 1897-96 period, the best rule in terms of mean return was a 5-
day moving average that produced an annual mean return of 17.2% with 
a data snooping adjusted p-value of zero.  The corresponding break-even 
transaction cost was 0.27% per trade.  The best rule in terms of the 
Sharpe ratio generated a value of 0.82 with a Bootstrap Reality Check p-
value of zero, while the B&H strategy generated a Sharpe ratio of 0.034.  
However, during the 1987-96 period, the 5-day moving average rule 
earned a mean return of 2.8% per year with a nominal p-value of 0.32.  
Moreover, in the S&P 500 futures market, the best rule generated a mean 
return of 9.4% per year with a Bootstrap Reality Check p-value of 0.90, 
implying that the return resulted from data snooping. 
 
2. Qi & Wu 
(2002) 
 
7 foreign exchange 
rates: mark, yen, 
pound, lira, French 




















During the sample period, the best trading rules, which are mostly 
moving average rules and channel breakout rules, produced positive 
mean excess returns over the buy-and-hold benchmark across all 
currencies and had significant data snooping adjusted p-values for the 
Canadian dollar, the Italian lira, the French franc, the British pound, and 
the Japanese yen.  The mean excess returns were economically 
substantial (7.2% to 12.2%) for all the five currencies except for the 
Canadian dollar (3.6%), even after adjustment for transaction costs of 
0.04% per one-way transaction.  In addition, the excess returns could not 
be explained by systematic risk.  Similar results were found for the 
Sharp ratio criterion, and the overall results appeared robust to 
incorporating transaction costs into the general trading model, changes 
in a vehicle currency, and changes in the smoothing parameter in the 
stationary bootstrap procedure.   
 
3. Sullivan,  
    Timmermann, 


















Sullivan et al. (1999) 
and calendar 
frequency trading 
rules from Sullivan 
et al. (2001) 
 






For the full sample period (1897-1998), the best of the combined 
universe of trading rules, a 2-day-on-balance volume strategy, generated 
a mean return of 17.1% on DJIA data with a data snooping adjusted p-
value of zero, and outperformed the B&H strategy (a mean return of 
4.8%).  For a recent period (1987-96), the best rule, a week-of-the-month 
strategy, produced a mean return of 17.3% slightly higher than the B&H 
return (13.6%), but the return was not statistically significant (p-value of 
0.98).  Similar results were found for the S&P 500 futures data.  
Although the best rule (a mean return of 10.7%) outperformed the 
benchmark (mean return of 8.0%) during the 1984-96 period, the data 
snooping adjusted p-value was 0.99.   
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Table 7  Summary of chart pattern studies published between 1988 and 2004 
 
 




Markets considered  




















1. Curcio,  
    Goodhart,  
    Guillaume,  
    & Payne  




yen, and pound 










minimum of the 
support and low and 
maximum of the 
resistance and high, 
and max-min  
 





Across exchange rates tested, the results of the earlier sample period 
indicated that only 4 of 36 buy and sell rules yielded statistically 
significant positive returns after transaction costs.  Max-min rules 
showed even worse performance.  For the later period, 10 rules had 
positive returns but 14 rules produced significantly negative returns.  
Max-min rules all realized negative returns.          
 
2. Caginalp &  
    Laurent  
    (1998) 
 
 
All world equity 
closed end funds 
listed in Barron’s 





















Candlestick reversal patterns appeared to have statistically significant 
short-term predictive power for price movements.  Each of the patterns 
generated substantial profits in comparison to an average gain for the 
same holding period.  For the S&P 500 stocks, down-to-up reversal 
patterns produced an average return of 0.9% during a two-day holding 
period (annually 309% of the initial investment).  The profit per trade 
ranged from 0.56%-0.76% even after adjustment for commissions and 
bid-ask spreads on a $100,000 trade, so that the initial investment was 
compounded into 202%-259% annually.   
 
3. Chang &  





6 spot currencies: 
yen, mark, pound, 
Canadian dollar, 








moving average (1/5, 
1/20, 5/20, 5/50, and 
20/50 days), and 
momentum (5-, 20-, 
and 50-day lags) 
 







Head-and-shoulders rules earned substantial returns for the mark and yen 
but not for other currencies.  Profits for the mark and yen were around 
13% and 19% per year, respectively, with being higher than the 
corresponding B&H returns or U.S.  equity yields.  These results were 
evident even after adjusting for transaction costs, risk, or interest 
differentials.  However, moving average rules and momentum rules 
appeared to have significant predictive power for all six currencies.  
Moreover, they easily outperformed head-and-shoulders rules in terms of 
total profits and Sharpe ratios. 
 
4. Guillaume  















4 trading range 
breakouts with a 
0.1% band 
 





For the first sample period, several trading rules generated statistically 
significant net profits, particularly, in trending markets such as the 
yen/dollar market.  For the second period, however, none of the trading 
rules produced significant net profits, even in trending markets.  In 
general, support-resistance rules performed better than Max-Min rules 
used in Brock et al. (1992). 
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Table 7 continued. 
 
 




Markets considered  




















5. Lo,  
    Mamaysky,  
    & Wang  















tops and bottoms 
(T&B), triangle 
T&B, rectangle 









Pattern-recognition algorithms were used to detect 10 chart patterns in 
price series smoothed by using non-parametric kernel regressions.  The 
results of goodness-of-fit and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that, 
in many cases, return distributions conditioned on technical patterns 
were significantly different from unconditional return distributions, 
especially, for the Nasdaq stocks.  This suggests that technical patterns 
may provide some incremental information for stock investment, even if 
they may not be used to generate excess trading profits. 
 






3 foreign exchange 
rates: mark, yen, 















“Bounce frequency” of support and resistance levels for each currency 
published by six firms was compared to that of artificial support and 
resistance levels.  Results indicated that trends in intra-daily exchange 
rates were interrupted at the published support and resistance levels 
more frequently than at the artificial ones.  The results were consistent 
across all three exchange rates and all six firms, although the predictive 
power of the published support and resistance levels varied.  Moreover, 
the results were statistically significant and robust to alternative 
parameterizations.   
 
7. Leigh, Paz,  
    & Purvis  










Bull flag charting 
patterns 
 




Across all parameter combinations considered, trading rule returns in 
excess of the B&H strategy were positive for all forecasting horizons 
(10, 20, 40, and 80 days).  Moreover, results of linear regression 
analyses indicated that trading rule parameters had predictive value for 
both price level and future price direction.   
 
8. Leigh, 
    Modani, 
    Purvis, &  
    Roberts  










Two bull flag 
patterns with trading 
volume (a buy 
position is held for 
100 days) 
 






During the out-of-sample period, patterns outperformed the B&H 
strategy.  The first and the second bull flag patterns with trading volume 
generated statistically significant mean returns of 14.0% (with 55 buy 
signals) and 8.6% (with 132 buy signals) for 100-day holding period, 
respectively, while the B&H strategy profited 5.5%.   
 













The same patterns as 
in Lo et al. (2000) 
 





This study replicates Lo et al.’s (2000) procedure on UK data.  Results 
were similar to Lo et al.’s finding.  The results of goodness-of-fit and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that return distributions 
conditioned on technical patterns were significantly different from the 
corresponding unconditional distributions.  However, across all technical 
patterns and sample periods, an average market adjusted return turned 
out to be negative. 
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Table 7 continued. 
 
 




Markets considered  




















10. Lucke  
      (2003) 
 
Dollar, mark, 













In general, head-and-shoulders rules failed to generate positive mean 
returns for all holding periods (1 to 15 days) except a one-day holding 
period.  In addition, it appeared that trading rule profits were not 
correlated with central bank intervention.   
 









1451 stocks listed 







(HS)and inverse HS 
(HIS), broadening 
tops (BT) and 
bottoms (BB), 
triangle tops (TT) 
and bottoms (TB), 
rectangle tops (RT) 
and bottoms (RB) 
 









To reflect the uncertainty of human perception and reasoning, fuzzy 
logic were incorporated into the definition of well-known technical 
patterns.  For all stocks tested, the HS, HIS, RT, and RB patterns 
generated significant cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of around 3% 
for 120 days.  For stocks trading above $2.00, however, the significance 
of CARs dramatically reduced or disappeared.  The effect of small 
trading prices was more severe for NASDAQ stocks.  For the HS, IHS, 
and RB patterns, the fuzzy logic-based algorithm appeared to detect 
subtly different post-pattern performances between two portfolios with 
different pattern membership values.  The results for four subperiods 
indicated that for the RT pattern the post-pattern performances of two 
portfolios with different membership values were significantly different 
in the first three subperiods from 1962 through 1990.  This may imply 
that stock markets have been efficient after the early 1990s.   
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Table 8  Summary of nonlinear technical analysis studies published between 1988 and 2004 
 
 




Markets considered  




















1. Gençay  











each of 6 
sub-samples) 
 
Trading rules based 
on a feedforwad 
network model 
 











Trading signals as a function of past returns were generated by a 
feedforward network, which is a class of artificial neural networks.  
Across subperiods, net returns of technical trading rule (7% to 35%) 
dominated those of the B&H strategy (-20% to 17%).  Sharpe ratio tests 
indicated similar results.  Correct sign predictions for the recommended 
positions ranged from 57% to 61% for all subperiods. 
 
2. Gençay 



















Trading rules based 













In terms of forecast improvement measured by the mean square 
prediction error (MSPE), non-linear models (feedforward network 
models) using past buy-sell signals from moving average rules (1/50 and 
1/200) as regressors outperformed linear specifications such as the OLS, 
GARCH-M (1,1), and a feedforward network regression with past 
returns.  For 14 of 22 subperiods, the nonlinear models generated at least 
10% forecast improvement over the benchmark model.  The model with 
a 1/50 moving average rule provided more accurate out-of-sample 
predictions relative to one with a 1/200 rule. 
 
3. Gençay &  















(Last 1/3 of 
the data set 
for each of 6 
sub-samples) 
 
Trading rules based 













Overall non-linear models (feedforward network models) outperformed 
linear models (OLS and GARCH-M (1,1)) in terms of MSPEs and sign 
predictions.  The non-linear models with lagged returns generated an 
average of 2.5% forecast improvement over the benchmark model with 
lagged returns.  This prediction power improved as large as 9.0% for the 
non-linear models in which past buy-sell signals of a moving average 
rule (1/200) were used as regressors.  In particular, when the non-linear 
model included a 10-day volume average indicator as an additional 
regressor, it produced an average of 12% forecast gain over the 
beanchmark and provided much higher correct sign predictions (an 
average of 62%) than other models.      
 
4. Gençay    
    (1999) 
 
 
5 spot exchange 
rates: pound, mark, 
yen, France franc, 





(Last 1/3 of 
the data set) 
 
Trading rules based 
on a feedforwad 
network model and 












Nonlinear models such as the nearest neighbors and the feedforward 
network regressions with past buy-sell signals from moving average 
rules (1/50 and 1/200) outperformed a random walk and a GARCH (1,1) 
model in terms of sign predictions and mean square prediction errors.  
For example, average correct sign prediction of the nearest neighbors 
model was 62% for the five currencies.  Models with a 1/50 moving 
average rule provided more accurate predictions over models with a 
1/200 rule.   
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Table 8 continued. 
 
 




Markets considered  





















    Rodríguez,  
    González- 
    Martel, &  
    Sosvilla- 
    Rivero (2000) 
 
The General Index 
of the Madrid 
Stock Market 








A trading rule based 
on a feedforwad 
network model 
 









In terms of gross returns, a trading rule based on a feedforwad network 
model dominated the B&H strategy for two subperiods, while the 
opposite was true for most recent subperiods in which there exists 
upwards trend.  Correct sign predictions for the recommended positions 
ranged from 54-58%, indicating better performance than a random walk 
forecast.    
 
6. Sosvilla- 
    Rivero,  
    Andrada- 
    Félix,  
    & Fernández- 
    Rodríguez  
    (2002) 
 





A trading rule based 
on the nearest 
neighbor regression 
 







Trading rule generated net returns of 35% and 28% for the mark and 
yen, respectively, and outperformed B&H strategies that yielded net 
returns of -1.4% and -0.4%, respectively.  Correct sign predictions for 
recommended positions were 53% and 52% for the mark and yen, 
respectively, beating a random walk directional forecast.  However, 
when excluding days of US intervention, net returns from the trading 
strategy substantially decreased    (-10% and -28% for the mark and yen, 
respectively) and were less than the B&H returns in both cases.   
 
7. Fernández- 
    Rodríguez,  
    Sosvilla- 
    Rivero, &   
    Andrada-Félix  
    (2003) 
 









Trading rules based 
on the nearest 
neighbor (NN) and 
the simultaneous NN 
regressions and 
moving averages 
(1/50, 1/150, 1/200, 











For most exchange rates, annual mean returns from nonlinear trading 
rules based on the nearest neighbor or the simultaneous nearest neighbor 
regressions were superior to those of moving average rules.  The 
nonlinear trading rules also generated statistically significant annual net 
returns of 1.5%-20.1% for the Danish krona, French franc, Dutch 
guilder, and Italian lira.  Similar results were found for the Sharp ratio 
criterion.  The nonlinear trading strategies generated the highest Sharpe 
ratios in 8 out of the 9 cases.      99 
Table 9  Summary of other technical analysis studies published between 1988 and 2004 
 
 




Markets considered  




















1. Pruitt &  
    White (1988) 
 
204 stocks from the 












Moving Average)  
 
Buy & hold 
 
0 to 2% per 
round-trip  
 
After 2% transaction costs and across various return-generating models, 
the CRISMA system yielded annual excess returns ranging from 6.1% to 
15.1% and beat the B&H or market index strategy.  The system also 
generated a much greater percentage of profitable trading successes after 
transaction costs than would be expected by chance.    
 
2. Schulmeister  








momentum, point & 
figure, combination 
of moving average & 
momentum 
 






All trading rules considered produced substantial annual returns up to 
16%.  The combination system performed best.  The probability of an 
overall loss appeared to be less than 0.005% when one of the trading 
rules was followed blindly during the 1973-86 period. 
 
3. Sweeney  












0.5% filter rule 
 
Buy & hold 
 
From 0.05% 




During the 1970-82 period, for 11 of 14 stocks that had earned profits 
before commissions in Fama and Blume’s (1966) study, a 0.5% filter 
rule produced statistically significant annual mean returns after 
adjustment for transaction costs of 0.1%.  For an equally weighted 
portfolio of 14 stocks, the filter rule generated a mean net return of 
10.3% per year.  Portfolio returns appeared to be robust across several 
subsamples but were quite sensitive to transaction costs.   
 
4. Taylor (1988) 
 
Treasury bond 






trend model based on 
ARMA(1,1) 
 





All four trading rules generated positive average excess returns ranging 
from 4.4% to 6.8% per year and were superior to the B&H strategy.  
However, t-test results indicated that none of the returns was 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  In addition, the B&H 
strategy performed better than each trading rule from 1982-87.   
 
5. Pruitt &  
    White (1989) 
 
In-the-money call 
options written on 















After transaction costs, the CRISMA system generated a mean return of 
12.1% per round trip.  In fact, 71.3% of the 171 transactions were 
profitable after adjustment for transaction costs.  The binomial 
proportionality test statistics showed that the trading profitability could 
not be achieved by chance.   
 


















This study showed that moving average rules were one of the few 
statistically well-defined procedures.  Trading signals of a 150-day 
moving average rule were incorporated into a dummy variable in an 
autoregression equation.  F-test results on the variable were insignificant 
for 1795-1910 but highly significant for 1911-76, indicating some 
predictive power of the moving average rule. 
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Table 9 continued. 
 
 




Markets considered  




















7. Corrado &  




120 stocks from the 
Dow Jones and 



















The own-stock filter rule generated an equally-weighted mean portfolio 
return of 30.8% per year during the sample period, while the B&H 
strategy yielded a mean portfolio return of 11.3% per year.  This 
difference between the returns made an annual gross margin of 6.4% 
over the B&H strategy after transaction costs.    
 
8. Pruitt, Tse, &  
    White (1992) 
 
148 stocks and  
in-the-money call 
options written on 
the 126 target 
stocks 




















For stocks, the CRISMA system generated annualized excess returns of 
between 1.0% and 5.2% after transaction costs of 2% and outperformed 
the B&H or market index strategy.  For options, the system generated 
highly significant returns of 11.0% per option trade after transaction 
costs, with 63.5% of all trades being profitable.    
 















(10, 20, and 50 days) 
 




In general, moving average rules performed well.  In particular, an 
MA10 (a 10-day moving average) bullish signal, an MA20 bullish 
signal, and an MA50 bearish signal generated statistically significant 
excess returns over the B&H strategy.  It appeared that for buy (sell) 
signals, prices declines (rises) slowly in the early pre-event period and 
rises (declines) sharply in the late pre-event period.  Prices continued to 
rise (declines) slowly in the post-event period for buy (sell) signals. 
 
10. Cheung & 
      Wong  











(0.5, 1, and 1.5%) 
 
Buy & hold 
 






When transaction costs and risk were adjusted, filter rules generated 
superior excess returns over the B&H strategy only for the Taiwan 
dollar.  Filter rules were inferior to the B&H strategy in the cases of the 
yen and Singapore dollar.  Both filter rule and B&H strategies failed to 
generate significant excess returns on the Malaysian ringgit.   
 
11. Irwin,  
      Zulauf,  
     Gerlow, &  




soybean meal, and 
soybean oil 


















During the out-of-sample period, the channel system generated 
statistically significant mean returns ranging 5.1%-26.6% for all 
markets.  The ARIMA models also produced statistically significantly 
positive returns (16.5%) for soybean meal, but significantly negative 
returns (-13.5%) for soybeans.  For every market, the channel system 
beat the ARIMA models. 
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Table 9 continued. 
 
 




Markets considered  

































Filter (0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 
2.5, and 3%) and 
moving average 
(1/10, 1/50, 5/10, and 
5/50 days) 
 
Buy & hold 






Technical trading rules showed positive net returns in 38 of the 40 cases.  
In general, moving average rules performed slightly better than filter 
rules.  Moreover, the trading profits were not likely to be compensation 
for bearing risk.  For example, for the mark, every moving average rule 
beat the B&H strategy of the S&P 500 Index in terms of the Sharpe 
ratio.  The CAPM betas from the trading rules also generally indicated 
negative correlation with the S&P 500 monthly returns.    
 
13. Goldbaum  






U.S. T-Bills, a 
value-weighted 
market portfolio of 
all the NYSE and 
AMEX securities 
from the CRSP, 






(1/50, 1/200, 5/50, 
and 5/200 days with 







As a performance measure, the price error between assets was estimated 
using the nonparametric stochastic discount factor (SDF), which was 
either conditioned or unconditioned on public information (e.g.  term 
structure).  For the market portfolio returns, moving average rules 
generally had unconditional estimates that were significantly positive or 
close to zero and conditional estimates that were negative or close to 
zero, implying a negative performance of the trading rules to an 
informed trader.  For IBM stock returns, however, the conditional 
estimates on the term structure were significantly different from zero.   
 
14. Marsh  
      (2000) 
 
 
3 IMM currency 
futures: mark, yen, 
and pound sterling 








Markov models and 
moving average rules 











Before transaction costs, all moving average rules tested yielded positive 
returns for both 1981-85 and 1986-90, but the rules generated positive 
returns only in 3 out of 9 cases for 1991-95.  For out-of-sample periods, 
Markov models also generated positive returns in 2 out of 6 cases.  
Augmented Markov models, in which interest differentials were 
included, produced substantially positive returns for all 3 currency 
futures during 1986-90 but only for the yen during 1991-95.     
 
15. Dewachter  







4 foreign exchange 
rates: mark, yen, 






(1/30) with a 5-day 
holding period,  
Markov model and 
its ARMA (1,1) 
representation as the 








Across exchange rates, the moving average rule produced a statistically 
significant average return of about 6% per year and the correct sign 
prediction of about 55%.  The extended Markov switching model and 
the ARMA (1,1) representation of the Markov switching model showed 
even better performance in terms of profits and sign prediction.  The 
results of Monte Carlo simulations indicated that the Markov model 
could replicate the observed profitability of the moving average rule.   
 
16. Wong,  
      Manzur, &  





















In general, every trading system tested produced statistically significant 
returns over all three subperiods and a whole period.  Single moving 
average rules generated the best results, followed by dual moving 
average crossover rules and relative strength index rules.   
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Table 10  The profitability of technical trading strategies in modern studies (1988-2004) 
 
The number of studies   
Studies 
Positive  Mixed  Negative 
Net profit range 
 (Out-of-sample period) 
 
Comments 
A. Stock markets 
     
Standard  1  0  3 
Model-based Bootstrap  7  2  3 
Genetic programming  2  1  3 
Reality Check  0  1  1 
Chart patterns  5  0  1 
Nonlinear  3  0  1 
Others  8  1  0 





• For the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) data, which was most 
frequently tested in the literature, results varied considerably depending on the 
testing procedure adopted.  In general, technical trading strategies were 
profitable until the late 1980s.  However, technical trading strategies were no 
longer economically profitable thereafter. 
• Overall, variable-moving average rules showed a quite reliable performance 
for the stock market over time. 
• For several non-US stock markets (e.g., Mexico, Taiwan, and Thailand), 
moving average rules generated large annual net profits of 10% to 30% until 
the mid-1990s.   
 
B. Currency markets 
     
Standard  7  3  3 
Model-based bootstrap  6  0  1 
Genetic programming  3  0  1 
Reality Check  1  0  0 
Chart patterns  2  0  3 
Nonlinear  3  0  0 
Others  3  1  1 






• Many studies investigated major foreign currency futures contracts traded on 
the CME, i.e., the Deutsche mark, Japanese yen, British pound, and Swiss 
franc.   
 
• For major currencies, a wide variety of technical trading strategies, such as 
moving average, channel, filter, and genetically formulated trading rules, 
consistently generated economic profits until the early 1990s.   
 
• Several recent studies confirmed the result, but also reported that technical 
trading profits have declined or disappeared since the early 1990s, except for 
the yen market.   
 
C. Futures markets 
     
Standard  5  0  1 
Model-based bootstrap  1  0  1 
Genetic programming  0  1  0 
Others  1  0  1 







• Technical trading strategies generated economic profits in futures markets 
from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s.  In particular, technical trading 
strategies were consistently profitable in most currency futures markets, while 
they appeared to be unprofitable in livestock futures markets.    
 
• Channel rules and moving average rules were the most consistent profitable 
strategies.   
 
• After the mid-1980s, the profitability of technical trading strategies for 
overall futures markets were not investigated comprehensively yet. 
Total  58  10  24     
a This is a break-even one-way transaction cost of a 5/200 moving average rule, which was optimized by using the DJIA data from 1897 to 1968 (Taylor 2000).
 
 